Neil Breton v. Clyde, Snow and Sessions : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2011
Neil Breton v. Clyde, Snow and Sessions : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Max D. Wheeler; Keith A. Call; Snow Christensen and Martineau; Attorneys for Appellees/
Defendants Clyde, Snow and Sessions and Hal Swenson.
Jeffrey R. Orbitt; Eisenberg Gilchrist and Cutt; Attorneys for Appellant./Plaintiff Neil Breton.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Neil Breton v. Clyde, Snow & Sessions, No. 20110996 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2996
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NEIL BRETON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CLYDE, SNOW & SESSIONS, a Utah 
professional corporation, and HAL 
SWENSON, an individual, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Appellate Case No. 20110996-CA 
Trial Court No.090919546 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE JUDGE ANTHONY QUINN, PRESIDING 
Max D. Wheeler (3439) 
Keith A. Call (6708) 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
(801)521-9000 
Jeffrey R. Oritt (2478) 
EISENBERG GILCHRIST & CUTT 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)366-9100 
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants 
Clyde, Snow & Sessions and 
Hal Swenson 
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiff 
Neil Breton 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
UTAH APPELUTE COURTS 
E3CD ft fi oh«* 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NEIL BRETON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
CLYDE, SNOW & SESSIONS, a Utah 
professional corporation, and HAL 
SWENSON, an individual, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Appellate Case No. 20110996-CA 
Trial Court No.090919546 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
HONORABLE JUDGE ANTHONY QUINN, PRESIDING 
Max D.Wheeler (3439) 
Keith A. Call (6708) 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
(801)521-9000 
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants 
Clyde, Snow & Sessions and 
Hal Swenson 
Jeffrey R. Oritt (2478) 
EISENBERG GILCHRIST & CUTT 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)366-9100 
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiff 
Neil Breton 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED FORREVIEW 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
ISSUE PRESERVATION 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 6 
I. The Underlying Case 6 
II. This Case 13 
III. The Trial Court's Ruling 14 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 16 
ARGUMENT 18 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND, AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, THAT A SUFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE BROKE 
THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION BETWEEN DEFENDANTS' 
NEGLIGENCE AND PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES 18 
A. Legal Standard for Causation in a Legal Malpractice Case 18 
B. Intervening Cause 19 
C. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
Neil's payment of $24,000 each to 12 beneficiaries broke 
the chain of causation between Defendants' negligence and 
Neil's damages 20 
CONCLUSION 23 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(f)(1) 24 
ADDENDUM 25 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Butterfieldv. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992) 18 
Christensen & Jensen, PC v. Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, 194 P.3d 931 18 
Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420,413 P. 2d 807 (Utah 1966) . . . 1 
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P. 2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977) 2 
Griswoldv. Snow Christensen & Martineau, 2010 WL 4180597 (D.Utah) *3 18 
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996) 22,23 
Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P. 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975) 1 
Iacono v. Hicken, 2011 UT App 377 18 
Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein & Felding, 909 P.2d 1283(Ut. Ct. App. 1996) . . . . 2, 17, 18,19 
McCorvey v. UDOT, 868 P.2d 41,45 (Utah 1993) 18 
Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 42 P.3d 379, 385 (Utah 2002) 2 
Price v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc., 252 P.3d 365 
(Ut. Ct. App. 2011) 2 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 487-8 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1991) 19 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P. 2d 1178, 1181 (Utah 1993) 1 
Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardick, 2008 UT 15, % 19, 179 P. 3d 786 2 
Unigardlns. Co. v. City o/LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Utah 1984) 18 
Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC v. ASC Utah, Inc., 2011 UT App 425 If 8 3 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). The Utah 
Supreme Court transferred this matter to this Court pursuant to an order dated November 16, 
2011 and filed on November 17,2011. R. 946-7. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court commit reversible error in granting summary judgment to 
Defendants on the ground that Defendants' negligence was not a proximate cause of 
Plaintiffs damages? More specifically, was the chain of causation from Defendants' 
negligence to Plaintiffs damages broken by an intervening cause of Plaintiff s actions? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because the summary judgment procedure is "considered a drastic remedy requiring 
strict compliance with the rule authorizing it," Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P. 2d 1178,1181 (Utah 
1993), the contentions of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment must be 
considered in a light most advantageous to him "and all doubts resolved in favor of 
permitting him to go to trial. The motion can only be granted when, viewing the matter that 
way, no right to recovery could be established." Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 
Utah 2d 420, 413 P. 2d 807, 809 (Utah 1966). Only when it appears that "upon any view 
taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail.. .is 
the court justified in refusing such a party the opportunity of presenting his evidence and 
attempting to persuade the fact trier to his views." Holbrook Company v. Adams, 542 P. 2d 
191,193 (Utah 1975). 
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Any doubts should be resolved in allowing the nonmoving party "the opportunity of 
at least attempting to prove his right to recover." Durham v. Margetts, 571 P. 2d 1332,1334 
(Utah 1977). "A trial court is not authorized to weigh facts in deciding a summary judgment 
motion, but is only to determine whether a dispute of material fact exists, viewing the facts 
and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party." Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete County, 42 P.3d 379, 385 (Utah 2002) 
(citation, quotations, and parenthetical omitted). 
"[BJecause negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts, 
which is properly done by juries rather than judges, summary judgment is appropriate in 
negligence cases only in the clearest instances." Price v. Smith's Food and Drug Centers, 
Inc., 252 P.3d 365, 367 (Ut. Ct. App. 2011) (citation and quotations omitted). A trial court 
is precluded from granting summary judgment "if the facts shown by the evidence on a 
summary judgment motion support more than one plausible but conflicting inference on a 
pivotal issue in the case... particularly if the issue turns on credibility or if the inference is 
dependent upon subjective feelings or intent." Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardick, 
2008 UT 15, % 19, 179 P. 3d 786. (emphasis in the original) 
When reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, this Court will "not defer 
to the trial court's conclusion that facts are undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported 
by those facts." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Felding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1996) (citation and quotations omitted). This Court will "therefore review the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment for correctness." Id. (citation omitted). See also, WolfMountain 
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Resorts, LC v. ASC Utah, Inc., 2011 UT App 425 1f 8 (appellate court reviews trial court's 
'legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment' for 
correctness...)(citation omitted). 
ISSUE PRESERVATION 
Defendants' Motion, and then Renewed Motion, for Summary Judgment were fully 
briefed by Defendants and were opposed by Plaintiff. R. 210-402,403-405,414-416,417-
667,668-904,908-921. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Neil Breton ("Plaintiff or "Neil"), along with his brother and two sisters, 
were co-trustees of the Testamentary Grandchildren's Trust (the "GC Trust") of Saul Breton, 
their father, who died in the mid-1980's. The GC Trust was established but not funded in 
his will. The co-trustees had to resolve financial issues left by Saul Breton at the time of his 
death, and funded the Trust with certain assets from Saul Breton's businesses. For a variety 
of reasons, by the mid-1990's, the GC Trust was essentially without assets. Also during 
these years, there were intra-family disputes, including between the Plaintiff and his sister 
and brother-in-law, Rhonda and Mark Slater. In late Summer 2004, the Plaintiff, urged on 
by his sister Jana Hadany, attempted to end the family enmity. Plaintiff had set aside 
approximately $3 50,000 of his own money in an attempt to fulfill the wishes of his father and 
provide some money to each of the (by now) fifteen grandchildren, including the three sons 
of Rhonda and Mark Slater: Breton, Jordan, and Hayden (the "Slater Boys"). Plaintiff 
retained the Defendants to create a "Plan" whereby he could make gifts to the fifteen 
3 
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grandchildren/Trust beneficiaries out of his personal funds and at the same time try to resolve 
outstanding family issues. Plaintiff specifically told the Defendants that this needed to be 
a "all or nothing" Plan; in other words, unless all fifteen of the grandchildren agreed to the 
Plan, the Plan could not go forward. The Defendants drafted and sent to each of the 
beneficiaries a document entitled "Receipt and Release, Consent to Termination of the Trust 
by Sworn Statement" ("Receipt and Release"), in which each beneficiary agreed to accept 
$24,000 in return for releasing any potential claims the beneficiary thought he or she may 
have against the GC Trust and any of the co-trustees, and also agreed to release his or her 
interest in the GC Trust and allow the GC Trust to be terminated. However, the language in 
that document as drafted by the Defendants was not clear that if not all beneficiaries signed, 
there would be no deal. 
Twelve of the fifteen grandchildren agreed to sign a Receipt and Release and to 
receive a $24,000 payment each, but the Slater Boys initially held off. For several months, 
from December 2004 into mid-September of 2005, they repeatedly gave excuses to the 
Plaintiff (and to his brother and fellow co-trustee Willie Breton) that they were still thinking 
about the proposal, they thought they'd agree to it, they needed more information, they 
needed additional copies of the Plan documents. 
Meanwhile, in or about February of 2005, while waiting for the Slater Boys to make 
up their minds, having told the Defendants that 12 of the 15 beneficiaries had agreed to the 
Plan and that they wanted to pay each of them the $24,000, and having not been advised by 
the Defendants against any distribution to most but not all of the beneficiaries, the Plaintiff 
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distributed those funds to, and received signed releases from, the twelve non-Slater Boys 
beneficiaries. The Plaintiff held in reserve the $72,000 for the Slater Boys, hoping that an 
ongoing dialogue between them and Willie Breton would lead to their agreeing to the Plan. 
In July and August emails from Breton Slater to Willie Breton, Breton Slater said that 
he and his brothers had decided to accept the Plan. But then, in mid-September 2005, the 
Slater Boys rejected the proposed Plan, unless they were each paid almost three times as 
much as each of the other beneficiaries had been paid. The Plaintiff rejected that proposal. 
In late June, 2007, the Slater Boys sued Neil and Willie Breton in California, claiming 
breach of fiduciary duties and mismanagement of the GC Trust (they did not sue their mother 
or aunt, both of whom had been co-trustees of the Trust), asking for millions of dollars. 
Ultimately, the Plaintiff settled that litigation for a fraction of what the Slater Boys claimed, 
but still incurred approximately $900,000 in fees, costs, and settlement payments. 
Subsequently, the Plaintiff sued the Defendants for legal malpractice. After extensive fact 
discovery, the Defendants moved for summary judgment on the sole issue of causation. 
Defendants argued that their negligence was not a proximate cause of Plaintiffs 
damages, under four different theories. The Trial Court rejected three of the four theories, 
but agreed with Defendants that as a matter of law, Plaintiffs distribution of monies and 
obtaining releases from all of the beneficiaries except the Slater Boys, knowing that the 
Slater Boys could still sue him, broke the chain of causation from Defendants' negligence 
and was an independent and intervening cause of Plaintiff s damages. 
5 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
I. The Underlying Case 
L In 1981, Saul Breton executed his will, in which he purported to give the 
Trustee, in trust, $1,000,000.00 that would be held for the benefit of his grandchildren. The 
assets to fund this trust were undesignated in his will. R. 705. Saul's four children (Neil, 
Willie, Rhonda, and Jana) were named as co-trustees of the GC Trust. R. 474. 
2. At the time of Saul Breton's death, his estate had no cash, the assets that 
existed were not readily marketable, and the estate had a negative net worth. R. 711 at p. 
158; R. 817. The four co-trustees, following approval in 1986 by the California probate 
court, R. 792-814, distributed assets of stock, a small amount of cash, and various 
receivables and unsecured promissory notes to the GC Trust. Due to unforeseen market 
conditions in real estate and the apparel industry (Breton Industries' principal business), the 
large majority of the value of these assets was lost. R. 816-818. 
3. During the 1990's and into 2000 and beyond, the companies founded by Saul 
Breton, including Breton Industries, were caught up in years of litigation. Some of that 
litigation involved Rhonda Breton Slater and her husband, Mark Slater, the parents of the 
1
 Even though the Trial Court granted Defendants summary judgment on a very 
narrow issue, Plaintiffs Statement of Facts is lengthy in order for this Court to 
understand the context of the Trial Court's ruling, and also to understand the significant 
amount of genuine issues of material fact that not only led to the Trial Court denying the 
majority of Defendants' arguments, but which Plaintiff asserts shows why the Trial 
Court's ruling is in error. 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Slater Boys. R. 723-24 at pgs. 303-07. During that time period, Neil Breton, having 
purchased a judgment against Rhonda and Mark Slater, nonjudicially foreclosed on their 
house. After giving them every opportunity to pay the judgment and retain their house, Neil 
was rebuffed by the Slaters and he successfully completed the foreclosure. R. 706 at pgs. 
81-83. 
4. In 1998, the oldest Slater Boy, Breton Slater, graduated from high school and 
sent a letter to three of the four co-Trustees of the GC Trust (his mother Rhonda had resigned 
her co-trustee position in 1993), asking about whether there were Trust funds available for 
his use for college, and asked for an accounting of the GC Trust. R. 442. That led to 
correspondence between him and Neil Breton, including a letter from Neil outlining the 
history of the assets in the GC Trust and their decline. R. 816-818. Breton did not think that 
what Neil provided was a sufficient accounting, R. 444 f 13, but he did nothing further to 
obtain documentation or a more complete accounting from 1998 until he met with his uncle, 
Mike Rosson, in or about 2006 to discuss his concerns.. During those eight years he did not 
ask his mother, a former co-trustee, about the GC assets or for an accounting; he did not 
follow up with Neil Breton or any of the other co-trustees; and he did not consult with any 
attorney or accountant. R. 729, 731-2, 736 at pgs. 52, 62-5, 86-7. 
5. Notwithstanding that lack of information. Breton Slater concluded that the co-
trustees had mismanaged the GC Trust, breached their fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, 
and hid their malfeasance from the beneficiaries. R. 444 f 11. 
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6. In 2004, Neil retained the Defendants to advise him with respect to his role as 
co-trustee of the GC Trust and his desire to make gifts from his personal funds to the 
beneficiaries of the GC Trust, while resolving any outstanding issues and resolving any 
potential claims of those beneficiaries against the co-trustees of the Trust, and causing the 
termination of the GC Trust. R. 3 f 6. Neil decided to consult with the Defendants because 
he was being pressured by his brother Willie and sister Jana, on behalf of their mother, to try 
to obtain a global resolution of what had become bitter family issues. R. 708-09 at pgs. 120-
126. 
7. During his initial telephone conference with Defendant Hal S wenson, Neil told 
Swenson about the lengthy history of bad feelings between him and the Slater parents, the 
background of the family business litigation, the lack of value of the GC Trust, and how Neil, 
his brother Willie, and his sister Jana hoped, through the advice and work of the Defendants, 
to effect a global resolution of the family disputes and to fulfill the intent of his father Saul 
to have the (now) 15 grandchildren receive some money. R. 712-13 at pgs. 185-88; R. 773 
at pgs. 22-23. 
8. Neil provided to Defendants various documents relating to the GC Trust, 
including his father's will. Neil also provided information and documents to Defendants 
clearly demonstrating the family business litigation and the bitter feelings between Neil and 
his sister Rhonda Slater and her children, the Slater Boys. R. 3-4 % 7. 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9. Defendants drafted various documents and correspondence and sent a set of 
each to the co-trustees and the 15 beneficiaries of the GC Trust. The key document was 
titled "Receipt and Release, Consent to Termination of the Trust by Sworn Statement," in 
which each beneficiary was offered $24,000 in return for the beneficiary acknowledging 
"that the proposed payment of $24,000 from Neil Breton will be in full payment and 
satisfaction of the undersigned's interest in the Grandchildren's Trust." The Receipt and 
Release included a release of "Neil Breton, Jana Breton and William Breton, as Trustees of 
the Grandchildren's Trust, from any and all liability in connection with the undersigned's 
interest in the Grandchildren's Trust." R. 4 [^s 9-11; R. 505-06; Addendum 6 (exemplar 
of Receipt and Release). 
10. A letter dated December 10, 2004, drafted by Defendants, from Plaintiff and 
his brother William Breton to each of the co-trustees and their children, discussed the loss 
of the GC Trust assets and stated in pertinent part, "this letter will... propose a distribution 
of assets presently held outside of the testamentary trust that benefits Saul's grandchildren 
. . . Each payment would be conditioned upon each child and each grandchild (or such 
grandchild's legal guardian if under age 18) agreeing to the tennination of the 
Grandchildren's Trust and waiving claims against the Trustees of the Grandchildren's Trust." 
R. 501-03. (emphasis supplied). 
11. The Defendants drafted these documents with input from Neil and his brother 
Willie, but Neil relied upon Defendants to craft these legal documents and attendant 
9 
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correspondence with the most important goal of all in mind: to protect the three co-trustees, 
Neil, Willie, and Jana, from any subsequent litigation. He wanted this plan to be an "all or 
nothing" Plan; either all beneficiaries would get payments and all would release the co-
trustees, or none would get payments. R. 712-14 at pgs. 186-88,208-09. Defendants knew 
that the Plan had to be "all or nothing." R. 712-13 at pgs. 187-188; Addendum 5. 
Swenson and his associate Matt Wiese knew Neil relied on their expertise. R. 774 at p. 27, 
777 at p. 72; R. 781 at p. 66. 
12. The Plan Defendants devised and implemented in response to Neil's stated 
desire to implement a gifting plan for the beneficiaries of the GC Trust and the resolution of 
outstanding issues between the Slaters and the Bretons was contrary to California law and 
the Receipts and Releases violated the spendthrift provisions of the GC Trust, subjecting the 
grandchildren who executed those documents to claims that they violated the no-contest 
clause of the GC Trust. R. 5-6 f 16. 
13. In 2004, there were 15 beneficiaries of the GC Trust, limiting any potential 
recovery by the Slater Boys to 3/15 of the recovery for the GC Trust as a result of any 
litigation. The Receipt and Release documents sent to the 15 beneficiaries had the effect of 
purporting to eliminate the interests of each of the beneficiaries of the GC Trust who 
executed a Receipt and Release, ostensibly leaving as beneficiaries only those who refused 
to release the co-trustees and who refused the payment by Neil. R. 6 % 17. 
10 
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14. Twelve of the beneficiaries signed the Receipts and Releases; the three Slater 
Boys did not, but indicated in June and July 2005 that they were going to sign, R. 823-824. 
However, on September 14,2005, they emailed Willie Breton that they refused to sign unless 
each of them received $66,666.66. R. 825. 
15. The execution of the Receipts and Releases by less than all of the beneficiaries 
appeared to leave the Slater Boys as the only remaining beneficiaries of the GC Trust. After 
the other 12 Receipts and Releases were signed, the Slater Boys believed, R. 735 at p. 82, 
and then claimed in their subsequent lawsuit against Neil and Willie Breton, that they were 
the sole beneficiaries of the GC Trust. R. 870 at (X), R. 877 at (II). 
16. In or about February, 2005, Neil, his brother William, and his sister Jana were 
interested in distributing the $24,000 each to the twelve beneficiaries who signed the 
Receipts and Releases. The Defendants knew that, and knew that only twelve of the fifteen 
grandchildren had signed the Receipts and Releases at that point, but the Plaintiff "never got 
any advice from my lawyers not to distribute any money until we had everybody's 
signatures.'' R. 713 at p. 190, R. 721 at pgs. 269-70; Addendum 5. Defendant Swenson 
did not think that was a critical issue. R. 775 at p. 53. 
17. In February, 2005, the three co-trustees distributed $24,000 each to the twelve 
beneficiaries who had signed their Receipt and Release documents. Neil held the $24,000 
each earmarked for the Slater Boys, who were engaged in dialogue with Willie Breton about 
whether they would agree to the Plan. R. 716-718 at pgs. 238-248. The Plaintiff "had a 
11 
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strong indication that everyone was signing." R. 713 at p. 190. Neil was prepared to hold 
the Slater Boys' dollars "indefinitely." R. 718-19 at pgs. 251-2; Addendum 5. In July and 
in August, 2005, Breton Slater emailed Willie Breton, saying in each email that he and his 
brothers had decided to agree to the Plan and would sign the Receipts and Releases. R. 823-
824. Then, in a September 14, 2005 email, he said the Slater Boys would not sign unless 
they were paid $66,666.66 each. R. 825. 
18. In or about the summer or fall of 2006, Mike Rosson, the Slater Boys' uncle 
and Rhonda Slater's brother-in-law, told the Slater Boys that he would pay for a consult with 
a lawyer about potential claims against Neil and Willie Breton, directed them to the 
California counsel who they then retained, and paid for those lawyers during the subsequent 
California litigation. R. 746-748 at pgs. 112-14,117 and 130. 
19. In June 2007, the Slater Boys' California counsel filed a Petition against Neil 
and Willie Breton, in the Superior Court for the State of California. The claims of GC Trust 
mismanagement concerned three or four actions approved by all four co-trustees, including 
their mother Rhonda, and all of those actions predated 1994. R. 710 at p.140; 864-5 at %s 
14-17. 
20. The litigation was hotly disputed and ultimately settled in January 2009. Neil 
Breton ultimately paid a settlement figure of $225,000.00. R. 564. The Slater Boys' 
attorneys fees and costs were paid by Rosson, totaling approximately $337,300. R. 748 at 
12 
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p. 130. The Slater Boys had alleged in their March 26, 2007 demand letter to the Bretons 
that the value of their claims exceeded $4 million, then doubled per statute. R. 899. 
21. At the time the Slater Boys retained California counsel in or about October, 
2006, they and their uncle Mike Rosson knew that the other twelve beneficiaries had signed 
Receipts and Releases. R. 747 at p. 117. The Slater Boys believed, as of the filing of their 
June 27,2007 Petition, and October 26,2007 First Amended Petition, that the three of them 
together held 100% interest in the GC Trust. R. 870 at (X); R. 876 at (I)(2). 
II. This Case 
22. Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment focused solely on 
causation. Accordingly, for purposes of their Motion, Defendants admitted negligence and 
damages. R. 417-419. 
23. Defendants argued that Neil failed to fulfill the causation element of his 
professional negligence claims for several reasons: (1) the Slater Boys did not sue him 
because Defendants' negligence in creating the plan and drafting the plan documents gave 
the Slater Boys an economic incentive to sue him, R. 430-432; (2) Neil's own actions, 
including that he failed to inform the Defendants of the California lawsuit or that 
Defendants' actions were the cause of that lawsuit, and that he gave Defendants no 
opportunity to participate in that lawsuit or otherwise provide input to Neil in that regard, 
were an intervening cause of his damages, R. 434; (3) Neil's actions as a co-trustee 
predating his retention of the Defendants was the cause of the Slater Boys suing him and 
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causing his damages; and (4) Neil's (and his co-trustees') decision to pay $24,000 each to 
the twelve other beneficiaries knowing that he did not have executed Receipts and Releases 
from the Slater Boys, and knowing that the Slater Boys retained their ability to sue him, was 
an intervening cause of Neil's claimed damages. R. 433-434 . 
24. In opposition, Neil raised and argued genuine issues of material fact as to all 
of Defendants'arguments. R. 668-699. 
III. The Trial Court's Ruling 
25. At the start of the hearing on Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment on July 27, 2011, the Court told the parties that his preliminary view was that the 
Defendants had three causation arguments: (1) Neil's economic incentive theory of causation 
failed as a matter of law; (2) any chain of causation was broken by Neil's decision to 
distribute funds to the twelve beneficiaries without having received releases from the Slater 
Boys, and (3) Neil's alleged breaches of fiduciary duties as a co-trustee prior to his retention 
of the Defendants were the sole cause of his damages. R. 948 at 2. The Court; then told the 
parties that "I think that there are reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts that 
would preclude summary judgment in this case..." R. 948 at 3. The parties then made their 
arguments. R. 948 at 4-51. 
26. At the end of argument, the Court allowed the Defendants to deliver to him 
additional deposition transcript citations and copies of certain cases, and gave Neil a chance 
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to respond. The Court then asked counsel to return on August 1,2011 for his ruling. R. 948 
at 50-53. 
27. The parties provided additional materials and argument to the Court. 
Addendum 4, 52. 
28. At the August 1 hearing, the Court reiterated Defendants' arguments and stated 
that he still believed that summary judgment was not appropriate as to all of Defendants' 
arguments, except one: that Neil's payment of the $24,000 to each of the twelve beneficiaries 
before obtaining executed Receipts and Releases from the Slater Boys broke the chain of 
causation as an intervening cause. The Court had changed his mind: "I'm going to grant the 
motion for summary judgment on that one ground." R. 949 at 2-4,10. 
29. The Court came to this conclusion based on how the Court interpreted Neil's 
opposition to Defendants' "intervening cause" argument: 
What he's really saying is that he should have been told that if he didn't get 
releases from all 15 then he was exposed to the possibility of a lawsuit from 
the Slater brothers. And I guess the problem that I have with that from a 
causation standpoint is that he seems to concede that he already knows that, 
and how can the lack of that advice be the cause of the injury if he already 
knew what he would like to have been advised of...So it really comes down to 
what was caused by the failure to specifically advise Mr. Breton that if you 
don't get all 15 to sign you're still at risk, and you distribute to the 12 you're 
2
 The materials in Addendum 4 and 5 are part of the Record on Appeal, but 
apparently the Trial Court did not include them as part of the Record, so Plaintiff has 
added them, as they were produced to the Trial Court, to his Addendum. 
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still at risk for being sued by the other three. And I think that it's so clear in 
anybody's mind that he was still at risk to be sued by the other three that the 
failure to tell him that was not the cause of what happened. 
R. 949 at 4-5, 7. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should find that the Trial Court erred in granting Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether 
Defendants' negligence was a proximate cause of Neil's damages, that is, whether Neil's 
payment of $24,000 to each of the twelve beneficiaries who signed the Receipt and Release, 
was an intervening cause that freed Defendants from the consequences of their malpractice. 
This Court should determine that the Trial Court erred when it usurped the jury's fact-finding 
role, determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to this alleged 
intervening cause, and granted Defendants summary judgment on this one narrow ground. 
In this case, and for purposes of Defendants' underlying Motion for Summary 
Judgment, it was assumed that the Receipt and Release documents crafted by Defendants did 
not create an "all or nothing" Plan, in which all 15 beneficiaries had to sign a Receipt and 
Release document (and get paid $24,000 each) or the Plan would not be effective. It was 
further assumed that Defendants' failure to so craft those documents was malpractice. It is 
undisputed that the Defendants, Hal Swenson in particular, did not advise Neil that he needed 
to obtain all 15 beneficiaries' signatures on Receipts and Releases before distributing any 
funds to any of the beneficiaries, and that Defendant Swenson did not think that was a critical 
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issue. In fact, because he did not so advise Neil, and those payments went forward to 12 of 
the 15 beneficiaries, the Slater Boys believed they then held 100% interest in the GC Trust, 
and that was the economic incentive for them to sue Neil. 
Whether or not Neil knew that if he did not obtain signed Receipts and Releases from 
the Slater Boys, they had the ability to sue him if they chose, is not the relevant issue. What 
is relevant, and what shows the unbroken causation chain, is this: (1) when he sought their 
advice, Defendants did not advise Neil to NOT make any distributions until he had 
agreements from all 15 beneficiaries that they would each sign the documents; (2) their 
failure to so advise him was malpractice; (3) since he wasn't so advised, Neil went forward 
with the payments to the 12, and receiving their signed Receipts and Releases; (4) which led 
the Slater Boys to think they held 100% interest in the GC Trust; (5) which gave them the 
economic incentive to sue Neil. 
Neil's payment of $24,000 each to the 12 beneficiaries, after not being told he should 
not do so, was not an intervening cause of his subsequent damages suffered as a result of the 
Slater Boys' lawsuit. Neil's payments, after not being advised against it by the Defendants, 
was reasonably foreseeable by the Defendants. At the very least, the record before the Trial 
Court reflects a genuine issue of material fact "on whether a sufficient intervening cause 
broke the thread of causation between defendant's" malpractice and Neil's damages. 
Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1293 (Ut. Ct. App 1996). Therefore, 
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the Court should determine that the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment to the 
Defendants on the ground of intervening cause. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
THAT A SUFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE BROKE THE CHAIN OF 
CAUSATION BETWEEN DEFENDANTS' NEGLIGENCE AND 
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES. 
A. Legal Standard for Causation in a Legal Malpractice Case 
Utah courts have long recognized that proximate cause is usually an issue for the jury 
to decide. See, e.g, McCorvey v. UDOT, 868 P.2d41,45 (Utah 1993). "Proximate cause is 
usually a factual issue and in most circumstances will not be resolved as a matter of law." 
Unigardlns. Co. v. City ofLaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Utah 1984). "...[I]t is the 
province of the jury...to determine whether the causation theory is fatally attenuated." 
Butter field v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992). To demonstrate causation in a legal 
malpractice case, "the client is required to show that "absent the conduct complained of...the 
client would have benefitted." Iacono v. Hicken, 2011 UT App 3 77, Tf 31 (citing Christensen 
& Jensen, PC v. Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, f 26, 194 P.3d 931. The defendant caused 
the plaintiffs damages " if its conduct was 'a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.'" 
Griswoldv. Snow Christensen & Martineau, 2010 WL 4180597 (D.Utah) *3 (citing Rest. 
(Second) Torts §431). 
In Kilpatrickv. Wiley, Rein and Fielding, 909 P. 2d 1283 (Ut Ct. App. 1996), the Utah 
Court of Appeals scrutinized the causation element in legal malpractice cases. While noting 
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that causation cannot be proved based upon speculation or conjecture, the Court did explain 
that causation is, as an element in a cause of action, highly fact-sensitive: 
Generally, causation "cannot be resolved as a matter of law..." "Proximate 
cause is an issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon which a 
reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary judgment appropriate..." In 
other words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of the element of causation 
on summary judgment. 
Causation is a highly fact-sensitive element of any cause of action... To 
establish causation, Plaintiffs must persuade a fact finder that their injury was 
a natural result of the Defendant's breach. Plaintiffs therefore must spin 
together myriad facts into a durable thread that reasonably connects 
Defendant's breach to Plaintiffs injury. Utah courts have recognized that 
"[f]act-sensitve cases... do not lend themselves to a determination of summary 
judgment." (All citations omitted) Id. at 1291-1292. 
B. Intervening Cause 
"An intervening cause is an independent event, not reasonably foreseeable, that 
completely breaks the connection between fault and damages." Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 487-8 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991). And "Utah courts have 
always recognized the fact-intensive nature of intervening cause inquiries." Kilpatrickv. 
Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1293 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996)(emphasis in 
original)(citations omitted). 
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C. There is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether NeiPs payment of 
$24,000 each to 12 beneficiaries broke the chain of causation between 
Defendants' negligence and NeiPs damages. 
Plaintiffs causation theory in this case has been that but for the malpractice of the 
Defendants in the devising and drafting of the Plan documents, in particular the Receipts and 
Releases, and lack of advice to Plaintiff that he should not pay any of the beneficiaries the 
$24,000 each until ALL of them agreed to the Plan, Plaintiff never would have been sued by 
the Slater Boys and would not have suffered the damages he did. The facts set forth above 
support the basis for Plaintiffs "economic incentive" argument, or at the very least raise a 
genuine issue of material fact: the Slater Boys waited years before suing the Plaintiff, until 
after they believed that they held 100% interest in the GC Trust, such that suing for alleged 
mismanagement damages would redound entirely to their benefit; their share would be 100%, 
not merely 3/15 of 100%. The Trial Court agreed. R. 948 at p. 49. 
As set forth above in 116, Defendants were aware that not all of the beneficiaries had 
agreed to the Plan, and were aware that Neil and his siblings wanted to distribute the $24,000 
payments to the 12 beneficiaries who had agreed to the Plan. But the Defendants, not 
thinking this was a critical issue, failed to advise Neil that he should not distribute any money 
to any beneficiaries until all beneficiaries agreed to the Plan. That malpractice, along with 
Defendants' malpractice in drafting the Receipts and Releases in a way that did not make it 
clear that it was an "all or nothing" Plan, caused the Slater Boys to believe that the other 12 
beneficiaries had given up their respective interests in the GC Trust and now the Slater Boys 
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held 100% interest. That in turn gave them the economic incentive to proceed with a lawsuit 
against Neil. 
The Trial Court ruled that, given the factual background articulated by the parties in 
their respective memoranda in support of and in opposition to Defendants' Renewed Motion 
for Summary Judgment, there were reasonable inferences that could be drawn to support 
Plaintiffs economic incentive causation argument: 
It's a reasonable inference that the reason that the case was brought in 2007 is 
because the other 12 people released their claims. I understand you [defense 
counsel] disagree with all this, but this is a reasonable inference that it's based 
on-it was influenced, at least to some degree, by the fact that the 12 had given 
up their claims, and so it opened up the possibility of recovering the entire 
amount of the trust or the entire claim of breach of fiduciary duty rather than 
just 3/15 of it. 
R. 948 at p. 49. 
What appeared to convince the Trial Court of an intervening cause to break the chain 
of causation between Defendants' negligence and Plaintiffs damages was the fact that Neil 
understood that if someone, like the Slater Boys, did not sign a release of claims, then that 
person could, if they chose, sue him at some point. The Trial Court thought that Neil's 
argument was that the Defendants should have advised him of this. The Trial Court 
misconstrued Neil's argument, which Neil's counsel (unsuccessfully) tried to clear up at the 
August 1, 2011 hearing. The Trial Court thought advising Neil about the general law on 
releases, and advising Neil that he should not distribute any money to any beneficiary until 
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all had agreed to the Plan, were the same thing. R. 949 at p. 9,1.16-18. But it is not the 
same thing. 
The Defendants were told by Neil, during their first encounters when their 
representation of Neil began, that the Plan had to be devised as an "all or nothing" Plan. 
Unless all 15 beneficiaries agreed to it, it would not be effective. That was Defendants' 
directive as they crafted the Plan, as they drafted the documents that memorialized the Plan, 
as they drafted the cover letters to the beneficiaries, as they continued to advise Neil as he 
waited to hear back from the 15 beneficiaries, and as Neil considered making the $24,000 
payments to those beneficiaries who had agreed to the Plan. Defendants' malpractice at each 
step of that process, including failing to advise Neil to riot make any payments until all 15 
had agreed to the Plan, was an unbroken chain of causation; it caused the Slater Boys to 
believe that they held 100% interest in the GC Trust, providing them with the economic 
incentive to sue Neil, causing his damages. 
The Defendants argued to the Trial Court (and provided a copy with their post-hearing 
materials, see Addendum 4) that Earline v. Barker, 912 P.2d433 (Utah 1996), compellingly 
supported their argument that NeiPs payment to 12 of the 15 beneficiaries, without the Slater 
Boys releasing their claims against him, was an intervening cause that broke the chain of 
causation. However, that case is factually distinguishable from this case, because in that case 
there was no issue of a failure on the part of Harline's counsel to advise him of appropriate 
legal action (in that case, amending Harline's bankruptcy schedules). Indeed, the facts were 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
opposite; Harline admitted that his counsel advised him to amend his schedules and he chose 
not to. Id. at 445-6, andfnl4. To the extent that the Trial Court relied on Harline to support 
its award of summary judgment, R. 934, that was error. 
The very same facts and reasonable inferences that were the basis for the Trial Court's 
rejection of Defendants' other causation arguments, especially with regard to Plaintiffs 
economic incentive causation argument, underlie Plaintiffs argument that his payments to 
12 of the 15 beneficiaries occurred only because he was not advised, as he should have been 
by his counsel, to not make those payments. It was not an independent decision, it was not 
an intervening cause which broke the chain of causation from Defendants' negligence to 
Plaintiffs damages. The Trial Court erred in so determining as a matter of law, and erred in 
granting summary judgment to the Defendants on that ground. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, and because there are genuine issues of material fact 
regarding whether the payment of $24,000 each to 12 of the 15 GC Trust beneficiaries was 
an intervening cause, breaking the chain of causation between Defendants' negligence and 
Plaintiffs damages, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to enter an order reversing the 
Trial Court's ruling awarding summary judgment to the Defendants, and remanding this case 
for a trial on the merits. 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Order Granting Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing 
Case with Prejudice R. 932-935 
2. Transcript of July 27, 2011 hearing on Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment R. 948 
3. Transcript of Court's August 1,2011 Ruling R. 949 
4. Cover letter and materials provided by Defendants to the Court after July 27, 2011 
hearing 
5. Cover letters and materials provided by Plaintiff to the Court after July 27, 2011 
hearing in response to those provided by Defendants to the Court 
6. Receipt and Release exemplar 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
, NEIL BRETON, ah individual, 
Plaintiff, 
• vs. 
. CLYDE, SNOW & SESSIONS, a Utah 
.professional corporation, and HAL. 
SWENSON, an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE 
Case No. 090919546 
Judge Anthony Quinn 
This matter comes before the Court oil Defendants; Clyde, Snow & Sessions' and Hal 
Swenson's (collectively "Defendants") Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants 
filed the motion and supporting memorandum on May 12, 2011. Plaintiff Neil Breton 
("Plaintiff') filed a memorandum in opposition on June 2, 2011. Defendants filed a reply 
memorandum on July 1, 2011. On July 27, 2011, the Court heard oral argument on the motion • 
and took the matter under advisement The Court also held a hearing on August 1,2011. 
SEP 19
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Having considered the memoranda and oral arguments related to this motion, the Court 
now GRANTS Defendants'Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, acting as Plaintiff's attorneys, prepared release 
documents to be signed by 15 individuals who were beneficiaries of a trust of which Plaintiff 
was a co-trustee. Twelve of the 15 beneficiaries signed the releases and, as consideration for the 
releases, Plaintiff paid $24,000 to each of the 12 signing beneficiaries. Plaintiff paid no 
•consideration to the three beneficiaries (the Slater Brothers) who refused to sign the releases. 
The Slater Brothers subsequently sued Plaintiff for, among other things, alleged breaches of 
fiduciary duty relating to management of the trust 
Plaintiff alleges Defendants should have prepared releases that provided that no release 
Would be effective unless and until all 15 beneficiaries signed a release, and that Defendants 
should have advised him to not to pay the $24,000 to any beneficiary until all 15 had signed. 
Plaintiff claims that, as a result of this alleged negligence, he suffered injury and damages in the 
foiin of attorneys fees incurred to defend the Slater Brothers' lawsuit, together with additional 
sums he paid to the Slater Brothers' to settle that lawsuit 
The Court determines as a matter of law and undisputed fact that the alleged conduct on 
the part of Defendants did not cause the alleged injury. Defendants could not possibly have 
forced the Slater Brothers to sign the releases. Moreover, it is undisputed, based on Plaintiffs 
own testimony, that Plaintiff was fully informed and aware, when he paid $24,000 to each of the 
twelve beneficiaries who had signed releases, that the Slater Brothers had not signed any release 
and were still fcee to sue Plaintiff. Therefore, the alleged failure to advise Plaintiff of something 
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he fully understood did not cause the alleged injury. Plaintiffs own decision (made in 
connection with his brother) to pay $24,000 to each of the signing beneficiaries without first 
obtaining releases from the Slater Brothers was an independent and intervening cause of the 
alleged injury. See, e.g., Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439, 446 (Utah 1996) (affirming 
summary judgment in legal malpractice case and concluding that client's own decisions were 
intervening cause of alleged injury). 
For these reasons, and for the reasons stated on the record at the hearings on this motion, 
* the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment: Plaintiffs 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
JElSENBERG & GILCHRIST < 
Jeffrey R. Oritt, Attorney 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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following parties by hand-delivery and by email to: 
Jeffrey R. Oritt, Attorney 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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1 THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
^ SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
n WEDNESDAY, JULY 27, 2011 
J) 12:57 P.M. 
4 * * * 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 * * * 
7 T H E COURT: We're here today on a motion for 
8 partial summary judgment as it relates to causation in this 
9 case. Let me share with you some of my thoughts and then 
10 give you a chance to respond. 
11 The causation analysis really breaks down, as 1 see 
12 it, to three separate issues. The first issue is whether, 
13 based upon the record in this case and particularly the 
14 affidavits of the Slater brothers, does the economic 
15 incentive theory of causation fail as a matter of law. 
16 Secondly, was any chain of causation broken by Mr. Breton's 
17 decision to distribute the funds to the 12 beneficiaries that 
18 elected to sign releases prior to receiving releases from the 
19 Slater brothers. And, finally, was Mr. Breton's losses 
20 solely caused by his breach of duty as a trustee prior to the 
21 engagement of Clyde Snow & Sessions. I'll talk a little bit 
22 about each of those issues. 
23 1 think the one that has received the most 
24 attention in the briefing is this idea that the Slater 
25 brothers' affidavits which protest that the decision of the 
2 
1 other 12 beneficiaries to sign releases had nothing 
2 whatsoever to do with their decision to file suit in 1 think 
3 it was the year 2007. 1 analyzed this with the help of two 
4 legal principles. First of all, the first legal principle is 
5 the causation in negligence cases is considered to be highly 
6 fact-dependent, and summary judgment is rarely appropriate on 
7 the issue of causation in negligence cases, only where it's 
8 absolutely clear. And, second, even where the facts are not 
9 in dispute, if conflicting reasonable inferences can be drawn 
10 from the facts, then summary judgment isn't appropriate. 
11 There really aren't very many facts in dispute in 
12 this case. To the extent that there are questions of fact, 
13 it comes from conflicting inferences that can be drawn from 
14 those facts. It really comes down to whether or not those 
15 inferences are reasonable or not, and 1 think that that's 
16 where the dispute on this issue primarily lies. 
17 1 think that there are reasonable inferences that 
18 can be drawn from the facts that would preclude summary 
19 judgment in this case, and among those inferences are, 1 
20 think, number one, the fairly reasonable and obvious 
21 inference that the start of any litigation, including the 
22 litigation arising out of this trust that was brought by the 
23 Slater brothers, there would have to be some cost-benefit 
24 analysis undertaken. And one of the things that you consider 
25 in making that cost-benefit analysis is what's the upside, 
1 and it's pretty obvious that the upside is greater if you 
2 have at least a claim to the entire trust rather than just 
3 3/15 of the trust. 
4 Secondly, as a simple historical, chronological 
5 matter, this case -- the case in California was not brought 
6 until after the attempt to reach a global settlement and 
7 after 12 of the beneficiaries had signed off on the release, 
8 which 1 think gives rise to a reasonable inference that there 
9 was some cause and effect there. It's not absolutely certain 
10 by any means, but 1 think it's reasonable to draw the 
11 inference that the fact that 12 of the beneficiaries had 
12 signed off on the release was a factor in the case being 
13 brought. 
14 Of course, on the other side is the absolute 
15 protestations from Mr. Wilson and from the Slater brothers 
16 that this had nothing to do with their decision to bring the 
17 case. Again, i think that there's a reasonable inference 
18 that can be drawn that they're pretty interested in making 
19 Mr. Breton's life miserable. There's a history of animosity 
20 between these parties that casts some doubt. Of course, we 
21 don't decide credibility on summary judgment, but 1 think it 
22 would be unwise to completely accept those affidavits without 
23 taking that into account in some fashion. 
24 And so what it really comes down to is, are the 
25 inferences which 1 articulated are they speculation, as 
4 
1 suggests in the reply brief filed by the defendant, or are 
2 they reasonable inferences, and 1 sort of tend to come down 
3 that they're reasonable inferences. 
4 The second issue is does the fact that Mr. Breton 
5 elected to distribute funds to the 12 beneficiaries and 
6 accept their releases without getting the release from the 
7 Slater brothers does that end up becoming, in fact, the cause 
8 of the problem that ultimately occurred here. 
9 1 find this a little closer case because it's 
10 absolutely clear that Mr. Breton knew that he did not have 
11 releases from all 15 at the time that he began that 
12 distribution. What is not clear is whether he--in a sense 
13 as 1 read the record, it sounds like he thought that he was 
14 going to get releases from the Slater brothers, and 
15 ultimately did not get releases from the Slater brothers. 
16 And it comes down to what he knew at that point in 
17 time, whether he knew that distributing those funds would, in 
18 fact, make the all-or-nothing global settlement that he 
19 contemplated impossible, and it's just not clear to me from 
20 the record that 1 can decide that as a matter of law. 
21 And finally the issue of whether his own breaches 
22 of duty as a trustee is the sole cause of what ultimately 
23 happened in this case. 1 think at the time that he went and 
24 saw the lawyers at Clyde that he was aware, at least there 
25 were being suggestions made, that he had breached his 
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1 fiduciary duty, and that's part of why he sought legal 1 
2 advice. He was seeking protection from any possible claims, 2 
3 and so I tend to discount that as being the sole cause in the 3 
4 case. 4 
5 So I guess after all that, I think that maybe 5 
6 summary judgment isn't appropriate in this case. I think 6 
7 that the defense has certainly pointed out that there's huge 7 
8 obstacles to overcome in proving causation in this case, but 8 
9 at least at this point I'm unconvinced that I can resolve 9 
10 that as a matter of law. But I'll give you a chance to 10 
11 change my mind, Mr. Wheeler. 11 
12 MR. WHEELER: Thank you, Your Honor. That's all weL2 
13 ask. 13 
14 I agree with Your Honor that the facts here are 14 
15 really not in dispute, at least those that are material. In 15 
16 the response, plaintiff nitpicked some of the language and so 16 
17 forth of our statement of facts, but nothing that really goes 17 
18 to the heart of the issue. 18 
19 And the issue here I think that Your Honor should 19 
20 focus on is whether the plaintiff can produce admissible 20 
21 evidence upon which a jury could conclude that but for the 21 
22 work performed by the Clyde Snow lawyers the Slater lawsuit 22 
23 would not have been filed. I mean, that's the real issue. 23 
24 If the evidence is insufficient to prove that but for the 24 
25 work performed by the Clyde Snow lawyers that the suit would I 25 
6 
got out of the car and was assisting other people in the 
wreck area when other cars came and ran into the back of the 
cars that had already been crashed. He found himself going 
over the railing and was severely injured when he went over 
the railing at the freeway. 
He sued the drivers of the cars that ran into the 
backs of the other cars during the snowstorm claiming that 
they were negligent and that their negligence proximately 
caused his injuries. Nobody saw what happened to him. He 
could not remember what happened after his injuries. He 
didn't know what happened to him. All he knew is he woke up 
with injuries in the hospital. 
The Court of Appeals first of all ruled that it is 
appropriate for a lower court to grant summary judgment where 
there's only speculation as to what happened, and in that 
case the plaintiff relied solely upon the fact that he was 
there in the accident -- at the accident scene. There were 
cars running into other cars; that he was thrown over the 
guardrail and was injured, and so he sued the drivers of the 
cars that ran into the other cars. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed a grant of summary judgment in that case on the 
grounds that it was speculation to assume that these drivers, 
simply because they were in a wreck and that he was a part of 
that wreck, caused his injuries because there was no specific 
eyewitness to what had happened. 
1 have been filed anyway, then I think summary judgment is 
2 appropriate. 
3 I recognize, Your Honor, that there are cases that 
4 hold that proximate cause is normally a jury question, but 
5 there are numerous cases -- and we've cited a lot of them --
6 that hold to the contrary and have granted summary judgment 
7 on proximate cause where, one, the evidence is so 
8 overwhelming on one side that no reasonable person could come| 
9 to a different conclusion, and on the other side where the 
10 evidence is so speculative that it would be pure speculation 
11 for a jury to consider the evidence and draw inferences as 
12 the plaintiff wants them to. So those are the two extremes 
13 that the Utah Supreme Court has articulated that Your Honor 
14 and any trial court viewing a motion for summary judgment 
15 must consider. 
16 We think that we fit into both of those, and I 
17 would like to focus on three cases that we've cited, Your 
18 Honor, because I think they answer many of the questions that 
19 you have raised here. The first is Clark versus Farmers 
20 Insurance. We cited that in our brief. This is a case where 
21 the plaintiff was involved in a chain-reaction accident up in 
22 Farmington on the freeway where Mr. Clark was involved as a 
23 passenger in one of the cars that was involved in this 
24 massive wreck during a snowstorm. He was unhurt initially 
25 when the car he was riding in impacted with another car. He 
1 Now, he had, I think, as good an argument on 
2 circumstantial evidence that these drivers caused his 
3 injuries as the plaintiff in this case. He was at the scene. 
4 There were accidents that the Court assumed that these 
5 drivers were negligent that ran into the other cars, and yet 
6 notwithstanding all of those circumstances that gave this 
7 plaintiff a significant argument that it had to be that 
8 negligence that caused his injuries, they affirmed summary 
9 judgment. 
10 Even closer in point, Your Honor, is the case 
11 Triesault versus the Greater Salt Lake Business District, and 
12 I think this is one ~ and I think, Your Honor, I request 
13 that you read these cases before you make a final decision 
14 against this motion, if that is your inclination, because 
15 they are very instructive. In this case the plaintiff hired 
16 a development company to assist them in the construction and 
17 starting up of a movie theater in Spanish Fork. The 
18 development company assisted in getting small business loans 
19 and setting up the business and doing their studies and so 
20 forth and so on. The movie theater was set up and became 
21 profitable. 
22 Shortly thereafter, the same development company 
23 was retained by a competitor movie theater who wanted to set 
24 up a theater in Payson, ten miles away from the first 
25 theater, and assisted that theater in setting up the Payson Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 theater, after which immediately after the Payson theater 
2 started up the theater in Spanish Fork became unprofitable. 
3 It was in the same market -- the Court found it was 
4 in the same market; that the impact, the lack of 
5 profitability, came immediately after the opening of the 
6 Payson theater. The plaintiff argued that these 
7 circumstances - the circumstantial evidence they argued was 
8 proof that the second theater destroyed the business of the 
9 first theater, and they sued the development company for 
10 breach of fiduciary duty and conflict of interest since they 
11 represented both theaters. 
12 The Court of Appeals said this. They pointed out 
13 that there was no evidence, other than the circumstances that 
14 the plaintiff argued, to show that the damage caused, namely 
15 the unprofitability of the first theater, was caused by the 
16 opening of the second. Plaintiff relied solely on those 
17 circumstances and the inferences to be drawn. And this is 
18 what the Court said: Triesault argues that Deseret's 
19 assistance to the Payson theater caused his loss. However, 
20 this claim is based simply on the timing of the opening of 
21 the Payson theater and the coincidental drop in revenues at 
22 the Spanish Fork theater. As a result, Triesault's claim 
23 would require a jury to engage in rank speculation to reach a 
24 verdict. 
25 THE COURT: It seems to me that this case is a 
10 
1 little different because what we have is allegations of 
2 misconduct essentially between the years of 1989 and 1993, if 
3 I remember correctly, and then we have one of the Slater 
4 brothers reaching his majority around 1998. So you have a 
5 period of 15 years where, notwithstanding nothing changed 
6 with respect to the trust and no information was gained with 
7 respect to any breach of duty by Mr. Breton, for 15 years 
8 nothing happens. No claim is brought. And then something 
9 does change, and what changes is 12 of the beneficiaries give 
10 up their -- any claim to the trust, and within two years 
11 after that you have this claim brought. 
12 Now, that isn't solid proof of causation, but it 
13 seems to me that there is a reasonable inference of causation 
14 that can be drawn from that chronology alone. 
15 MR. WHEELER: Well, here again, to rely on the 
16 language of the Triesault case, there the same situation 
17 occurred. I mean, you have a sequence of events that occur 
18 one after the other, and the inference clearly could be that 
19 the first theater's business was destroyed by the opening of 
20 the second. I don't see that the facts of this case are all 
21 that better. They're not as good as that. I mean, the 
22 Triesault case--
23 THE COURT: There's all kinds of vagaries in 
24 business. There can be lots of reasons, I suppose, why 
25 theaters are successful or not successful, but here we have 
1 kind of a discrete issue; is this claim going to be brought 
2 or is not going to be brought, and nothing changes with 
3 respect to that except -- there's absolutely nothing you can 
4 point to that changes - that you would point to Mr. Wilson 
5 getting involved and offering to pay for it. 
6 MR. WHEELER: And the law firm doing an 
7 investigation of the facts. 
8 THE COURT: So. I mean, that's equally as 
9 reasonable as an explanation. I tend to discount the idea 
10 that money could have been obtained from any number of 
11 relatives prior to the time. That would be pure speculation, 
12 but I have a hard time concluding that with respect to what 
13 initiated this dispute that it's not a reasonable inference, 
14 and that's what it really comes down to, is a reasonable 
15 inference that this had something to do with it. 
16 MR. WHEELER: Well. Your Honor. I think it would be 
17 helpful if you look at Exhibit 10 to our memo as well which 
18 is the demand letter that the lawyers for the Slater brothers 
19 sent to Mr. Breton making a demand for payment. This was 
20 prior to the filing of the lawsuit, and it sets forth the 
21 facts and allegations that they deem to be material to a 
22 claim against Mr. Breton. And they go through in some detail 
23 about the findings that they have made with respect to his 
24 conduct as a cotrustee of the trust. They make allegations 
25 of breach of fiduciary duty and other malfeasance and make 
12 
1 the statement in there that the Slaters were shocked or 
2 dismayed by what they discovered. 
3 And so to answer the first question you raised is 
4 what new happened, what new happened is that they were able 
5 to hire a law firm to conduct a due diligence examination and 
6 investigation, and they were shocked at what they discovered, 
7 according to this letter, what they discovered Mr. Breton had 
8 done as a trustee of their trust. So they learned these 
9 facts for the first time after they were able to hire a 
10 lawyer. 
11 Now, we're not denying that the attempt to get them 
12 to sign a release was a catalyst in focusing on the conduct 
13 of Mr. Breton and this trust, but the fact that it's a 
14 catalyst that causes them to focus and decide to go to a 
15 lawyer and see what really happened doesn't help the 
16 plaintiff on his proof of showing proximate cause. And so 
17 there were disclosures made after the lawyers got involved 
18 that the Slater brothers, according to that letter, were 
19 unaware of before they went to the lawyers. So there was 
20 something new. 
21 And in the petition ~ and this is another fact, 
22 Your Honor, that we keep getting puzzled with in these 
23 pleadings. There's nothing in the pleadings, there's nothing 
24 in Exhibit 10, in the demand letter, that ever makes a claim 
25 that the Slaters are claiming that they are entitled to more 
11 13 
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1 than their fair share. 
2 THE COURT: The petition isn't clear on that 
3 respect, and, in fact, the petition names all the other 
4 beneficiaries which suggests maybe to the contrary, but on 
5 this record we have the testimony of Geraldine Lyle 
6 (phonetic) who says on page 85 of her deposition the Slater 
7 boys took the position that they were the only three 
8 remaining beneficiaries of the trust and therefore were 
9 entitled to the entire rest of the trust. 
10 In addition to that, we have the exchange that took 
11 place with the attempted rescission which apparently prompted 
12 an angry and emotional response from the Slater brothers' 
13 counsel. 
14 MR. WHEELER: How is that admissible, one lawyer 
15 interpreting the meaning of another lawyer being upset? 
16 THE COURT: How's it not admissible? It certainly 
17 wouldn't be hearsay because it's not being offered for the 
18 truth. 
19 MR. WHEELER: Because there's no basis upon whichl9 
20 one lawyer can interpret the meaning of others. They can 
21 testify as to what was said. They can't testify as to what 
22 that meaning is. I mean, if you get angry with me, I can't 
23 attribute a motive or a meaning to you unless you tell me it. 
24 And there's nothing that was said that discloses that the 
25 Slater lawyers thought that that was somehow going to hurt an 
14 
1 made whole. 
2 MR. WHEELER: This is all speculation because the 
3 petition doesn't say that, Your Honor. It does not say that. 
4 It makes -- it recites what happened with respect to the 
5 other beneficiaries and argues that that is a sign of bad 
6 faith by Mr. Breton because he's trying to buy off the 
7 beneficiaries in order to hide his misconduct. That's the 
8 allegation of the petition. 
9 And the other beneficiaries are named because they 
10 would be indispensable parties if they had not waived their 
11 rights to the trust and agreed to terminate the trust, which 
12 is what they did. They agreed to terminate the trust which 
13 was what the Slater lawsuit tried to do as well. And, of 
14 course, they had to be named because if there was some 
15 question as to whether they still had to give their consent 
16 to a termination of the trust, then that had to be litigated. 
17 But that doesn't mean that the Slater lawyers thought that 
18 they would get more than their--
THE COURT: The fact that the other beneficiaries 
20 were named I think that's a good fact for you, not a bad fact 
21 for you. I'm sorry if I didn't express that. I think the 
22 fact that the other beneficiaries were named goes against the 
23 idea that at the time of filing the petition they thought 
24 they were entitled to 100 percent of the trust's assets. 
25 MR. WHEELER: So I submit, Your Honor, that to 
16 
1 argument that they were entitled to 100 percent. 
2 And besides, Your Honor, we're talking about a 
3 trust that was without value. There was no value in this 
4 trust, so if the Slater lawyers thought that the Slaters were 
5 entitled to 100 percent, 100 percent of nothing is nothing. 
6 THE COURT: 100 percent of the claim for breach of 
7 fiduciary duty is better than 3/15 of a claim for breach of 
8 fiduciary duty. 
9 MR. WHEELER: But there's nothing in the petition, 
10 Your Honor, that argues that they thought they were entitled 
11 to collect damages that would have belonged to the other 
12 beneficiaries. How could they possibly make a claim -- the 
13 only asset the trust had was a claim against the trustees. I 
14 think everybody is in agreement with that. But how could 
15 anybody make a claim that they are entitled to more than the 
16 damage that was caused to them by the conduct of the 
17 trustees? It's legally impossible for them to claim damages 
18 that belong to somebody else. I mean, could they offer 
19 evidence that the other trustees were damaged in such a way 
20 and therefore they're entitled to collect for that? No, they 
21 couldn't do that. 
22 THE COURT: You mean there's no way to make a 
23 that the trust itself should be made whole and therefore 
24 you'd be entitled to what -- the remaining beneficiaries 
25 would be entitled to what 100 percent of the trust after it's 
1 
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allow an inference that somehow the lawsuit was designed to 
collect more than the damage that was actually incurred by 
these three Slater brothers is pure speculation. There is 
absolutely no evidence --
THE COURT: Except for what Geraldine Lyle says in 
her deposition. 
MR. WHEELER: But the pleadings state -- maybe 
that's what she thought they were going to do, but the 
pleadings don't say that, nor does the demand letter. The 
demand letter makes no reference whatsoever to the Clyde Snow 
papers, absolutely nothing. 
And so let me ask this question, Your Honor. How 
can the plaintiff possibly prove that had the Clyde Snow 
lawyers prepared different papers, okay, all or nothing, an 
all-or-nothing agreement or some other condition that they 
think would cure the so-called malpractice here, what 
evidence can they produce that those changes would have 
caused the Slaters not to file a lawsuit? The Slaters simply 
refused to sign a release. They didn't say we're not going 
to sign a release unless you put something else in the 
papers, or we would sign the release if you put this in the 
papers. 
THE COURT: I think that the ambiguity of the 
release I think that's a nonissue because if they had all 
signed it, it would have worked. And regardless of what you 
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1 put in the release, if they don't all sign it it's not going 
2 to work. 
3 MR. WHEELER: Right. And the plaintiff knew that 
4 they hadn't signed and wouldn't sign. Yes, they tried to get 
5 them to sign afterwards, and what they got was a counteroffer 
6 that they would settle for 66,000 which is what their 1/15 
7 pro rata share of the $1 million trust was supposed to have 
8 contained at the time of Saul Breton's death which is again 
9 proof that what they were after is their damage, what they 
10 personally -- their 1/15 times three for the three brothers. 
11 It certainly makes no sense that they could argue, 
12 absent something in the pleadings that could have been 
13 produced, that they were asking for more than their pro rata 
14 share of damages. There's simply nothing except the 
15 speculation of Mr. Breton and his lawyers that that's what 
16 they were trying to do. 
17 Let me get to another point, Your Honor, which I 
18 think is important and which you raised. Let me go to the 
19 Harline case, which is a Utah Supreme Court case where the 
20 plaintiff sued two law firms. He had filed bankruptcy, and 
21 he filed -- he hired one law firm to prepare the filings for 
22 the bankruptcy court. He signed the schedules of property 
23 and debts and so forth prepared by the lawyers. The 
24 bankruptcy court made a finding that those schedules were 
25 fraudulent and did not disclose all of his assets and failed 
18 
1 to disclose other material facts. 
2 Mr. Harline, after being denied discharge of his 
3 debts because of false filings, fired the first set of 
4 lawyers and hired a second set and sued them because they had 
5 not amended the fraudulent schedules. The Supreme Court, 
6 first of all, granted summary judgment with respect to the 
7 first set of lawyers, and let me read some things that the 
8 Supreme Court said. Justice Zimmerman was writing the 
9 opinion for the unanimous court. Harline's lawyers made the 
10 same argument that Your Honor has reiterated here, that 
11 proximate cause is an issue for a jury that should not be 
12 decided on a summary judgment motion, particularly in a 
13 malpractice case, attorney malpractice case. 
14 And this is what the judge said with respect to 
15 that: As a preliminary matter, we address the question of 
16 whether a judge or a jury should decide two issues relating 
17 to proximate cause in legal malpractice actions. These 
18 issues are common to both appeals before us, and so they join 
19 in the appeals. Harline first contends that proximate cause 
20 issues inevitably raise jury questions and always preclude 
21 summary judgment. Then'he goes on to state that there are 
22 fact issues and so forth. And Justice Zimmerman writing says 
23 we disagree with both contentions. 
24 And then he goes and he states the rule. He said, 
25 A causal connection between the breach of duty and the 
. .... .11 ' 
1 resulting injury to the client is required as one of the 
2 elements. Proximate cause--and this is important--
3 proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous 
4 sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, 
5 produces the injury and without which the result would not i 
6 have occurred. 
7 So here we have the rule that the proximate cause 
8 evidence has to show that but for the negligence of the 
9 lawyers the damage would not have occurred, and in this case 
10 that means that but for the papers prepared by the Clyde Snow 
11 lawyers, and if there was malpractice the malpractice, but < 
12 for that malpractice that the Slaters would not have sued. 
13 That's what they have to prove, and they don't have evidence 
14 of that. And more importantly » 
15 THE COURT: I think I'm really more focused on the 
16 allegation that Mr. Breton should have been advised that if 
17 he were to pay the 12 beneficiaries without getting a release 
18 before getting the release from the Slater brothers his 
19 all-or-nothing goal of a global settlement was in jeopardy. 
20 MR. WHEELER: Your Honor, there's absolutely no 
21 case cited by the plaintiff here that a lawyer has to tell a 
22 client what is obvious to everybody on the street. 
23 Mr. Breton knew he did not have releases signed by the 
24 Slaters. There's no question about that. Your Honor stated 
25 that a minute ago. He knew that he did not have releases 
20 
1 from those three brothers. He knew that they were the ones 
2 most likely to sue him because this animosity had gone on for 
3 years before that. As Your Honor indicated, it was probably 
4 because of that animosity that he went to Clyde Snow in the 
5 first place to try to get releases from those people in 
6 particular so he wouldn't get sued for breach of fiduciary 
7 duty. 
8 So we're dealing with a situation where the 
9 lawyers' advice to him would have been something that would 
10 be obvious to anybody. That is, if you pay out this money to 
11 the other beneficiaries, you are still not protected from a 
12 lawsuit by the Slaters because they have not signed a 
13 release. He knew that. 
14 THE COURT: So is it your position that I should 
15 just assume that he connected those dots because any 
16 reasonable person would? Is that what it really comes down 
17 to? 
18 MR. WHEELER: I think -- let me read what the court 
19 says here. I think that is one of the prongs that you can 
20 rely on in granting the motion. The Supreme Court said--
21 Mr. Call has just handed me the transcript of Mr. Breton's 
22 testimony. I asked the question: "Well, common sense tells 
23 you that if they hadn't signed a release there's nothing to 
24 stop them from suing you, correct? 
25 "Answer: If that's their intention, yes." 
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1 I mean, he acknowledges that he knew that they 
2 could sue him. And let me read out of the Harline case 
3 again. It says, Contrary to Harline's first contention then, 
4 proximate cause issues can be decided as a matter of law when 
5 a determination of the facts fails on either of two opposite 
6 ends of a factual continuum. Thus, summary judgment is 
7 appropriate, one, when the facts are so clear that reasonable 
8 persons could not disagree about the underlying facts." 
9 I think this is one of those that fall in that end 
10 of the spectrum. It is so obvious that if somebody doesn't 
11 sign a release that they can sue you that that is something 
12 that is so obvious that reasonable persons could not disagree 
13 on that about the underlying facts or about the application 
14 of the legal standard. And, two, when the proximate cause of 
15 an injury is left to speculation so that the claim fails as a 
16 matter of law. 
17 When the court goes on and it talks about 
18 intervening causes, I think it answers one of your points 
19 that you raised because there are several intervening causes 
20 here that I think are critical to this case. After the judge 
21 granted a motion for summary judgment as to the first team of 
22 lawyers who prepared the false submissions to the bankruptcy 
23 court, it went on to decide whether failure to amend by the 
24 second set of lawyers was actionable potentially, and they 
25 went on and said, yes, if the second set of lawyers failed to 
22 
1 amend the schedules, a jury might have concluded that a 
2 different result would have occurred, and his debts might 
3 have been discharged. And so that is a question we can't 
4 resolve on a summary judgment motion. Then the court went on 
5 to say that the evidence indicates that the plaintiff 
6 voluntarily made the decision not to amend, and therefore 
7 that decision precludes a finding of proximate cause because 
8 there's the intervening cause of the plaintiff making a 
9 decision that leads ultimately to his or her claimed damage. 
10 And that's what happened here. 
11 Let me read the language here because it's very 
12 important. "The evidence demonstrates that Harline chose not 
13 to pursue his available legal remedy of amending his 
14 statement of affairs and schedules prior to his bankruptcy 
15 discharge hearing in August of 1988." And this is the 
16 important language. "We do not believe it would be a wise 
17 judicial policy to allow one party to create legal 
18 liabilities in another by voluntarily exercising the 
19 complaining party's own personal business decisions." And 
20 then it lists a string of citations where the decision by the 
21 plaintiff destroys the chain of proximate cause, and it is a 
22 subsequent intervening cause that the Court talks about in 
23 the beginning when it states that the language is what 
24 proximate cause means. 
25 Now, what intervening acts occurred here? What 
1 independent business judgment did Mr. Breton make that 
2 destroys their claim against the Clyde Snow firm7 One, Your 
3 Honor referred to it, and that is he made a decision to 
4 distribute $24,000 to the 12 beneficiaries who had signed 
5 releases. He made that decision. There's no dispute about 
6 that. He admitted that. Now, he claims, well, they should 
7 have -- and you mentioned this. The lawyers should have told 
8 him not to do it. Well, the same argument can be made in the 
9 Harline case. When the plaintiff there said I don't want to 
10 amend, the lawyers should have said, based on Your Honor's 
11 comments, well, you shouldn't do that, that's a bad decision. 
12 They didn't tell him that, and that was not raised as an 
13 issue in the appeal. It makes no difference. The plaintiff, 
14 the client, made the decision, and whether it was right or 
15 wrong is the client's issue. 
16 Then it goes on -- then we go on. Secondly, his 
17 business judgment, and this is all admitted in his 
18 deposition, he rejected an offer to settle this case for 
19 $66,000 for each of the three Slater boys. He could have 
20 settled this case for $66,000 each, and there's a written 
21 document in our exhibits where that formal offer was made, 
22 and he admitted in his deposition he rejected it. 
23 The third independent decision that he made which 
24 was a business judgment fits within this language of the 
25 Harline case was that he elected to spend, according to his 
24 
1 numbers, almost a million dollars litigating this Slater 
2 lawsuit, and ultimately settling for more than he could have 
3 settled it for before the lawsuit was ever filed by paying 
4 $225,000 to the three Slaters. Another independent business 
5 judgment that he made that is an intervening cause between 
6 what the lawyers at Clyde Snow did and what the ultimate 
7 damages he claims are. 
8 Finally, he elected to manage the trust as a 
9 co-trustee in a way that gave rise to allegations that he 
10 committed breaches of his fiduciary duty and committed other 
11 bad acts as a trustee in violation of California law, which 
12 are the allegations of the petition. 
13 So he has intervened in this situation at least in 
14 four major ways along the way. He also elected not to tender 
15 the defense to the law firm. He did not inform them of what 
16 he was doing or ask them their opinions as to which decisions 
17 he ought to make. He made these decisions and then handed 
18 the bill to the Clyde Snow firm and said, okay, I made all 
19 these decisions, I decided to litigate this case for a 
20 million dollars, now I want you to pay for the decisions I 
21 made. That's not right, Your Honor. 
22 Those are all intervening causes that destroy the 
23 chain of proximate cause to the damages that he's asking for. 
24 At the very least, those damages ought to be limited to the 
25 offer to settle for $66,000 each. The very least if Your Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 Honor's correct on all the other proximate cause, he made an 
2 independent business decision to litigate and reject that 
3 offer without involving the law firm. 
4 Now, I submit, Your Honor, common sense tells you 
5 you cannot do that. You cannot, without involving the 
6 defendants that you ultimately sue in the decisions, make 
7 decisions that incur huge expenses in litigation and never 
8 give them an opportunity to say yes or no or to intervene or 
9 to do anything else, and then hand them a bill and tell them 
10 to pay it. It's not right. It's not in accordance with the 
11 law, and I submit, Your Honor, that it's not appropriate 
12 here, and I submit that his decisions along the way destroy 
13 that chain that has to be maintained for them to collect the 
14 damages that they are asking for here. 
15 THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr. Wheeler. 
16 MR. WHEELER: Thank you. 
17 THE COURT: Let me hear from Mr. Oritt. 
18 MR. ORITT: Thank you, Your Honor. As the Court 
19 may imagine in light of your opening comments, I'm going to 
20 skip through the opening part of my argument where it's going 
21 over all of the facts and the reasonable inferences because I 
22 think the Court has outlined them. I may do a quick summary, 
23 but I think it may be more effective if I respond to the 
24 points that Mr. Wheeler has raised, the arguments he's made 
25 anyway, and then the three points the Court -- the three 
26 
1 petition in which the Slater brothers named the 12 other 
2 beneficiaries as respondents, and I suspect it's because they 
3 were concerned that their argument that the rescission were 
4 invalid would be denied. 
5 But what's very important about the amended 
6 petition, there is language in the petition, I believe, that 
7 indicates that the Slater brothers believed they had 
8 100 percent interest. But in the amended -- first amended 
9 petition, which is Exhibit 8, it couldn't be clearer indeed 
10 under Roman numeral 1, jurisdictional facts, Paragraph 2, the 
11 Slater brothers say, Petitioners name respondents, that is 
12 the 12 others, for the sole purpose of -- this is page 2 of 
13 the amended petition -- for the sole purpose of asking the 
14 Court to confirm the validity and enforceability of the 
15 respondent's releases and satisfaction of their interest in 
16 the trust as set forth (inaudible) Section 2 below. Well, 
17 obviously they're saying throw out those rescissions, and 
18 though don't have any interest. 
19 But then when you look at Roman numeral 2 on 
20 page 3, the heading itself says petitioners are the only 
21 beneficiaries with any remaining interest in the trust. And 
22 then you go to page 14 where Roman numeral 6, Paragraph 58, 
23 because petitioners are the only beneficiaries with any 
24 remaining interest in the trust, they bring this action on 
25 their behalf alone. So in fact, that is the position that 
28 
1 issues the Court made. I 1 
2 First of all, with regard to the cases that 2 
3 Mr. Wheeler cited, in particular the theater case, where that 3 
4 case was simply talking about a chronology, that that was the 4 
5 only evidence in that case that would raise a reasonable 5 
6 inference. And in our case we not only have the chronology, 6 
7 but we have multiple other facts in the record, testimonial I 7 
8 evidence, documentary evidence, inconsistencies between the 
9 Slater brothers' declarations which were monolithic in their I 9 
10 language versus their deposition testimony both this year and 10 
11 in 2008. 11 
12 So we don't just have a chronology, and we have -- 12 
13 I have summarized that on pages 3 through 6 of our memorandumL3 
14 in opposition. We have 12 different areas of facts that we 14 
15 believe raise genuine issues of material fact and reasonable 15 
16 inferences, so we don't just have chronology, so that case, 16 
17 as the Court noted, is not quite apposite: 17 
18 The second point I'd like to make is there was kind 18 
19 of an extended colloquy between Mr. Wheeler and yourself 19 
20 about the petition and what's in the petition and the 12 20 
21 other beneficiaries were named. Well, we need to understand 21 
22 that there was a petition and then there was an amended 22 
23 petition. And Exhibit 7 of our memorandum in opposition is 23 
24 the petition in which only the three beneficiaries, the 24 
25 Slater brothers, were (inaudible). It was the amended I 25 
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the Slater brothers took in the underlying litigation. And 
as the Court noted, the petitioners are seeking damages from 
two of the four co-trustees, Neil Breton and his brother 
Willie, and presumably - on the grounds that they wasted the 
trust through their alleged bad acts, and they want the 
damages to be what that waste was, which means it goes back 
into the trust, and you have three beneficiaries, not 15. 
And that is the position they took, and it's the argument 
we're making on that point based upon the underlying 
pleadings. 
This is kind of a side point, but counsel said 
that - made it sound like it's undisputed that Mr. Breton 
went to see the defendants to avoid being sued. No, that's 
not true, and we set it forth in our disputed facts and also 
additional facts. It was Mr. Breton's siblings who were 
pressing him to try to resolve this intraextended family 
schism, and so at their request he went forward. It was not 
because he was afraid of being sued. That may have been 
something he had in his mind, but it was to try to resolve 
these issues and get people speaking again. So I just say 
that because the presentation was that it's undisputed that 
he went to see them simply to avoid being sued. 
THE COURT: I think it's pretty clear that that was 
one of his motivations though in putting together this deal. 
He definitely wanted the release. 
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1 MR. ORITT: Yes, I just wanted to say there were 
2 other issues, too. And this is along the lines again what 
3 the Court was asking counsel. I guess counsel is saying, 
4 yes, any reasonable person would know how to connect the dots 
5 as far as getting releases and what that would mean. I 
6 disagree. Mr. Breton hired Clyde Snow to advise him. He 
7 hired Clyde Snow to create the documents that memorialized 
8 this plan and wanted it to be an all-or-nothing plan. 
9 Why would any reasonable person know to connect th^ 
10 dots when they've hired counsel to advise them. Why would 
11 any reasonable person know that, well, I better not get 
12 releases from the 12 while I'm still waiting to try to get 
13 releases from the other three when I've talked about this 
14 with my attorneys, and they have not -- and they've told me 
15 well, yes, they're creating the language that will be all or 
16 nothing, and they have not said that's not a good idea, don't 
17 do that. And we cited to Hal Swenson's deposition on 
18 pages 53 and 54 in which he admitted that he never advised 
19 Mr. Breton to wa t until all 15 beneficiaries had signed. He 
20 did not think that was critical. Well, we think it was 
21 critical, but the point is he admits that he didn't advise 
22 him. And our position is just as one of the critical aspects 
23 of malpractice, and Neil went ahead because he had talked to 
24 his counsel and counsel did not say no, no, don't do that, 
25 that's problematic. 
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1 MR. ORITT: Right, all 15. 
2 THE COURT: And the language that you're suggesting 
3 if it had only been signed by 12 wouldn't have worked. 
4 MR. ORITT: What I'm suggesting is that if there 
5 had been clearer language about this truly being all or 
6 nothing, then if only 12 signed and after the leading-on had 
7 happened and the Slater brothers ultimately said, no, we're 
8 not going to sign, then there wouldn't have been a deal, and 
9 there would have been a need -- those other releases would 
10 not have been valid, and the money would have had to come 
11 back. That's the argument we're making, because the language 
12 that should have been in there should have indicated that if 
13 all 15 don't sign, the deal is off. 
14 And as we indicated in our memorandum in 
15 opposition, what Mr. Breton testified to is that if that had 
16 happened he simply would have gone back to the California 
17 probate court that was still open under Saul Breton's trust 
18 and proposed the plan before the court. But that didn't 
19 happen because of all that did happen, but that's the 
20 argument that we're making; that is, if the language had been 
21 there and the 12 did sign and the three ultimately didn't 
22 sign, the deal would have been off, and things would have 
23 been reversed. And then, of course, yes, the Slater 
24 brothers --
25 THE COURT: Did he ever try -- after the Slater 
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1 THE COURT: I've got to tell you. Mr. Oritt. this 
2 is really the part of it that bothers me the most from your 
3 standpoint, and that is I can't really articulate in my own 
4 mind what it is that Mr. Breton did know that he should have 
5 been advised of. I think that the record is pretty clear he 
6 knew that he did not have the releases from all 15. I think 
7 that the record suggests at least that he believed at the 
8 time he made the distribution that he was going to get 
9 releases from the Slater brothers. It sounds like they were 
10 sort of leading him on. 
11 MR. ORITT: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: And he thought that that was the case| 
13 Did he not know that if he went ahead and distributed the 
14 24,000 to each of the 12 that if the Slater brothers didn't 
15 sign they could still sue him? What is it that he didn't 
16 know? 
17 MR. ORITT: What he believed -- well, a couple of 
18 things. First of all, he believed that he was being 
19 protected by the all-or-nothing language which we believe 
20 didn't protect him. That's one of our arguments on the 
21 negligence issue. And that if, in fac t -
22 THE COURT: Let me just explore that with you. 
23 Because even if -- the releases that he had, had they been 
24 signed by all 15, would have been fine. They would have 
25 worked. 
1 brothers stopped leading him on, did he ever go back to the 
2 other people and say deal's off. You all knew from the 
3 releases that each person had to sign or else there wasn't a 
4 deal, and had one of them say, wait a minute, I read this 
5 release differently than that. I read it as saying that I 
6 just have to sign to get -- that "each" means me, so if I 
7 sign I get to keep my money. Did that conversation ever take 
8 place or was that ever attempted? 
9 MR. ORITT: To my knowledge that conversation 
10 didn't take place or that conversation with -
11 THE COURT: So how are you worse off based on the 
12 language of the release? I mean, it may have worked if he 
13 had done what you suggested he would have done had the 
14 releases been more clear, may have worked with the releases 
15 he had. We just don't know. He never tried. 
16 MR. ORITT: Right, and that's where --1 mean, the 
17 defense is saying as far as the allegations we may speculate, 
18 speculate, speculate. It is speculative both ways. We can't 
19 know because the facts didn't happen that way. We have the 
20 facts that are before us, but he wasn't advised by his 
21 attorneys. And then after this took place and the deal 
22 didn't happen with the Slater brothers, then things were 
23 essentially in limbo - or not in limbo but continued on as 
24 the Slater brothers took their path and talked with Uncle 
25 Mike and everything else took place from that point. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 I don't know what to say other than the fact that 
2 on both sides of this, this lawsuit we're in. I guess it 
3 would be speculative to say if that had happened then maybe 
4 this would have happened, or that should have happened and it 
5 didn't. I don't know what else to say other than the fact 
6 that those conversations didn't take place and things 
7 progressed as they progressed in a mostly undisputed way. 
8 (inaudible). 
9 THE COURT: (inaudible) you make me hurt. 
10 MR. ORITT: I'm doing a lot better. 
11 On the seven intervening causes that counsel spoke 
12 to, and I guess that goes to -- well, actually I think it's 
13 the second of your three issues. It's also the fifth one 
14 that counsel mentioned, or the fourth one, I'm sorry, the 
15 third of your issues, but I need to speak to those points 
16 that Mr. Wheeler said. 
17 We actually just now talked about Mr. Breton's 
18 decision to get releases from the 12, and I think I pointed 
19 out or I think I've argued that it wasn't an independent 
20 business decision. He'd been talking with his attorneys. He 
21 was not advised. We have the cite from Mr. Swenson. 
22 The second point, that is, it was Mr. Breton's 
23 decision to reject the offer of the Slater brothers to settle 
24 for what would be 1/15 of the one million that wasn't in the 
25 trust, and. in fact, as we know from the underlying facts 
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1 that we've cited was never in the trust even from Mr. Saul 
2 Breton's death. So the offer from -- or the counteroffer 
3 from the Slater brothers was three times or almost three 
4 times what their cousins all received, and that offer, the 
5 counteroffer they made, was rejected because it was, in 
6 Mr. Breton's view as the co-trustee, was simply unfair to the 
7 other 12. I don't know how -- and they don't cite any 
8 authority for their argument -- how the defendants can say 
9 that's an independent business decision, an intervening cause 
10 that wipes away, as we argue, the malpractice, and that the 
11 malpractice -- or but for the malpractice the Slater brothers 
12 wouldn't have sued. 
13 I guess their argument is, well, you had an 
14 opportunity to settle with this counteroffer. Then we take 
15 that to its most illogical extreme; what if their 
16 counteroffer had been pay each of us $100,000 instead of the 
17 24,000 that each of our cousins received. Would defendant's 
18 argument be that you should have taken that; too? Otherwise. 
19 it's an intervening cause. 
20 It's actually the same argument. I believe, when 
21 they say it's another intervening cause that he elected to 
22 fight the underlying case and spend the money on that. Well, 
23 what would have happened if Mr. Breton after receiving the 
24 demand letter had simply said, or through counsel or 
25 directly, had contacted Patty Glazer, their lead counsel, 
1 Slater brothers' lead counsel and said I don't want to fight 
2 this, what will you take. Well, their demand was for 
3 8 million plus punitives, so what would the demand have been, 
4 a million, 2 million, 3 million? Should he have accepted 
5 that and then that would have been another independent 
6 business decision, I think, that the defendants would have 
7 come in and said he never should have settled, he should have 
8 fought it. 
9 THE COURT: I sort of analyze the most of those 
10 issues differently than Mr. Wheeler, and maybe he'll stand up 
11 again and tell me why this isn't right, but with respect to 
12 things that happened prior to the engagement of Clyde Snow. I 
13 mean, that's just the facts on the ground as they were at the 
14 time of the representation was engaged. That's not causally 
15 related. Either it's malpractice or it's not. It's either 
16 caused by the actions of the lawyer or it's not, but those 
17 were the issues as they appear. 
18 And thereafter when it: comes to accepting the offer 
19 and deciding to litigate and everything happens up to that, I 
20 would analyze that under the rule of mitigation of damages. 
21 In other words, Mr. Breton has to act reasonably. After the 
22 malpractice, if it occurred, he has to act reasonably to 
23 mitigate his damages. And we're entitled to second-guess 
24 every decision that he made, but we have to second-guess it 
25 based upon what was known to him at the time that those 
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1 decisions were made to ensure that he acted reasonably. And 
2 I don't think I can decide that under a chain of causation 
3 analysis, at least not on this motion. 
4 With respect to the one, the decision to pay out 
5 the 24,000 to each of the 12,1 think that that clearly 
6 impacts causation, and that, I think, is maybe your biggest 
7 problem in the case. 
8 MR. ORITT: Well, I understand --
9 T H E COURT: We talked about that. 
10 MR. ORITT: Right, and our argument as to his 
11 counsel (inaudible) Clyde Snow. 
12 The final -- that was what I was going to say, by 
13 the way, prehiring the Clyde Snow, that is the fourth point 
14 that Mr. Wheeler made managing the trust that gave rise to 
15 allegations. Like you say. that's facts on the ground prior 
16 to. 
17 The fifth one, the last one he mentions, is that 
18 Neil did not tender the defense of the California case to 
19 Clyde Snow. Well, let's remember it's undisputed that when 
20 Neil got the demand letter he went to Clyde Snow with the 
21 demand letter. Now, Mr. Swenson was having medical issues so 
22 he wasn't there. But as we noted in our memorandum, 
23 Mr. Wiese met with him, and he showed him the letter, and 
24 Mr. Wiese said, well, gee, we don't do anything in 
25 California, and we don't really work in this area so let me 
QR 37 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 see if I can find you some names. And it was some referrals 
2 that Mr. Wiese gave to Mr. Breton in his own investigation 
3 that led him to hire counsel. So the first point is they 
4 knew about it. As far as the--
5 THE COURT: Did they know he was claiming it was 
6 their fault, or did he just say, look, I've got this problem, 
7 or did he say you guys caused me this problem, what are you 
8 going to do about it? 
9 MR. ORITT: Let me see if I mentioned that. He 
10 received the demand letter, and it had the draft petition, so 
11 it wasn't just the demand letter. And he went to discuss it, 
12 and so I don't know that either Mr. Wiese or Mr. Breton 
13 recalled the substance of the conversation as far as, well, 
14 this is your fault or it's because of you. We don't have 
15 that as an undisputed fact. But the first point is that he 
16 brought it to their attention, and they directed him to some 
17 people. 
18 The second point is that -- and the defense did not 
19 identify any case law on this point and we do. We referenced 
20 Mallam (phonetic) and Smith. And, again, I think it goes to 
21 mitigation of damages, but there is no obligation on the part 
22 of Mr. Breton to tender the defense of the California case to 
23 Clyde Snow. As I mentioned in the memorandum, if the lawsuit 
24 had been brought in Utah, Clyde Snow would have been able to 
25 participate as a third-party defendant. Another problem with 
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1 the defendant's argument is giving them a chance to 
2 participate unless it's purely financial it would be a 
3 conflict of interest if they would be co-counsel in any way 
4 representing Mr. Breton on issues that in our view were a 
5 result of their malpractice. So I think the argument that he 
6 didn't tender the defense is wrong on multiple levels. 
7 That's how I would respond to that intervening cause 
8 argument. 
9 I think the final point, Your Honor, I would make I 
10 think Your Honor covered it on your first issue, that is, the 
11 record and especially the Slater brothers' declaration. 
12 We've gone after that at length in our memorandum in 
13 opposition. In some ways it's quite challenging for the 
14 plaintiff when the defendants have the three Slater brothers' 
15 declarations that are near identical saying, no, it wasn't 
16 economic, no, it wasn't, no, it wasn't, and, of course, that 
17 puts at issue their motivation and intent. 
18 And the Court cited the law on that, as we did in 
19 our memorandum, and that's what we've tried to do to show 
20 with record evidence that, in fact, there are questions of 
21 material fact as to their credibility, as to their 
22 truthfulness in those declarations. And so we believe that 
23 issues of fact and reasonable inferences get us past that 
24 barrier on the point of the Slater brothers saying, no, it 
25 wasn't the economic incentive. 
1 We think we've responded to the Court's second 
2 issue of was the chain of causation broken by Neil. 
3 Appreciate the Court's analysis of that. And the third 
4 issue, that is, loss is solely caused by his breach of duty 
5 prior to retaining. We talked about that. 
6 So, Your Honor, in light of all of that, we believe 
7 that we have met our burden of raising genuine issues of 
8 material fact, and this matter should be -- the motion for 
9 summary judgment should be denied. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Oritt. Let me hear 
11 finally from Mr. Wheeler. 
12 MR. WHEELER: Thank you, Your Honor. Let me try tc 
13 deal with these points one by one. First of all, the 
14 petition and Exhibit 8, which is the first amended petition. 
15 Counsel reads from petition -- this is Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, 
16 which is the first amended petition that he refers to, which 
17 is the first time, as he says, that the issue of the releases 
18 was raised. That's a significant admission right there, Your 
19 Honor, because if it doesn't come to light until down the 
20 road in the pleadings, then it must not have been a 
21 motivating factor in filing (indiscernible) in the first 
22 place. 
23 THE COURT: When was the first amended petition7 
24 MR. WHEELER: First amended petition is Exhibit 7. 
25 (Overlapping speakers.) 
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1 THE COURT: Seven months after the first petition. 
2 MR. WHEELER: Yes. So seven months passes, but 
3 even more if you take the demand letter, which was shown to 
4 Clyde Snow when they referred him to the California counsel, 
5 that demand letter makes no reference to any interest or 
6 claim that Clyde Snow was at fault or that somehow they were 
7 going to claim more than their pro rata share of damages. 
8 There's nothing in that letter that would suggest that. 
9 There's nothing in the first petition to suggest that. So 
10 half a year later you see the first appearance of references 
11 to the other beneficiaries. 
12 And the part that he read there, petitioner names 
13 respondent in this action for the sole purpose of asking the 
14 court to confirm the validity and enforceability of the 
15 respondent's releases and satisfaction of their interest in 
16 the trust as set forth more fully in Roman numeral 2 below. 
17 So they refer to Roman numeral 2 to explain what they mean by 
18 this. 
19 I submit that that is just as consistent to 
20 interpret that to mean we're the only litigants in this case 
21 because the others have released it, and if there's any 
22 question about that we've named them so that can be resolved. 
23 They're not indispensable parties. They don't need to be 
24 parties in this lawsuit. They have released their claims and 
25 have released any interest in the trust so we don't need to 
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1 name them as indispensable parties. 
2 If you go to Roman numeral 2, the allegations there 
3 have nothing to do with a claim that they're entitled to 
4 additional damages because the other beneficiaries have 
5 signed releases. It's in Paragraph 9 it says in an apparent 
6 attempt to avoid liability for their mismanagement of the 
7 trust and breaches of fiduciary duties, Neil and Willie 
8 attempted to buy the beneficiaries' silence. And then they 
9 go on and recite the attempt to pay the 24,000 in releases, 
10 and then talks about the other respondents accepting the 24 
11 in full payment. It never says anything in there about the 
12 Slaters being entitled to more than their pro rata interest 
13 for the damages that they have suffered. It's shown here as 
14 a bad act by the plaintiff in trying to buy off the 
15 beneficiaries so he can hide his malfeasance. That's what 
16 the allegation is, and it's in the second petition. It's not 
17 even in the first one. 
18 So we think, Your Honor, that the inferences that 
19 are drawn there are not reasonable and are pure speculation 
20 as to what is intended by that. And I submit that the 
21 statement by his California lawyers in effect is no different 
22 than if Mr. Oritt says that he thinks that they were trying 
23 to collect more than their pro rata share.. There's nothing 
24 in the pleadings, nothing in the statements of the Slaters or 
25 Mr. Larsen that that is the case. They deny it, and so 
1 you're asking -- you're going to be asking the jury --
2 they're going to be asking the jury to draw inferences that 
3 are totally contradictory by the only people who really know 
4 what the fact are. 
5 Your Honor stated that you thought that there was 
6 an attempt being made by the plaintiff to get the Slaters to 
7 sign and he thought they would sign. That is not correct, 
8 Your Honor. Willie, his brother, continued to try to get the 
9 Slaters to sign. It was Willie who was trying to convince 
10 the Slaters to sign off and was offering them other benefits 
11 and so forth if they would sign, including the extinguishing 
12 of the debt that their parents owed to Mr. Breton. So it was 
13 Willie that was trying to sign it. We cannot find it right 
14 now because it was a surprise to us, but Mr. Call and I both 
15 remember that Mr. Breton said he never believed that Willie 
16 was ever going to get the Slaters to sign off. It was 
17 Willie's futile attempts to get them to sign, but he never 
18 believed that it would ever happen. 
19 THE COURT: I can't remember anything specific 
20 about that. I just came away sort of with the impression 
21 that it sounded like Mr. Breton thought that they were 
22 ultimately going to sign. That isn't a linchpin. 
23 MR. WHEELER: I don't think that's true, and if 
24 you'd like we can find it in the transcript. 
25 THE COURT: Like I said, it's not a linchpin for 
anything I'm going to decide but it's --
MR. WHEELER: There's nothing in the statement of 
facts by either side that would justify that conclusion, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Fair enough. ( 
MR. WHEELER: With respect to the intervening 
cause -- and, Your Honor, I don't dispute or argue with your 
analysis. That can be analyzed several ways. I analyze it 
as an intervening cause that changes the situation. But 
Mr. Oritt's arguments I don't think are valid with respect to 
what Mr. Breton should have done when he was made an offer to < 
settle with the Slaters for $66,000 apiece. 
Number one, I can answer the question that both of 
the lawyers from Clyde Snow who were deposed denied that they 
were ever accused by Mr. Breton until this lawsuit was 
fomenting; that they were ever told by Mr. Breton that they 
were the cause of the Slater lawsuit. They were never told i{ 
that he considered their conduct to be the reason why he was 
having to litigate the case. That was never said during the 
entire litigation of the case in California. It was only 
brought up when a demand letter was sent to Clyde Snow long 
after the settlement of that case. 
But to answer Mr. Oritt's questions, what should he l 
have done? He should have allowed the Clyde Snow people to 
be a part of the decision. He doesn't have to make the 
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decision as to whether the Slaters get more than the other 
beneficiaries. He can tell the other beneficiaries, look, 
the Clyde Snow people caused this problem. I'm turning it 
over to them with respect to how they want to deal with the 
Slater claims. How does he know that the Clyde Snow carriers 
wouldn't have said we don't want to litigate this, we'll pay 
$66,000 and be done with it. They were never given that 
chance because they were never told. They were never told or 
given the opportunity, and maybe they didn't have to do a 
formal tender of the defense. I think that's the appropriate 
way to handle it. If you think a third party is responsible 
for a claim made against you, the proper procedure is to 
tender the defense to them and their carrier and say you 
caused this problem, you fix it. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure it breaks the chain of 
causation though. One thing it does do, I mean, if they make 
that tender and Clyde Snow says, no, we're not interested, 
it's not our fault, then it's a lot harder for Clyde Snow to 
come back and second-guess the decisions that were made 
thereafter. 
MR. WHEELER: I agree. 
THE COURT: But, you know, you deny yourself the 
ability -- if you don't give them the chance to participate, 
you deny yourself the ability to say we did the best we 
could. It just makes it a lot harder case I think. 
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MR. WHEELER: For the plaintiff you mean? 
THE COURT: Yeah, if you don't tender the defense. 
MR. WHEELER: Yes, I agree. 
THE COURT: In reference you ought to allow the 
second-guess. 
MR. WHEELER: Your Honor, I would submit going 
to the Harline case again that we're talking about here two 
ends of the spectrum on summary judgment the Court can 
consider. One end of the spectrum is that the evidence is so 
10 clear that reasonable people cannot dispute the conclusions. 
11 Let me talk about that first. 
12 They have taken upon themselves in this case the 
13 burden of trying to prove what motivated the Slater brothers 
14 in filing that lawsuit. That's the burden they've accepted 
15 by claiming virtually all of their damages from the 
16 litigation of the California lawsuit. And so they have to 
17 show by evidence that they have enough evidence that 
18 reasonable people could disagree as to why the Slater 
19 brothers sued. 
20 In the face of that burden that they have, we have, 
21 one, the undisputed history of tremendous animosity between 
22 the Slaters and this plaintiff. There was litigation before 
23 they ever came to the Clyde Snow firm. The defendant himself 
24 in his deposition said that he viewed his eviction of them 
25 from their home and putting them out in the street was the 
1 the time they went to Clyde Snow, with the sworn testimony of 
2 the Slaters saying it never entered their mind, that it was 
3 not part of their decision to sue, the fact that it was not 
4 even raised in the demand letter or in the first petition, 
5 was not even raised until the second petition demonstrates 
bic6 that no reasonable person could conclude that that lawsuit 
7 was filed because they thought that the papers prepared by 
8 Clyde Snow gave them some additional damages that they would 
9 not otherwise be entitled to. I just cannot see how you can 
10 come to that conclusion. 
11 Now, counsel tries to avoid that by arguing the 
12 credibility of Breton Slater. That's not appropriate. He 
13 has no case authority saying that Your Honor can ignore sworn 
14 testimony. And it's a specious argument anyway to say, well, 
15 he lied in a letter to Mr. Breton. He doesn't have any 
16 evidence that Breton Slater ever lied under oath. He has a 
17 statement that was not correct on some totally unrelated 
18 issue, and so we ask you to ignore the sworn testimony. 
19 THE COURT: I struggle with that a little bit, too, 
20 but I don't think I can ignore the hostility. I'm not going 
21 to decide the credibility of the Slaters in ruling on this 
22 motion. I think what it ultimately comes down to is, is 
23 there a reasonable inference that contradicts their 
24 testimony. And if there's a reasonable inference that 
25 contradicts their testimony, it doesn't matter if you've got 
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1 genesis of the lawsuit that was filed against them. He's 
2 made claims -- they made claims in their paper that 
3 Mr. Slater said that he was going to use his children's 
4 lawsuit as retaliation for all that Mr. Breton had done to 
5 them, so we have all these motivating factors that are 
6 admitted. All of this took place before the Clyde Snow 
7 people were retained. 
8 I submit that he is going to Clyde Snow and paying 
9 money to lawyers to prepare a release that had to be at least 
10 in part a factor to prove that he knew that there was a risk 
11 he was going to get sued. If he didn't think there was a 
12 risk, why did he go to the trouble? Why did he pay a lawyer 
13 to prepare releases if he didn't think there was any chance 
14 he was going to get sued? And, finally, you have the sworn 
15 testimony of the Slaters that say that this was not a factor. 
16 So in order to agree with their conclusions, you 
17 would have to disregard the sworn testimony of four 
18 witnesses, the three Slaters and their uncle, all of whom 
19 testified under oath, not just in their affidavits. They 
20 were deposed, and they testified under oath that the idea 
21 that they were going to get 100 percent of the trust and 
22 thereby increase their potential damages never entered their 
23 mind. That's what they said. You have to disbelieve that. 
24 And I submit, Your Honor, with all of the history 
25 that occurred with this defendant and the Slaters prior to 
1 six witnesses. I don't balance the evidence, I don't weigh 
2 the evidence. If there's a reasonable inference that 
3 contradicts it, then it's a question of fact, so I weigh 
4 against is it a reasonable inference. Do you disagree with 
5 that analysis? 
6 MR. WHEELER: An inference of what? What they're 
7 trying to do is they're taking the circumstances -
8 THE COURT: It's a reasonable inference that the 
9 reason that the case was brought in 2007 is because the other 
10 12 people released their claims. I understand you disagree 
11 with all this, but this is a reasonable inference that it's 
12 based on -- it was influenced, at least to some degree, by 
13 the fact that the 12 had given up their claims, and so it 
14 opened up the possibility of recovering the entire amount of 
15 the trust or the entire claim of breach of fiduciary duty 
16 rather than just 3/15 of it. Then if that's a reasonable 
17 inference based upon the record, then it doesn't matter how 
18 many witnesses are lined up against it. It's still a 
19 question of fact. 
20 MR. WHEELER: That inference is drawn upon 
21 situations and circumstantial evidence that is as consistent 
22 with the Slaters' denials as it is with their inference. 
23 We're not arguing here about circumstantial evidence that 
24 raises -- that is contradictory to the statement of the • 
25 Slaters thereby raising a fact question. We're talking about Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 inferences that are drawn from evidence, namely the sequence 
2 of events and the history of the Slaters and the plaintiff 
3 and so forth. We're drawing inferences from that evidence 
4 which is consistent and explained by the Slaters' testimony. 
5 They explained all of this why they waited so long, they 
6 explain why they didn't file a lawsuit to begin with, they 
7 explain all of this in their testimony. And yet the 
8 plaintiff is trying to say, okay, well, they say that's what 
9 happened, but we think that it's possible to take that 
10 evidence and draw another inference from it. That is 
11 speculation, Your Honor. If you read the cases, the Clark 
12 case -
13 THE COURT: I understand your position that it's 
14 speculation, but you would agree with me, I take it, that if 
15 it were a reasonable inference - and you don't believe it 
16 is, but if it were a reasonable inference, then that's a 
17 question of fact. 
18 MR. WHEELER: Yeah. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. You've given me lots to think 
20 about. Is there something else you want to say7 I didn't 
21 mean to cut you off. 
22 MR. WHEELER: Your Honor, if you'd like us to find 
23 the reference to where Mr. Breton testified that he didn't 
24 think the Slaters would ever sign, we can try to find that. 
25 If it's not important to you, we won't take the time to 
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1 bother with it. But I would request that you read those 
2 three cases in particular because I think Mr. Breton's 
3 decision to unilaterally litigate that case without ever 
4 informing Clyde Snow that he thought they were responsible, 
5 without ever giving them a chance to intervene and to try to 
6 settle it, without giving them a chance to accept the offer 
7 of the 66,000, it's exactly what Justice Zimmerman was 
8 talking about when he said you make an independent business 
9 judgment, you cannot pass the bill to your lawyer and say I 
10 made these decisions, now you pay for those decisions that I 
11 made, which is exactly what we're doing here. Thank you, 
12 Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: All right, thank you. I want to think 
14 about this a little bit more. I'm wondering if lean impose 
15 on you. I'm going to be out of town for a couple of days 
16 starting sort of middle of next week, and I would like to get 
17 this decided while it's fresh in my mind. I'm probably not 
18 going to have a chance to write something between now and 
19 then. Could I impose on you to come back for an oral ruling 
20 on Monday at let's say 10:00: 
21 MR. WHEELER: Normally I would, Your Honor, but I 
22 have a sister-in-law who's on her death bed, and we expect 
23 her to pass at any time, and I don't know where I'm going to 
24 be Monday if she passes. I'm going to have to leave town. 
25 She's down in St. George, and I'm going to have to be with my 
brother when she passes, so that's a problem for me, Your 
Honor. Later in the week would be probably better, but even 
then I don't know for sure what my situation is going to be. 
THE COURT: Can we set something up tentatively, 
and I understand if you need to cancel or maybe you could i 
just send Mr. Call. 
MR. WHEELER: Are you going to ask for further 
argument or just announce your decision? 
THE COURT: I was just going to announce my 
decision. 
MR. WHEELER: If that's the case, then Mr. Call can < 
be here if you don't need me to respond to anything else. 
THE COURT: I'm going to try and read the things 
that you've asked me to read, and if you can give me the 
citation -- actually I only have the excerpts from the 
depositions, so if it's not in one of the excerpts I have, 
you can find that and get it to me. ( 
M R. WHEELER: We can give your clerk copies from 
our file of those cases, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, that would be helpful, but I was 
talking about Mr. Breton's deposition. I only had the 
excerpts. If you wanted to give me that. 
MR. WHEELER: We can do that as well. Your Honor. ' 
THE COURT: If there's anything else you wanted me 
to look at, get it to me by the end of the day tomorrow. 
52 
Mr. Oritt, I'm not sure that there is anything. 
MR. ORITT: As long as --1 assume counsel 
(inaudible) provide me a copy of the portion of the 
deposition they provide you, and then if I think --
(Overlapping speakers,) 
M R. ORITT: Your Honor, what time did you want us? 
THE COURT: Can we do it at ten? 
MR. ORITT: Sure. On this Monday the 1st. 
THE COURT: Right. Does that work for you, 
Mr. Call? 
MR. CALL: I'll make it work, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: We'll see you then. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded at 
2:23 p.m.). 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MONDAY, AUGUST 1, 
9:56 A.M. 
2011 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Breton versus Clyde Snow and Sessions 
State your appearances, please. 
MR. ORITT: Jeff Oritt on behalf of the plaintiff, 
Your Honor. 
MR. WHEELER: Max Wheeler and Keith Call for the 
defendants, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you're still with us. 
MR. WHEELER: Yes. My sister-in-law did pass over 
the weekend, but the funeral is not until later this week, so 
it allowed me to be here. 
THE COURT: I'm sorry about your sister-in-law. 
MR. WHEELER: She was in bad shape. It was a 
19 blessing when she died. She was in great pain. Some people 
20 have a hard time dying. I hope I'm not one of them. 
21 THE COURT: There isn't very many that get out of 
22 this life easily. 
23 Well, let's turn our attention to this case. I 
24 brought you back here for a ruling today. I've had a chance 
25 to review the additional materials that you have prepared. 
2 
9 
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11 
12 
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1 reasonable inferences can be drawn. And this is by no means 
2 clear, but based upon the chain of inferences that I 
3 articulated last time we were together, I think that you can 
4 draw reasonable inferences to overcome a motion for summary 
5 judgment on causation grounds. 
6 The more I thought about it the less convinced I am 
.7 about sort of the ultimate inference that you would have to 
8 make, which is really the legal decision, about whether or 
9 not the release by the other 12 beneficiaries includes the 
10 share of damages that the Slater brothers would have been 
11 able to receive. The more I think about that the more I 
12 doubt that's the case, but I haven't got enough information 
13 to decide that as a matter of law. 
14 But the good news from the standpoint of the 
15 defendants at least is that I thought a lot more about the 
16 second issue, the more troubling issue, which is does the 
17 fact that Neil Breton decided to pay the 12 beneficiaries 
18 without getting releases from all 15 did that break the chain 
19 of causation, and I guess I've come around to the view that 
20 it has broken the chain of causation. 
21 In Mr. Breton's deposition this exchange takes 
22 place. What he's really saying is that he should have been 
23 told that if he didn't get releases from all 15 then he was 
24 exposed to the possibility of a lawsuit from the Slater 
25 brothers. And I guess the problem that I have with that from 
1 We really talked about four issues. The three 
2 issues that I identified or the three categories of issues 
3 that I identified. I was urged to also consider a fourth 
4 category. Those categories of issues are the first one 
5 whether or not the economic incentive theory that has been 
6 advanced by the plaintiffs falls on causation grounds as a 
7 matter of law. The second is whether or not the decision to 
8 distribute the funds breaks the chain of causation. The 
9 third was -
10 MR. WHEELER: Payment of the 24,000. 
11 T H E COURT: Right. Essentially all the decisions 
12 that were made postsettlement, but there was one other. 
13 MR. ORITT: I think the third one was preretention 
14 of Clyde Snow, any actions that may or may not be breach of 
15 fiduciary duties, mismanagement and so forth. 
16 THE COURT: That's the four. I really haven't 
17 changed my mind on any of them except for the second which is 
18 the one that was the most troubling, you might recall, to me 
19 at the time of the hearing. We spent a lot of time talking 
20 about the first one. I've gone back and reread your 
21 causation cases. 
22 I think that really the analysis under summary 
23 judgment has tightened up a little bit as a result of the USA 
24 Power case that was decided about a year ago that I think 
25 refocuses the analysis on whether or not inferences --
1 a causation standpoint is that he seems to concede that he 
2 already knows that, and how can the lack of that advice be 
3 the cause of the injury if he already knew what he would like 
4 to have been advised of. This is essentially what - I'm 
5 just reading -- so it's in front of all of us and fresh in 
6 our minds, let me read what his deposition says. 
7 This is beginning at the very bottom of page 269. 
8 I'm going to start in the middle of an answer, but this is 
9 Mr. Breton speaking, and he says: "And they could have 
10 easily said you can't distribute any money to anybody until 
11 everybody signs, and that would have been the end of the 
12 story. I would have been a million dollars richer. We 
13 wouldn't all be sitting here. That's not what happened." 
14 And the question then is: "Okay. So one piece of 
15 advice that they didn't give you that you think you should 
16 have is that they should have told you not to make any 
17 distributions unless everybody signed?" 
18 And the answer is: "Absolutely." 
19 And I'm skipping a question. "You previously 
20 testified that you and Willie made a decision to distribute 
21 the money, not the lawyers, but your complaint is they didn't 
22 tell you not to do it; is that right?" 
23 And the answer is: "My complaint is they never 
24 said that by doing anything all or nothing you leave yourself 
25 exposed to potentially a very -- well, I didn't know how Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 large the lawsuit would be and neither did 1, but you left 
2 yourself exposed, and that was again -- this was --1 had no 
3 reason to do any of this, consent, release, distribute money, 
4 any of that. There was no time frame, no gun to my head. 
5 There were 12 more years ahead of me so, yeah, I'm a little 
6 upset. 
7 "Question: Well, let me ask you this. At the time 
8 you and Willie decided to distribute the money to the signing 
9 grandchildren, you knew, did you not, that the Slaters had 
10 not signed the releases? 
11 "Answer: At that time 1 knew they had not signed 
12 the releases. 
13 "Question: You knew that without them signing 
14 those releases that they were free to sue you? 
15 "Answer: 1 didn't focus on that at the time, but 
16 yes, apparently they would be free to sue me as they did. 
17 "Question: Well, common sense tells you that if 
18 they haven't signed a release there's nothing to stop them 
19 from suing you, correct? 
20 "Answer: If that's their intention, yes." 
21 And so the more 1 think about that, how can there 
22 be causation if Mr. Breton already knew what he wanted to be 
23 advised by his lawyer, what he thinks in retrospect was a 
24 mistake not to advise him of. 
25 I've already expressed that 1 have a lot of 
6 
1 concerns about the ambiguity or the alleged ambiguity in the 
2 releases because if everybody had signed this release it 
3 would have worked just fine, and if only 12 had signed a more 
4 clear release, it would have had the same effect as where we 
5 are now. 
6 And 1 understand the argument that because of the 
7 ambiguity in the release it would provide a basis for people 
8 to argue if he asked for the money back that they wouldn't 
9 have to give it back, but it's admitted that that discussion 
10 never happened. He never requested the money back, so we 
11 don't know whether the release that the 12 actually signed 
12 would have worked or not, would have allowed him to claw back 
13 the settlement in the event that all 15 did not sign. 
14 There's no attempt to do that anyway. 
15 So it really comes down to what was caused by the 
16 failure to specifically advise Mr. Breton that if you don't 
17 get all 15 to sign you're still at risk, and you distribute 
18 to the 12 you're still at risk for being sued by the other 
19 three. And 1 think that it's so clear in anybody's mind that 
20 he was still at risk to be sued by the other three that the 
21 failure to tell him that was not the cause of what happened. 
22 1 said 1 wouldn't allow any additional argument, 
23 but since Mr. Wheeler is here, I'm going to allow you one 
24 last chance to tell me if there's something I'm missing 
25 there, Mr. Ontt. 
1 MR. ORITT: Thank you, Your Honor. As 1 was 
2 listening to what you were saying, 1 think you said among 
3 other things the Court thinks that Mr. Breton already knew 
4 that if he got releases from the 12 he could still be sued. 
5 Yeah, 1 understand that, but -- and please tell me if I've 
6 misunderstood. It also sounded like you were saying or 
7 thinking that if Mr. Breton -- or that Mr. Breton seemed to 
8 know what he thought his attorneys should have advised him, 
9 that is, what was caused by the failure to advise him. 
10 THE COURT: Maybe 1 didn't say it very well. What 
11 I'm trying to say is that he's claiming it was malpractice 
12 not to tell him that if he didn't get releases from all 15 
13 that he was still at risk for being sued by the other three, 
14 and I'm saying that -- I'm accepting as true that they didn't 
15 tell him that. But if he already knew that, then as a matter 
16 of law the lawyer's failure to tell him that was not the 
17 cause of what ultimately happened. 
18 MR. ORITT: And 1 think that there's the 
19 misunderstanding, and 1 thought that we had argued this not 
20 only in our memo in opposition but also in our argument last 
21 week. That is, that it wasn't their failure to advise him 
22 that if you don't get all the releases they can still sue 
23 you. It was their failure to advise him to not distribute 
24 unless he got all of the releases; that had it to be an all 
25 or nothing. Don't go through with the plan getting the 
8 
1 releases, distributing the money unless you get all of them. 
2 And maybe I'm missing something here, Your Honor. But if 
3 they had advised him of that, and Mr. Swenson admitted that 
4 he did not advise him of that, he didn't think it was 
5 critical, and 1 think it was, and Neil testified that he did 
6 not get advice that he should not distribute which is part of 
7 getting release signed and distributing. 
8 T H E COURT: It's really part and parcel of the same 
9 thing the way 1 see it. 1 guess if the complaint was and the 
10 facts were that I'm out the money that 1 paid to the other 
11 12, if that was the theory of damages, then 1 could follow 
12 that, and if he had tried to get that money back and been 
13 unable to do it, you could say, well, gee, you should have 
14 told me. 1 shouldn't be giving anybody money until everybody 
15 signed because, look, I'm now out 12 times $24,000. 
16 1 can see a causation argument may be that that's 
17 the cause of that, if he had tried to get it back and hadn't 
18 been able to, but it's really the same thing. The way 1 said 
19 and the way you said it amounts to the same thing. He knew, 
20 regardless of whether he paid the money or not, until he had 
21 all 15 signed he could still be sued by whoever did sign, and 
22 that's the ultimate cause of his -- the ultimate suit in the 
23 case, the suit that he settled for a million -- with legal 
24 fees and everything, it cost him more than a million dollars. 
25 In fact, he didn't get releases from all 15. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 MR. ORITT: To the tying into the economic 
2 incentive theory that you talked about earlier, if he had 
3 been advised not that either he had to get all 15 or none, 
4 and he couldn't get all 15, then he wouldn't have gone 
5 forward with it. And then to follow our argument, there 
6 would have been no incentive, and they wouldn't have sued 
7 him. 
8 It seems to me what the Court is saying is that --
9 well, actually I'm not sure what the Court is saying when 
10 we're saying if he had been advised, as we allege he should 
11 have been, either get all of them or don't go forward with 
12 this, and he had not been able to get all of them because the 
13 three weren't doing (indiscernible), then he wouldn't have 
14 gone forward with it, and as we argued he would have 
15 submitted it to the California probate court. That's the 
16 argument that we're making. Either that he should have been 
17 advised if you go forward with all of it it's over because 
18 you get all of it. If you don't go forward with it because 
19 you haven't gotten all of them, then, as we argue, there 
20 would be no economic incentive for the Slater boys, and they 
21 wouldn't have sued him, and we think the reasonable 
22 inferences support that. That's what our argument is. 
23 MR. WHEELER: We'll submit it, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: I'm going to rule. I'm going to grant 
25 the motion for summary judgment on that one ground. I think 
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that's where I am at this point in time. Mr. Wheeler, would 
you prepare the order. 
MR. WHEELER: We will, Your Honor, thank you. 
MR. CALL Your Honor, may we have until a week 
from this coming Friday to submit the order. Mr. Oritt 
(indiscernible) in arbitration this week, and so I'd like to 
have next week to prepare the order. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings concluded at 
10:11 a.m.) 
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VIA EMAIL 
The Honorable Anthony Quinn 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
marianad@etnail.utcourts.gov 
RE: Neil Breton v. Clyde, Snow & Sessions, ei at. (Civil Mo. 090919546) 
Dear Judge Quinn: 
I have attached excerpts from the transcript of the December 8, 2010 
deposition of Neil Breton. We believe the folio wing excerpts demonstrate that Mr. 
Breton was fully informed that he could be sued and was skeptical that the Slater 
Brothers would sign releases at the time he and his two siblings released funds to the 
12 grandchildren: 
p. 120 1,15 t o p . 121 1. 16 
p. 122 1. 14 to p. 123 1. 13, esp. p. 122 1. 24 ("I thought it was futile") 
p. 184 1. 18 to p. 186 1. 9, esp. p. 186 11. 4-5 ("I was very leery") 
p. 223.1. 12 t o p . 225 1. 9 
p. 227 1. 20 to p. 230 1. 5 
p. 239 1. 6 to p. 241 1. 1 
p. 271 1. 16 t o p . 274 1. 21 
I have also attached a copy of Deposition Exhibit 37, an email from William 
Breton to Neil Breton, in which William reports that Rhonda Slater told him on 
January 3, 2005, "The [Slater] kids aren't signing." The funds were disbursed to the 
grandchildren sometime between January 6, 2005 and February 6, 2006. See 
Deposition Exhibits 38 and 43, also attached. (These exhibits are discussed in the 
references provided above.) 
I have also attached copies of the following cases: 
Triesault v. Greater Salt Lake Business District, 2005 UT App 489, 126 P.3d 781 
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996) 
Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 893 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
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Thank you for your consideration. 
Sincerely, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
£$A.&x 
KeitK A. Call 
cc: Jeffrey R. Oritt, Attorney (via email) 
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BRETON, EXAM BY WHEELER 
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gave Hal the information I was able to give him, and 
he put together a plan, estate plan. Was setting up 
various trusts and explained how they would operate 
and kind of gave us an education about estate 
planning and how we should proceed, and that's how I 
knew or met Hal. 
And we had that relationship for a couple 
years, and from time to time I think we met 
occasionally at Hal's office to update or review the 
estate plans as assets changed and things became 
clearer in my life in terms of financial situation. 
Q Okay. But my question goes to what 
prompted you to go to Hal or to Clyde Snow with 
respect to the grandchildren's trust. 
A That was just -- it was basically -- I knew 
Hal. I knew he did estate work, and I believed at 
the time that he understood our family and that I had 
this matter that I'd been asked by my other two 
trustees to try to resolve, a family global dispute, 
and I went to the Clyde Swenson firm, spoke to Hal 
about his advice about how we best -- at one point --
at the same time protect me from — because we had 
several failed attempts at trying to settle a 
global -- reach a global settlement, and this was at 
my brother's and sister's insistence that we get a 
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lawyer, and I said, "Well, I know somebody in Utah, 
and since you both don't live in this country, let me 
talk to 
and see 
Hal and see" -- "explain to him the situation' 
if he can put together a document that you 
can present to Rhonda and her children, and if they 
accept i 
then we' 
go anywh 
Q 
brother 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Jana --
Q 
A 
t, we'll reach a settlement. If they don't, 
11 have spent money on a document that won't 
ere." 
I think you said "at the insistence of your 
and sisters. " 
Right. 
Plural. 
That's correct. 
Was Rhonda insisting --
No, no. I meant brother and sister. 
Sister? 
Yeah. Rhonda had nothing to do with this. 
It was Willie and Jana. 
Q 
that was 
What was 
A 
mother -
close tc 
And you said there was a family dispute 
kind of the catalyst for this decision. 
that dispute? 
Well, party — a few things. One, my 
-- you know, my mother, who we were all very 
, was really being torn apart by the fact 
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BRETON, EXAM BY WHEELER 
1. that her family was not speaking for years, and my 
2 nephews and I -- my sister had accumulated eight 
3 years of birthday presents that.we'd mailed them and 
4 sent them all back. It was just -- it was just a 
5 real family mess that wasn't going anywhere. We 
6 weren't going to resolve anything. 
71 Jana had a relationship with Rhonda, but it 
8 was strained. Willie occasionally spoke to.Rhonda. 
9 I didn't speak to anybody in the Slater family, nor 
10 were they allowed to speak to me or any of my kids. 
11 They disowned all my kids. My daughters, who were 
12 very close to their aunt, were basically, you know, 
13 removed from any family communications. 
14 And so it was probably partly my mother 
l5i • requesting we try to make a settlement. I know I had 
16 a meeting at my -- with my mom and my aunt, with 
17 Rhonda actually there, sometime years earlier, and 
18 she was crying about, "Why can't we all get this 
19 worked out?" And I, of course, explained that her 
20 husband is a problem that we can't resolve and work 
21 around. And then, of course, my mother was never 
221 allowed back in her house, and it just became a 
23| really ongoing ugly and uglier family issue that — 
241 this was an attempt — I thought it was futile, but 
25| Jana and Willie offered to try to negotiate, once 
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BRETON, EXAM BY WHEELER 
again, after several failed attempts at global 
settlement, and I said, "Look, you two trustees — 
I'm only one vote. If the two of you can negotiate a 
deal that satisfies everybody, I'm willing to give up 
the judgment," which is a huge gift. That's a 
quarter million dollars more than anybody else got or 
was entitled to, and the judgment was still valid. I 
said, "That's what I'll give up, but I'm not engaging 
in any communications or writing any letters, .talking 
to anybody. You negotiate it, you make the deal, and 
if you make a deal, I'll go to a lawyer and have it 
papered," and that's what I did, given the assurance 
that they had made a deal. 
Q Okay. So, as I understand what you're 
saying, is that this is a general good faith attempt 
by you to settle the family feud that has been going 
on for years, correct? 
A It was an attempt by all — yes, all of us, 
to — all the parties. 
Q And who was it that came up with the idea 
•that, "Well, let's pay each of the grandchildren some 
money and see if that takes care of the problem"? 
A Jana. Jana was aware that I put money 
aside in a personal account --- in this account, 
actually. It was my money. It was about --
RENEE'L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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BRETON, EXAM BY WHEELER 
A 
Q 
actuall 
A 
• receive 
October 
Q 
marked 
Q 
one of 
Yes. 
Which is a number 
y received the letter 
Well, I told you I 
d the letter, but it 
of '04. 
01. 
(Whereupon Deposit 
for identification.) 
(BY MR. WHEELER) 
the drafts of Receipt 
to Terminate? 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
And this was one o 
the lawyers at Clyde Snow? 
A 
Q 
when --
Swenson 
letter. 
Yes. 
And describe the p 
I see that you sent 
where he explains wh 
Did you also provid 
Mr. Swenson or to Mr. Wiese 
should 
A 
Q 
orally? 
be in the letter? 
Yes. 
And how did you do 
of months after you 1 
, correct? 
wasn't sure when I 
was sometime before 
ion Exhibit No. 26 was 
Do you recognize this as 
and Release and Consent 1 
f the drafts prepared by 
•| 
rocedure, if you would, 
Willie's letter to Hal 
at he wants in the 
e any information to 
as to what you thought 
that? In writing or 
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A O r a l l y . 
Q And — 
A As I recall, it was orally, but I don't 
recall the documents that were written. 
Q Tell me, as best as you can recall, what 
you told Mr. Swenson you wanted in the letter. 
A Initially I think it was Mr. Swenson, and 
then I think at one point it became Mr. Wiese, but I 
think -- if I — and I'm assuming this is to 
Mr. Swenson — that I brought him up to speed with 
the family history, I brought him up to speed, I 
think in great detail, because he explained that in 
his own deposition, that he understood there was --
he hated my guts, or some term, I think, some phrase 
that Hal referred to, that there was serious -- he 
understood, Hal did, that there was serious problems 
between Mark Slater and myself and that Willie and 
Jana had been negotiating, for the umpteenth time, to 
try to find a global settlement, and in Jana's case, 
as I spoke to you and answered your question earlier, 
she specifically needed the money, so when she said 
everybody needed it, she was being a little generous 
with the facts. She was specifically the only one 
that needed money. 
I tried to accommodate her. As I said, 
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BRETON, EXAM BY WHEELER 
offered her — to loan her the money, but she thought 
if we just distributed the money and ended all of 
this, she .got indication from Rhonda that's what they 
all wanted,•was a global settlement, and I was very 
leery, but when I met with Hal, I was very clear 
about, "I have no obligation to do this. I!m not 
even sure that it will get settled, but if we do it, 
it's got to be something that all of the trustees are 
protected. There are no repercussions." 
Hal acknowledged that, understood that, and 
referred to it as "the all or nothing clause," which 
was critical, totally critical for me to be involved 
in any of this transaction. And, unfortunately, 
whatever Hal's best efforts were, he didn't 
accomplish that goal, and I ended up in a lawsuit. 
Q Okay. Tell me exactly how you transmitted 
the information concerning your family feud to 
Mr. Swenson or Mr. Wiese. 
A Just that there had been years of threats 
of litigation. I think I maybe even produced some 
documents. I don't know if I did or I didn't. Some 
of the letters that I'd seen or gotten. But I made 
it crystal clear, to use an old expression, that 
there was about as bad of blood between our families 
as there could be. Mark threatened to kill me three 
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writ ing 
hatchet 
this 
letters to Rhonda, saying, "Let's 
" — my words, not his — "and let 
family dispute and sign off, and the 
sitting 
a long 
Will 
Rhon 
mark 
A 
Q 
ie, 
da 
A 
Q 
ed 
Q 
in the account for you," and this 
time, right? 
Yes, that's correct. 
bury the 
s solve 
money is 
goes on for 
So these letters continue, and efforts by 
in particular, continue to try to convince 
to get her kids to sign off? Is that fair? 
That's fair. 
Thirty-eight, CSS. 
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 37 was 
for identification.) 
(BY MR. WHEELER) Exhibit 37 to 
deposition appears to be an e-mail -- may 
been 
you, 
Will 
was 
— 
A 
Q 
It was a fax, maybe. 
your 
have 
It may have been a fax. It's addressed to 
correct? 
A 
Q 
A 
ie, 
in 
Q 
Yes. 
Is it from Willie? 
No. It's actually -- well, it . Is from 
but it's from — this says "MBreton," that he 
town at my mom1s. 
I see. That's why the "MBreton i 
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BRETON, EXAM BY WHEELER 
nothing,1 then the kids decided not to sign, either." 
And then she goes on to complain about not 
seeing tax returns or other information, correct? 
A Right. And that she doesn't trust me. She 
put that in there. 
Q Yeah. And that she doesn't like you. 
A Yeah. 
Q And doesn't trust you. 
A Right. 
Q So would you agree that, assuming that 
that's an accurate recording of the conversation, 
Rhonda thinks this is an all-or-nothing deal that she 
can kill if she doesn't cooperate? 
A Well — 
MR. ORITT: I'm just going to object. I 
don't know that it's a recording, because he says 
it's a summary, but go ahead. It doesn't matter. 
MR. WHEELER: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. I — your question, I 
think, is, does -- I mean, Willie says, "Rhonda, 
you're saying opposite things. If this was an issue 
of time, then you should have consulted a lawyer." I 
mean, her kids had these documents for weeks. I 
don't know. This was Rhonda being Rhonda, and I 
really don't know what she intended to say. She made 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Murdis. 
of kids 
know wh< 
Q 
A 
Do you know whose handwriting that is? 
It looks like it's Willie's. 
Okay. "Aunt Vickie talking"? 
Yeah. That's my mom. 
Can you read that? 1 
It just says, "Aunt Vickie talking. Vickie 
Reconfirmed no intent. Speaking on behalf 
with" — I don!t know what that — I don't 
at 
know what 
Q 
text sa1 
decided 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
marked 
Q 
A 
my wife 
Formagg 
ys 
-
Willie's — 
With the kids' knowledge? I 
It says, "With kids'.knowledge." I don't 
Willie had in mind with this. 
That's kind of consistent with what the 
, is that she showed it to the kids and 
Apparently. 
They all decided not to — 
That's what it appears to say. 
Let's go to 6717 BRE. 
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 38 was 
for identification.) 
?s 
io 
(BY MR. WHEELER) You recognize this? 
This was sent to me — well, Formaggio is 
-- that's Gail's e-mail addresses, 
49 -- to me, so this is — and Judy is 
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BRETON, EXAM BY WHEELER 
1 Willie's wife. 
2 Q Okay. 
3 A So you see who the players are. 
4 Q I don't understand why there's so many 
5 addresses up above. 
6 A I don't know. I — yeah. It beats me. 
7 Q Getting down to the text, it — 
8 A Neither of them, back in '05, are probably 
9| very literate with using computers and texting and 
10 everything and — it's not so simple, but this looks 
11 like -- this looks like, to me, like Judy and Gail 
12 were speaking. From Willie, though. Oh, no. This 
13 has nothing -- this has nothing — all right. Well, 
14 let me explain. 
15 The Kobb bank accounts is a totally 
16 different matter. Willie and I own a piece of 
17 property in a partnership called Kobb Realty. The 23 
18 and the 76 are our ownerships respectively of that 
19 real estate partnership, so my brother and I 
20 currently own a property. 
21 Q Okay. 
22 A And so that's the whole Kobb part of this 
23 letter, okay? Just so you know, it's nothing to do 
24 with whatever else is in -- "With regards to Rhonda's 
25 letter, you told me that you'd have the lawyer send a 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
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BRETON, EXAM BY WHEELER 
:f 
' I 
1 copy of the draft for my input before mailing it 
2 out." 
3 THE REPORTER: Sir — 
4 MR. ORITT: Yeah. You better read that to 
5 yourself or read it slower. 
6 THE REPORTER: It's getting harder and 
7 harder and harder. 
8 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. I'll go slowly. 
9 Ifll just read it to myself so you won't even have to 
10 listen. 
11 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Yeah, just read to 
12 yourself. Well, let me read it so we have it on the 
13 record. Talking about Rhonda, that's where I want, to 
14 start, is, "Also, with regards to Rhonda's letter, 
15 you told me that you would have the lawyer send me a 
16 copy of the draft for my input before mailing it 
17 out." Was that the practice, that he wanted to see 
18 everything that went out? 
19 A Willie -- I think so, yes. 
20 Q "I'm thinking that since Rhonda's kids' 
21 issues will take a bit of time, you will probably 
22 want to distribute everything to the early signers 
23 and leave $75,000 for the time being." Is that — 
24 that's talking about the 24,000, correct? 
25 A Yeah. 
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Q And he's suggesting that he wants you to 
distribute to those that signed and to leave in the 
account $75,000 to pay the Slater boys, because he 
thinks they're going to come around later, right? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q Let's go to 765. 
MR. CALL: One more time, please? 
MR. WHEELER: CSS 765. 
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 39 was 
marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Exhibit 39, again, is a 
letter that's unsigned, and it says "not sent," if 
you'll see there in the handwriting, addressed to 
Jordan Slater 
be drafted? 
MR. 
MR. 
| it's getting 
MR. 
THE 
Do you 
WHEELER: 
ORITT: 
a little 
WHEELER: 
WITNESS: 
little left in me. My 
MR. 
not you. 
THE 
MR. 
WHEELER: 
WITNESS: 
WHEELER: 
know how this document came to 
Are you a little warm? 
Oh, just as the day goes on 
stuffy, but I'm okay. 
Got to wear you guys down. 
I got a little — I got a 
tank's not empty yet. 
Yeah. I'm talking to him, 
Oh. 
It looks like you can go 
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BRETON, EXAM BY WHEELER 
that he wanted that — it likely did. 
Q And the letter would have come from him, I 
assume. 
A Yes. 
Q Let's go to 6720. 
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 43 was 
marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Do you recognize this 
document? 
A Yeah. This — yes. 
Q It's an e-mail to you from Willie, correct? 
A Yeah. 
Q So at this stage you're starting to use 
e-mails -- • 
A Yes. 
Q -- it appears. 
A Disregard the fact that I didn't shoot any 
geese. Don't -- don't hold me responsible'for that. 
It was a very foggy day. 
Q And is he talking about the checks to the 
signing grandchildren? 
A I think he's referring, actually, to what 
the FedEx — because FedEx is our tenant in a 
building. I don't know, but I just — I saw the word 
"FedEx" and it just made me wonder. 
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Q It says, "You'll have the checks by Tuesday 
afternoon." Which checks is he talking about? 
A I think we -- I distribute checks to his 
account. I manage a real estate partnership, and 
FedEx is our tenant, so I don't really know if this 
was -- if these were the checks to the kids, to the 
Vanguard, because Willie has an account at Vanguard. 
Oh. It says "the kids' money," so — 
Q Yes. 
A Yeah, I think it is the checks. 
Q When it says that the kids1 money arrived, 
I'm assuming he's talking about his own kids. 
A Yes, I think that's correct. 
Q So you have made the distribution of the 
money, and his kids received their share? 
A Yes. 
Q And he's talking about the checks? 
A Yes. 
Q Also relating to the children's money? 
A Yes. 
Q Arriving by Tuesday? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, the decision to distribute that money 
was made by you and Willie? 
A And Jana. The three of us. 
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Q And Jana. The three of you together. 
Let's go to 6719. 
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 44 was 
marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Looks like we're still 
getting drafts from Willie here. Do you recognize 
Exhibit 44? 
A Yeah. It looks kind of like the same 
version as the one he wrote back on January 21st, 
Exhibit No. 41. 
MR. ORITT: Not exactly. 
THE.WITNESS: Not exactly, but it's 
similar. 
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Are you encouraging him 
to try to get this done with Rhonda, or is this 
something he's just doing on his own? 
A He is really operating on his own at this 
point. 
Q Yet — 
A I mean, he --
Q You're having your lawyers look at his 
drafts, correct? Or not — 
A At this point, I'm not even sure that — I 
don't see anything that — on these drafts that I 
even sent them off to anybody. I think he was 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 241 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
BRETON, EXAM BY WHEELER 
1 Maybe even your firm. So yeah, I was — I was — 
2 Q Well, you previously testified that you and 
3 Willie made a decision to distribute the money, not 
4 the lawyers, but your complaint is they didn't tell 
5 you not to do it; is that right? 
6 ' A My complaint is they never said that, "By 
7 doing anything other than the all or nothing, you 
8 leave yourself exposed to potentially a very" --
9 well, they didn't know how large the lawsuit would 
10 be. Neither did I. But you left yourself exposed, 
11 and that was — again, this was -- I had no reason to 
12 do any of this consent, release, distribute money, 
13 any of that. There was no time frame that — no gun 
14 to my head. There was 12 more years ahead of me, and 
15 so yeah, I'm a little upset. 
16 Q Well, let me ask you this: At the time you 
17 and Willie decided to distribute money to the signing 
18 grandchildren, you knew, did you not, that the 
19 Slaters had not signed releases? 
20 A At that time, I knew they had not signed-
21 the releases. 
22 Q And you knew that, without them signing 
23 those releases, that they were free to sue you? 
24 A I didn't focus on that at the time, but — 
25 yes, apparently they would be free to sue me, as they 
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made the distribution, that you had been threatened 
with a lawsuit by Breton Slater, correct? 
A Ten years earlier? 
Q Yeah. 
A Yeah. When he was 14 years old, I think he 
threatened to sue me, yeah. I think -- yes, I do 
recall that he threatened to sue me a couple times. 
Q And you knew that they had bitter feelings 
against you because they thought you had thrown them 
out in the street when you foreclosed on their house, 
correct? 
A I did not know that until their 
depositions. I knew, they were bitter at me, but that 
was what came out in the deposition. 
Q And you had been in litigation with Rhonda 
as well that we talked about in some of these other 
lawsuits where you were adverse to her in cases prior 
to this, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. So you knew that there had been 
threats of litigations -- litigation against you by 
the Slaters; there had been written threats; there 
had been allegations by them that you had mishandled 
the funds. All of this is true, correct? Prior to 
the time you distributed the money to the 
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1 grandchildren? 
2 A The last communication I got from them was 
3 in 19- — mid '90s, so ten years had gone by. Those 
4 threats — I mean, I -- you know, they were so 
5 concerned that, for ten years, I didnft hear another 
6 word from them, so I don't know what their thinking 
7 was for the next ten years, so I — I don't want to 
8 assume anything about what they were thinking. All I 
9 know is what they did. 
10 Q Well, if you were not concerned, why did 
11 you make it so abundantly clear to the Clyde Snow 
12 people that you wanted to make sure that you were not 
13 going to get sued? You said that was your primary 
14 objective. 
15 A Just because I'd been in litigation in 
16 California. I'd gone through a lot of — millions of 
17 dollars of litigation fees, and I was not interested 
18 in inviting a lawsuit that I didn't need to invite, 
19 and I had moved to Utah, and that was the last thing 
20 on my mind, was to get into further litigation with 
21 any of my relatives. 
22 Q What evidence do you have that the Slaters 
23 would not have sued you but for the work done by 
24 Clyde Snow & Sessions? 
25 MR. ORITT: Well, I'll object to the extent 
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Supreme Court ofUtah. 
Wesley G. HARLINE, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Ronald C. BARKER and Larry Whyte, Defendants 
and Appellees. 
Wesley G. HARLINE, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Pete N. VLAHOS and Vlahos and Sharp, a partner-
ship, Defendants and Appellees. 
Nos. 940322,940323. 
Feb. 14, 1996. 
Client brought two legal malpractice actions 
against bankruptcy attorneys. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Tyrone Medley and Leslie 
A. Lewis. JJ., granted summary judgment for attor-
neys, and client appealed. The Supreme Court, Zim-
merman, C.J., held that: (1) doctrine of issue preclu-
sion bound client to bankruptcy court's determination 
that he transferred property with intent to defraud 
creditors and that he knowingly and fraudulently made 
false oath and that therefore his discharge had to be 
denied on those grounds, and (2) client's instructions 
to his attorneys not to amend his bankruptcy schedules 
precluded finding that attorneys' negligence prox-
imately caused denial of client's bankruptcy discharge. 
Affirmed. 
See also, 854 P.2d 595. 
West Headnotes 
HJ Attorney and Client 45 €^»129(2) 
45 Attorney and Client 
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful 
Acts 
45kl29f2) k. Pleading and evidence. Most 
Cited Cases 
In legal malpractice action, plaintiff must plead 
and prove (1) attorney-client relationship, (2) duty of 
attorney to client arising from their relationship, (3) 
breach of that duty, (4) causal connection between 
breach of duty and resulting injury to client, and (5) 
actual damages. 
J21 Attorney and Client 45 ©?*105£ 
45 Attorney and Client 
45ITI Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k 105.5 k. Elements of malpractice or neg-
ligence action in general. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 45kl05) 
For purposes of proving legal malpractice, 
"proximate cause" is that cause which, in natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by efficient interven-
ing cause, produces injury and without which the 
result would not have occurred; it is the efficient cause 
which necessarily sets in operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury. 
E l Attorney and Client 45 0^129(3) 
4£ Attorney and Client 
45IIL Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful 
Acts 
45k 129(3) k. Trial and judgment. MflSl 
For purposes of legal malpractice action, question 
ofproximate cause generally raises issue of fact to be 
submitted to jury for its determination. 
J3J Attorney and Client 45 €1^129(3) 
45 Attorney and Client 
45HL Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful 
Acts 
45k 129m k. Trial and judgment. Most 
Citeci Cases. 
Proximate cause issue in legal malpractice action 
can be decided as matter of law when (1) facts are so 
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clear that reasonable persons could not disagree about 
underlying facts or about application of legal standard 
to the facts, or (2) when proximate cause of injury is 
left to speculation so that claim fails as matter of law. 
E ] Attorney and Client 45 €=112 
45, Attorney and Client 
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k112 k. Conduct of litigation. Most Cited 
Cases 
For purposes of proving proximate cause in legal 
malpractice cases by showing that absent the attor-
ney's negligence, the underlying suit would have been 
successful, the objective is to establish what the result 
of underlying litigation should have been, which is an 
objective standard, not what particular judge or jury 
would have decided, which is a subjective standard. 
IS] Attorney and Client 45 €=»129(3) 
45 Attorney and Client 
45III Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful 
Acts 
45k129(3) k. Trial and judgment. Most 
Cited Cases 
For purposes of proving proximate cause in legal 
malpractice cases by showing that, absent the attor-
ney's negligence, the underlying suit would have been 
successful, if only a bankruptcy judge could have 
decided issues in the underlying suit in the first in-
stance, then malpractice plaintiff is not entitled to lay 
jury in malpractice action to decide what outcome of 
underlying suit would have been absent attorney's 
negligence. 
fZl Attorney and Client 45 €=129(2) 
45 Attorney and Client 
45IT1 Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k 129 Actions for Negligence or Wrongful 
Acts 
45k 129(2) k. Pleading and evidence. Most 
Cited Cases 
For purposes of determining, in legal malpractice 
action, whether outcome in underlying suit would 
have been different but for attorney's alleged negli-
gence, subjective opinion testimony mom judge who 
presided over original case as to how that judge would 
have ruled absent the alleged negligence of attorney is 
improper and inadmissible. 
18] Appeal and Error 30 €=1050.1(12) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVim Harmless Error 
30XVimiO Admission of Evidence 
30k 1050 Prejudicial Effect in General 
30k 1050 1 Evidence in General 
30kl050.1(8) Particular Types of 
Evidence 
3Qkl05Q.in2^k. Opinions and 
conclusions. Most Cited Cases 
Error in admitting, in legal malpractice suit 
against plaintiffs bankruptcy attorney, subjective 
opinion testimony from bankruptcy judge who pre-
sided over original case as to how that judge would 
have ruled absent the alleged negligence of attorney 
was harmless error where plaintiff foiled to show that 
bankruptcy attorney caused plaintiffs denial of dis-
charge in underlying bankruptcy cases. 
B l Appeal and Error 30 <£=s?1026 
2H Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
3HXYICU Harmless Error 
30XVIQU In General 
lQklH2i Prejudice to Rights of Party as 
Ground of Review 
30k 1026 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
"Harmless error" is error which, although prop-
erly preserved below and presented on appeal, is suf-
ficiently inconsequential that appellate court con-
cludes that there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
error affected outcome of proceedings. 
fljQJ Judgment 228 "C^mo 
22S. Judgment 
228XIV Conclusiveness of Adjudication 
22ftXIVfn Matters Concluded 
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228k716 Matters in Issue 
228k720 k. Matters actually litigated 
and determined. Most Cited Cases 
Issue preclusion prevents relitigation of issues 
that have once been adjudicated even though claims 
for relief in the separate actions may have been dif-
ferent. 
01] Judgment 228 €^829(3) 
22& Judgment 
228XVII Foreign Judgments 
22M22 Effect of Judgments of United States 
Courts in State Courts 
228k829H) k. Operation and effect. Most 
Cited Cases 
Doctrine of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel 
bound former Chapter 7 debtor to bankruptcy court's 
factual determination that he transferred property with 
intent to defraud creditors and that he knowingly and 
fraudulently made false oath and that therefore his 
discharge had to be denied; thus, debtor could not 
prove that outcome in bankruptcy proceedings would 
have been different but for attorney's alleged negli-
gence in preparing debtor's schedules and statement of 
affairs. 
IIU Bankruptcy 51 €=•3315(2) 
51 Bankruptcy 
51X Discharge 
51X(B) Dischargeable Debtors 
51 X(B)2 Determination of Dischargeabil ity 
i l k l l H Evidence 
51k3315 Presumptions and Burden of 
Proof 
51k3315(2) k. Particular grounds 
for objection to discharge. Most Cited Cases 
Bankruptcy 51 G»3317(1) 
51 Bankraptcy 
51X Discharge 
51X(B) Dischargeable Debtors 
51X(B)2 Determination of Dischargeabil ity 
HJL&14 Evidence 
51k3317Weight and Sufficiency 
51km7(1) k. In general. Most 
©2011 Thomson Reuters. No 
Cited Cases 
When creditor objects to debtor's discharge, 
burden of proof is on creditor to prove by prepon-
derance of evidence that debtor acted with fraudulent 
intent. 
[13] Bankruptcy 51 €^3315(2) 
51 Bankruptcy 
51X Discharge 
51X(R) Dischargeable Debtors 
51X(B)2 Determination of Dischargeabil ity 
i lk2H4 Evidence 
51k3315 Presumptions and Burden of 
Proof 
51k3315f2) k. Particular grounds 
for objection to discharge. Most Cited Cases 
When creditor objects to debtor's discharge, 
bankmptcy court may deduce or infer requisite intent 
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors from facts and 
circumstances of the case. 
[14] Bankruptcy 51 €=^3274 
l i Bankruptcy 
5IX Discharge 
5lX(B) Dischargeable Debtors 
51X(TO1 In General 
51k3273 Grounds for Denial of Dis-
charge 
51k3274k. Intent. Most Cited Cases 
For purposes of denying discharge for intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, finding of "reck-
less indifference to the truth" suffices to establish 
requisite intent to defraud. 
{15] Bankruptcy 51 <fc*3274 
51 Bankmptcy 
51X Discharge 
51X(B) Dischargeable Debtors 
51X(B)1 In General 
5lk3273 Grounds for Denial of Dis-
charge 
51k3274k. Intent. Most Cited Cases 
Generally, debtor who acts in reliance on advice 
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of his attorney lacks intent required to deny his dis-
charge, but his reliance must be in good faith. 
HJ5J Attorney and Client 45 0^109 
A5. Attorney and Client 
45I1I Duties and Liabilities of Attorney to Client 
45k 109 k. Acts and omissions of attorney in 
general. Most Cited Cases 
Chapter 7 debtor's refusal to amend his statement 
of affairs and schedules prior to discharge hearing 
precluded finding in debtor's later legal malpractice 
action against his bankmptcy attorneys that bank-
ruptcy attorneys1 alleged negligence in failing to 
amend his schedules and statement proximately 
caused the denial of debtor's discharge for intending to 
defraud creditors and filing false statements. 
*434 Third District, Salt Lake County; Tyrone Medley 
in the Barker case; Leslie A. Lewis in the Vlahos 
case. J. Bruce Reading. Wesley D. Hutchins.Salt Lake 
City, for Harline. 
Thomas L. Kay, Mark O. Morris. AmvE. Weissman. 
Salt Lake City, for Barker and Whyte. 
for Vlahos. 
*435 ZIMMERMAN, Chief Justice: 
This opinion addresses two appeals filed by 
Wesley G. Harline from separate grants of summary 
judgment, each in favor of the attorneys who 
represented Harline in connection with his bankmptcy 
before the U.S. Bankmptcy Court for the District of 
Utah. After the bankmptcy court denied Harline's 
bankmptcy discharge, Harline brought two legal 
malpractice actions, the first against defendants Pete 
N. Vlahos and the law firm Vlahos and Sharp (col-
lectively "Vlahos"), and the second against defendants 
Ronald C. Barker and Larry Whyte. Both sets of at-
torneys moved for summary judgment, alleging that 
they were not the proximate cause of the denial of 
Harline's discharge. The trial court in each action 
granted the motion, ruling that Harline had failed to 
produce any record evidence that the attorneys had 
caused the denial of Harline's bankmptcy dis-
charge. ^  Harline appeals both rulings. Because each 
appeal raises similar claims, we consider them to-
©2011 Thomson Reuters. No 
gether and discuss pertinent differences between them 
in our analysis as necessary. We affirm both rulings. 
FN1. The malpractice actions were assigned 
to different judges in the Third District Court. 
" '[I]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
ingparty.' "K& T.lna v.Koroulis. 888 P.2d 623. 624 
(Utah 1994) (quoting Hiqciins v. 5£/f Lake County, 
KS5 P7.H m 2K nitah 1993)). Because summary 
judgment was entered against Harline in both cases, 
we state the tacts in the light most favorable to him. 
In February of 1986, Harline retained Vlahos in 
connection with his chapter 11 petition for bankmpt-
cy. Harline gave Vlahos a list of his creditors and his 
assets. Vlahos filed Harline's bankmptcy petition on 
February 14, 1986. Five weeks later, on March 21st, 
Harline signed both a "Statement of Affairs for Debtor 
Not Engaged in Business" and schedules of his assets 
and liabilities. Harline's signature on each document 
was preceded by the statement "I, Wesley G. Harline, 
certify under penalty of perjury that I have read ... the 
foregoing ... and that [it is] true and correct to the best 
of my knowledge, infonnation and belief." These 
documents were then submitted to the bankmptcy 
court. 
In June of 1986, Vlahos withdrew as bankmptcy 
counsel for Harline, and Betty J. Marsh entered her 
appearance as counsel. Marsh subsequently withdrew, 
and in the tall of 1986, Barker and Whyte began 
representing Harline. — On September 18, 1986, the 
bankmptcy court converted Harline's case to a chapter 
7 proceeding and entered an order directing Harline 
and his counsel to prepare and file chapter 7 schedules 
and statements on or before November 18,1986. 
FN2. The parties dispute the date on which 
Harline engaged Barker and Whyte. Flow-
ever, solely for purposes of this appeal, 
Barker and Whyte concede that they 
represented Harline during the relevant time 
period. 
About two years later, in August of 1988, a 
hearing was held at which Harline's creditors objected 
to his bankmptcy discharge. By this date, Harline and 
his counsel still had not filed new or amended state-
to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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ments and schedules. At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the bankruptcy court orally denied Harline's discharge 
on the ground that there were omissions and inaccu-
racies in Harline's statement of affairs and bankruptcy 
schedules. The court based its denial of discharge on 
section 121(a)(2) and (4) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
which provides: 
The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless-
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate 
charged with custody of property under this title, 
has transferred, ... or has permitted to be trans-
ferred ... 
(A) property of the debtor, within one year 
before the date of the filing of the petition; or 
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the 
filing of the petition; 
*436 (4) the debtor knowingly and fraudu-
lently, in or in connection with the case-
(A) made a false oath or account[.] 
11 USC § 727(a). 
The bankruptcy court found that Harline had 
failed to disclose transfers ofpartnership interests and 
real property on his March 21, 1986, statement of 
affairs. Specifically, Harline answered "No" when 
asked whether he had been engaged in a partnership or 
in any business during the six years immediately 
preceding the filing of his original bankruptcy peti-
tion. However, the court found that in January of 
1985, thirteen months prior to the filing ofhis bank-
ruptcy petition, Harline had assigned two partnersh ip 
interests to the Weber Clinic pension plan,m which 
he should have disclosed on the statement. In addition, 
Harline answered "None" on the statement when 
asked whether he had made any transfer or other 
dispositionofreal or tangible personal property during 
the year immediately preceding the filing ofhis orig-
inal bankruptcy petition. However, the court found 
©2011 Thomson Reuters. No 
that in January of 1985 and December of 1984, Har-
line executed, without consideration, four quitclaim 
deeds conveying real property to his children. Two of 
these deeds were recorded in November of 1985, three 
months prior to the filing of Harline's original bank-
ruptcy petition; the other two were recorded in March 
and May of 1986, after Harline's petition was filed. 
The court held that the date the deed was recorded 
determined the date of each transfer and that Harli ne 
should have disclosed the real property transfers on his 
statement of affairs. 
FN3. Harline, a medical doctor, was em-
ployed by the Weber Clinic. 
The court also found other omissions and miss-
tatements in Harline's filing. Specifically, Harline 
owned a Merrill Lynch stock account at the time he 
filed his bankruptcy petition but failed to list the ac-
count on his bankruptcy schedules. In addition, im-
mediately before and after filing his bankruptcy peti-
tion, Harline directed Merrill Lynch to cash out the 
account, and he used the $38,63427 in proceeds for 
his personal expenses without authorization from the 
bankruptcy court. Finally, the court found that Harline 
did not reside at the address listed on his statement of 
affairs. 
The bankruptcy court found that Harline made the 
transfers of property and cashed the Merrill Lynch 
account with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 
creditors and that he knowingly and fraudulently made 
a false oath by signing the statement of affairs and 
schedules which misstated his residence, denied the 
partnership and real property transfers, and omitted 
the Merrill Lynch account In making these findings, 
the court noted that Harline had testified that he signed 
the statement of aflairs and schedules "after only 
glancing through them [and t]hat he didn't read them, 
that he was not familiar with bankruptcy law or 
bankruptcy rules, but that he gave information [omit-
ted from his statement and schedules] to his attorney." 
However, the court concluded: 
My findings as to intent to hinder, delay or de-
fraud creditors and knowing and fraudulent false 
oath are made because of the significant number of 
wrongful acts and the reckless indifference to the 
truth showed [sic] by Wesley G. Harline. 
The sheer weight of the evidence gives rise to the 
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inescapable conclusion that Wesley G. Harline 
acted knowingly and with the intent to avoid paying 
creditors with the intent to conceal property or to 
place the property beyond the reach of creditors. 
considered on its merits in the federal courts. 
P& Harline v. Barker. 854 P.2d 595. 598 n. 1 
(Utah CIApp.), cert denied, 862 P,2d 1356 
(Utah 1993). 
The Court therefore will not grant to the debtor a 
discharge. Discharge will be denied. 
After the bankruptcy discharge ruling, Harline's 
attorneys moved to alter or amend the judgment. The 
motion addressed all the bases the judge gave for his 
ruling: Harline contended that the real property 
transfers to his children occurred on the dates Harline 
conveyed the deeds and not on the dates the deeds 
were recorded; that liquidating the Merrill Lynch 
stock account constituted an exchange of assets rather 
than a transfer; and that Harline did not knowingly and 
fraudulently make a false oath because he provided his 
attorneys with all of the information for his statement 
of affairs and schedules, *437 advised them of subse-
quent changes, did not himself prepare or file the 
statement and schedules, was unfamiliar with bank-
ruptcy rules, relied on the advice of counsel, was 
unaware that the statement and schedules contained 
erroneous information, and signed the schedules after 
only briefly glancing through them. The bankruptcy 
court denied the motion to alter or amend the judg-
ment. Harline's attorneys then appealed, and in May of 
1989, the federal district court dismissed Harline's 
appeal, affirming both the denial of discharge and the 
denial of the motion to alter or amend. 
FN5. Vlahos contended that (i) Harline's 
signature on the statement of affairs and 
schedules constituted an intervening cause; 
(ii) Harline's failure to amend his statement 
and schedules was the proximate cause of his 
denial of discharge; and (iii) Harline's 
pre-petition fraudulent conveyances and 
misstatements in the original statement and 
schedules caused his denial of discharge. 
Meanwhile, in November of 1990, Harline filed a 
second malpractice lawsuit in state district court 
against Barker and Whyte, alleging that their failure to 
prepare an amended or new statement of affairs and 
schedules resulted in the denial of Harline's dis-
charge.1^ Barker and Whyte filed their first motion 
for summary judgment, alleging that Harline's claims 
were barred by equitable estoppel, that they had no 
duty to amend the schedules, and that they were not 
the proximate cause of the denial of Harline's dis-
charge. The trial court granted Barker and Whyte's 
motion. Vlahos then immediately moved for summary 
judgment a second time in his separate suit on the 
ground that the Barker and Whyte judgment consti-
tuted res judicata as to the proximate cause issue. The 
trial court granted Vlahos' second mot ion^ 
Harline next filed a malpractice lawsuit in state 
court in January of 1990, alleging that Vlahos'negli-
gent preparation of Harline's statement of affairs and 
schedules directly resulted in the denial of Harline's 
bankruptcy discharge.im In December of 1990, Vla-
hos filed the first of three motions for summary 
judgment, contending that Harline's suit was barred by 
equitable and collateral estoppel and that even if 
Vlahos was negligent, that negligence was not the 
proximate cause of Harline's denial of discharge. m -
The district court denied the motion in June of 1991. 
FN4. Harline also alleged that Vlahos' neg-
ligence directly resulted in the loss of any 
exemptions. All parties to this appeal con-
ceded at oral argument that the exemption 
issue is moot, because the bankmptcy court 
eventually allowed Harline to file an 
amended exemption schedule which was 
FN6 Harline also alleged that Barker and 
Whyte's negligence resulted in the denial of 
any exemptions. This allegation is now moot. 
Sea supra note 4. 
FN7. The propriety of the trial court's deci-
sion on Vlahos' second motion for summary 
judgment is not before us in this appeal, and 
we therefore express no opinion regarding 
the basis for that court's ruling. 
Harline appealed both rulings to this court, which 
transferred the cases to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The appeals court reversed the Barker and Whyte 
judgment, holding that the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment on the proximate cause issue. 
Harlinev.Barker. 854 P2d 595rtJtah CtAm.). cart 
denied, 862P.2d n56flJtah 1993\ The appeals court 
held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
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how a "reasonable juror" would have ruled regarding 
Harline's intent to defraud if Harline had submitted 
amended bankruptcy schedules. Id. af 602. The ap-
peals court subsequently issued an unpublished me-
morandum decision reversing and remanding the 
Vlahos judgment on the basis of its decision in Barker. 
Harline v. Vlahos, No. 930067, slip op. (Utah CtApp. 
Aug. 5,1993) (mem.). 
Vlahos then filed a motion requesting that the 
original bankruptcy judge clarify his August 1988 
order denying Harline's discharge. Vlahos asked the 
judge to rule that he would have denied Harline's 
discharge even if Harline had amended his schedules. 
In essence, Vlahos wanted the bankruptcy judge to 
state for the record that it was Harline's own wrong-
doing that caused the denial of his discharge. On 
January 24, 1994, the bankruptcy court held aheari ng 
on Vlahos' motion.*438 Although noting that he was 
being asked to clarify an order entered over five years 
earlier and his discomfort with the fact that Harline's 
attorney was not present, the bankruptcy judge entered 
an oral ruling "that an amendment would have made 
no difference whatsoever with this Court's denial of 
discharge, that the act was the act of Mr. Harline, 
Wesley Harline, and not the act of any lawyers" and 
directed "everybody concerned" to his opinion in Job 
v. Qa/cfar (In re Calder), 93 B.R. 734, 737-38 
fBankr.D.Utah 1988) (finding debtor's subsequent 
disclosure of property interests omitted from state-
ment and schedules insufficient to rebut debtor's intent 
to defraud), aff'd, 907 F.2d 953 (10th Cir,1990). 
Vlahos' counsel submitted a written order to the 
bankruptcy court incorporating its oral ruling. Har-
line's counsel then moved for reconsideration. At an 
April 25, 1994 hearing on the reconsideration motion, 
the bankruptcy judge refused to sign the prepared 
order. However, the judge reiterated that he originally 
denied Harline's discharge as a matter of law on the 
basis of Calder. 
Barker and Whyte then filed their second motion 
for summary judgment in state district court. They 
contended that no issues of material feet remained as 
to causation because the bankruptcy court's January 
24th oral ruling conclusively resolved any question as 
to how the original bankruptcy judge, or any bank-
ruptcy judge, would have ruled on Harline's discharge 
even if Harline had submitted an amended statement 
of affairs and schedules. In response, Harline moved 
to strike any reference to the January 24th ruling, 
©2011 Thomson Reuters. No 
vigorously contesting both the ethical propriety and 
the admissibility of the ruling. In addition, in an at-
tempt to establish the existence of a disputed issue of 
material fact, Harline submitted portions of Whyte's 
deposition and answers to interrogatories which in-
dicated that Whyte knew Harline's statement of affairs 
and schedules were deficient. After a hearing, the trial 
court granted the summary judgment motion. 
Meanwhile, Vlahos filed his third motion for 
summary judgment. This motion essentially mirrored 
Barker aid Whyte's second summary judgment mo-
tion. In addition, Vlahos argued that the doctrine of res 
judicata precluded Harline from litigating the prox-
imate cause issue because of the trial court's decision 
in the Baiker and Whyte case. The trial court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Vlahos, ruling that 
there was; no longer any material fact at issue, that 
Harline could not establish that any act or omission by 
Vlahos proximately caused his loss, and as an addi-
tional ground, that the Barker and Whyte judgment 
was res judicata as to the proximate cause issue. 
Harline appeals both rulings. In each appeal, 
Harline claims that (i) the trial court improperly ad-
mitted the January 24,1994 bankruptcy ruling; (ii)the 
very issuance of the bankruptcy judges January 24th 
ruling vio lated rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
was animcoristitutional advisory opinion and, on the 
merits, was clearly erroneous; and (iii) disputed issues 
offact regarding proximate cause preclude summary 
judgment. We decline to address Harline's second set 
of claims because he has presented no authority for the 
proposition that this court could constitutionally re-
view an order emanating from a federal bankruptcy 
court. In any event, in light of our holding today, we 
need not n^ch these claims. 
We first state the applicable standard of review. 
"Summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." K& 
T, Inc, m P.2d at ft2C>27 (citing Utah RCiy.P, 
56(c); Higgins. 855 P2d at 235). ''Because entitlement 
to summary judgment is a question of law, we accord 
no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal 
issues presented." Id. at 627 fciting Hiaains. 855 P.2d 
at 235; Etnas v. Sate 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1989V)." 'We determine only whether the trial court 
erred in applying the governing law and whether the 
toOrig.USGov. Works. 
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trial court correctly held that there were no disputed 
issues of material fact.' "/d. (quoting Farree. 784P.2d 
at 151). In addition, "we may affirm a grant of sum-
mary judgment on any ground available to the trial 
court, even if it is not one relied on below." Higginsr 
855P.2dat23S. 
*439 As a preliminary matter, we address the 
question of whether a judge or a jury should decide 
two issues relating to proximate cause in legal mal-
practice actions. These issues are common to both 
appeals before us. Harline first contends that prox-
imate cause issues inevitably raise jury questions and 
always preclude summary judgment. Harline further 
contends that if he should prevail on these appeals, at 
trial a jury should decide whether a reasonable judge 
would have granted him a discharge absent the alleged 
negligence of his attorneys, despite the fact that only a 
bankruptcy judge could have made this determination 
in the first instance. We disagree with both conten-
tions. 
[1] We first address the contention that the pres-
ence of a question of proximate cause precludes a 
summary judgment. In a legal malpractice action, a 
plaintiff must plead and prove (i) an attorney-client 
relationship; (ii) a duty of the attorney to the client 
arising from their relationship; (iii) a breach of that 
duty; (iv) a causal connection between the breach of 
duty and the resulting injury to the client; and (v) 
actual damages. Wlliams v. Barber. 765 P.2d 887. 
889 (Utah 1988): 2 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffiey M. 
Smith, Legal Malpractice^ 27.5, at635 (3ded. 1989). 
For the purposes of their summary judgment motions, 
both Vlahos and Barker and Whyte conceded the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship, a duty 
owed to Harline, and breach of that duty. Thus, the 
question before each trial court was whether the at-
torneys' breach of duty proximately caused Harline's 
denial of discharge. 
[2][3] Proximate cause is" 'that cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequence[ ] (unbroken by an 
efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and 
without which the result would not have occurred. It is 
the efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in 
operation the factors that accomplish the injury.' " 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enters.. 697 P.2d 240. 245-46 
(Utah 1985) (quoting ftate vs Lawson, 688 P.2d 479. 
482 & n. 3 (Utah 1984ft. Generally, the question of 
proximate cause raises an issue of tact "to be submit-
ted to the jury for its determination." Mitchell, 697 
P.2d at 245: see also 2 Mallen & Smith, supra, § 
27.10, at 657. However, there are occasions when no 
jury question is presented. As Prosser and Keeton 
explain, "Two kinds of questions, then, are always to 
be decided by the jury if reasonable persons could 
differ about them on the evidence received at tri-
al-first, fact questions in the usual sense and, second, 
evaluative applications of legal standards (such as the 
legal concept of 'foreseeability') to the facts." W. 
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of 
Torts § 45, at 320 (5th ed. 1984). Accordingly, if 
"there could be no reasonable difference of opinion" 
on a determination of the facts "in the usual sense" or 
on an evaluative application of the legal standard to 
the facts, then the decision is one of law for the trial 
judge or for an appellate court. Id. at 319-20; cf. gate 
v.Pena. 869 P.2d 932. 936-39 (Utah 1994) (discuss-
ing nature of legal questions). At the other extreme, 
when the facts are so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently 
established that determining causation becomes 
"completely speculative," the claim fails as a matter of 
law. M/ftftef/. 697 P.2d at 246; see also Seffensen V, 
Srith's Management Com.. 820 P.2d 482. 486-87 
(Utah Q,App1991), aff'd, 862 P.2ri 1342 (Utah 
19931 
[4] Contrary to Harline's first contention, then, 
proximate cause issues can be decided as a matter of 
law when a determination of the facts fells on either of 
two opposite ends of a factual continuum. Thus, 
summary judgment is appropriate (i) when the facts 
are so clear that reasonable persons could not disagree 
about the underlying facts or about the application of a 
legal standard to the facts, and (ii) when the proximate 
cause of an injury is left to speculation so that the 
claim fails as a matter of law. We therefore reject 
Harline's first contention that the presence of an issue 
of proximate cause precludes summary judgment. 
[5] We now turn to Harline's second contention, 
that only a jury sitting in the malpractice action should 
decide what a reasonable judge should have done in 
the underlying suit. To prove proximate cause in legal 
malpractice cases such as Harline's, the plaintiff must 
show that absent the attorney's negligence, the un-
derlying suit would have been successful. Thus, the 
proximate*440 cause issue is ordinarily handled by 
means of a " 'suit within a suit' or 'tri-
al-within-a-trial.' "2 Mallen & Smith, supra, § 27.7, 
at 641. "The objective is to establish what the result 
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[of the underlying litigation] should have been (an 
objective standard), not what a particular judge or jury 
would have decided (a subjective standard)." Id. § 
27.7, at 641-42. 
[6] Seemingly because of this objective standard, 
a number of courts have concluded that "[i]f the un-
derlying suit would have been tried to a jury, or a 
judge sitting as a trier of feet, ... the jury in t he mal-
practice case should decide the disputed factual issues 
pertaining to the original suit." Phillipsv. CI ana/. 152 
Ari? 415, 1W P2ri 300, 306 (C\ App 1986) .In other 
words, the identity of the original trier of fact makes 
no difference; rather, "the line dividing the respo nsi-
bility of judge and jury runs between questions of law 
and questions of fact." Chocktoot v. Sn'th. 280 Or 
567.571 P.2d 1255. 1259 (1977) (en banc); see also 
Hdmbrechtv.a. Paul Ins, Co., 122 Wis 2d 94, 362 
N.W2d 118. 134 fl 985). Following this line of rea-
soning, these courts have concluded that it is appro-
priate for a malpractice jury to decide how areaso na-
ble administrative law judge should have ruled on an 
applicant's eligibility for Social Security disability 
benefits had the applicant's attorney filed a timely 
appeal, Phillips, 733 P,2d at 307; how a reasonable 
judge in a divorce action should have divided marital 
assets had the plaintiffs attorney properly established 
the value of the assets, Hdmbrecht, 162 N W,2d at 
135-37; and how a reasonable probate judge should 
have ruled on whether a claimant was a decedent's heir 
had the claimant's attorney properly discovered and 
presented evidence and filed a timely appeal of the 
original adverse decision, Chocktoot. 571 P2d at 
1259 
While the fact versus law distinction followed by 
these courts has some superficial analytic appeal, we 
reject its application in this context. Harline seeks to 
have a jury determine what only a bankruptcy judge 
could have determined in the first instance. We see no 
reason why a malpractice plaintiff should be able to 
bootstrap his way into having a lay jury decide the 
merits of the underlying "suit within a suit" when, by 
statute or other rule of law, only an expert judge could 
have made the underlying decision. It is illogical, in 
effect, to make a change in the law's allocation of 
responsibility between judge and jury in the underl y-
ing action when that action is revisited in legal mal-
practice actions and thereby distort the "suit with in a 
suit" analytic model. Sfee2Mallen & Smith, supra, § 
2723, at 693 n. 5. To so proceed ignores and, in some 
cases, contradicts the public policy goals which 
prompted the initial assignment of decision-making 
authority respectively to judges and to juries on spe-
cific issues. There is no basis for abrogating those 
public policy goals simply because the matter arises in 
a legal malpractice context. 
Nor do we agree with the implication, not 
well-analyzed by those courts applying the simplistic 
feet versus law distinction, that a judge sitting in a 
malpractice case would be any less objective than a 
jury in determining what a reasonable judge should 
have done in the underlying case.1*18. We simply do not 
see the logical connection between ensuring an ob-
jective determination of how the underlying case 
should have come out and the identity of the arbiter 
who makes that objective determination. Rather, it 
makes far more practical sense to apply the rule that if 
the underlying case could only have been tried by a 
judge, then this aspect of the malpractice claim-the 
suit within the suit-must likewise berried by a judge. 
FN8. We note that "what a reasonable judge 
should have done" is not a different inquiry 
than "what the plaintiff should have recov-
ered." These are identical inquiries; we do 
not mean to suggest that "there may be cha-
racteristics peculiar to a judge in the deci-
sion-making process." 2 Ronald E. Mallen & 
Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 2723, 
ait 693 n.9 (3d ed. 1989). Rather, we use the 
"reasonable judge" term to indicate that a 
statute or other rule of law permits only a 
judge to make the underlying decision. 
The next question we address, also common to 
both appeals, is whether both trial courts erred in 
considering the bankruptcy court's January 24th ruling 
regarding the motion to clarify its original order de-
nying Harline's bankmptcy discharge. 
"[I]nadmissible*441 evidence cannot be considered in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment." D & L 
Supply v. Saurini. 775 P2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989). 
Therefore, we must determine whether the two trial 
courts properly admitted the bankruptcy court's Janu-
ary 24th oral ruling. 
The trial court in the Vlahos case held a pretrial 
hearing in May of 1994 on Harline's motion in limine 
to exclude the bankruptcy court ru l ing^ The tran-
script indicates that the trial court likened the bank-
©2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
912P2d433 
(Cite as: 912 P26 433) 
ge 10 
ruptcy judge's ruling to expert testimony. The trial 
court appears to have weighed the prejudicial effect of 
the ruling against its probativeness, as required by rule 
403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, noting that the oral 
ruling was not "unduly prejudicial" and "no more 
prejudicial than probative." mML Thus, the trial court 
concluded that the bankruptcy court ruling on the 
motion to clarify was relevant and admissible evi-
dence in an objective determination of how a rea-
sonable judge mighthave ruled onHarline's discharge 
absent any alleged negligence on the part ofVlahos. 
FN9. The record does not indicate how the 
trial judge in the Barker and Whyte case 
ruled onHarline's motion to strike the Janu-
ary 24th bankruptcy ruling. However, be-
cause Barker and Whyte's summary judg-
ment motion relied solely on the January 
24th ruling, we must assume that the trial 
court in that case implicitly ruled that the 
January 24th ruling was admissible. 
FN10. Rule 403 provides, "Although rele-
vant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, contusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." UtahRF.vid, 401 
"In reviewing atrial court's ruling on the admis-
sibility of evidence under mle403Twe will not over-
turn the court's determination unless it was an 'ab use 
of discretion.' " State v. Hamilton. 827 P2d 232.239 
(Utah 1992). Thus, we must decide "whether, as a 
matter of law, the trial court's decision that 'the un-
fairly prejudicial potential of the evidence outweighs 
[or does not outweigh] its probativeness' was beyond 
the limits of reasonability." Id. at 239-40 (alteration in 
original) (quoting State v, Ramirez, 817 P,2d 774, 
781-82 n. 3 (Utah 1991VI. We conclude that both trial 
courts erred in considering the bankruptcy court ruling 
in connection with the motionsfor summary judgment 
but that the error in each case was harmless. 
[71 Because an objective standard applies in legal 
malpractice cases, virtually all authorities agree that 
subjective opinion testimony from the judge who 
presided over the original case as to how that jud^ 
would have ruled absent the alleged negligence of the 
attorney is improper and inadmissible. Phillips. 733 
P.2d at 303-06: Chocktoot. 571 P.2d at 1258-59: 
Hdmbrecht, 362 N.W.2d at, 125-26; see also 2 Mallen 
& Smith, supra, § 27.17, at 683. Such testimony is 
considered inadmissible because its marginal relev-
ance to an objective inquiry as to what the outcome of 
the underlying litigation should have been is substan-
tially outweighed by the possible prejudice created 
when a judge, "in effect, sides with one of the litigants 
in an ongoing proceeding." Phillips. 733 P.2d at 305. 
Such testimony also raises ethical and public policy 
concerns because it creates an appearance of partiality 
on behalf of one of the current litigants by the judge 
who testifies. Id. In addition, permitting such testi-
mony may produce disruption in the courts. For ex-
ample, if the judge who tried the underlying case is 
permitted to testify in the subsequent malpractice 
action, the same would seem to apply to jurors when 
the underlying case is tried to a jury. "The specter of 
such a scene throws a chill down our judicial spine." 
Id. at 306; see also! Mallen & Smith, supra, § 27.17, 
at 683. We lay it to rest today. 
While we express no view on the bankruptcy 
court's actions, we note that; the oral ruling was in-
tended to clarify an order entered five and one-half 
years earlier, that it was rendered without the presence 
of Harline's counsel, apparently withdrawn on the 
subsequent objection of Harline's counsel and, in its 
final form, contained little of the hypothetical specu-
lation to which Harline objects. We fail to see how the 
January 24th ruling had much, if any, probative value. 
We thus conclude that what little probative value it 
may have had was substantially outweighed by pre-
judice. Therefore, each trial *442 court abused its 
discretion in considering the oral ruling. 
[8][9] However, we conclude that any error in the 
trial courts' admissionofthis evidence was harmless. " 
'Harmless' errors are 'errors which, although properly 
preserved below and presented on appeal, are suffi-
ciently inconsequential that we conclude there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the out-
come of the proceedings.' "Hamf/fon. 827 P2d at 240 
(quoting State v. Verde 770 P.2d 116. 120 (Utah 
1989V>: see also Utah RCiv.P. 61: Utah REvid. 
103faV Utah R.Crim.P. 30(a). Put another way, " 
'[f]or an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a 
different outcome must be sufficiently high to un-
dermine confidence in the verdict.' "Id. (quoting Sate 
v.Kniaht. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987U The error here 
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does not undermine our confidence in the summary 
judgment granted toVlahos or to Barker and Whyte. 
We reach this conclusion because we agree with each 
trial court that Harline failed to raise any disputed 
issue of material fact indicating that Vlahos or Barker 
and Whyte caused his denial of discharge. We ex-
amine each case separately. 
[10][11] Turning first to Harline's malpractice 
claim against Vlahos, we are satisfied that the doctrine 
of issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, binds Har-
line to the bankruptcy court's factual determination 
that he transferred property with the intent to hin der, 
delay, or defraud creditors and that he knowingly and 
fraudulently made a false oath, even if Vlahos negli-
gently prepared Harline's statement and bankruptcy 
schedules. Issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of 
issues that have once been adjudicated even though 
the claims for relief in the separate actions may be 
different. penrod v, Nu Creation Cram Inc., 669 
P.2d 873. 875 (Utah 1983V The doctrine applies only 
if four requirements are met: 
First, the issue in both cases must be identical. 
Second, the judgment must be final with respect to 
that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, 
fairly, and competently litigated in the first action. 
Fourth, the party who is precluded from litigating 
the issue must be either a party to the first action or a 
privy of a party. 
Madsen v. Borthick. 769 P.2d 245. 250 (Utah 
12S& seealsoNohlevNnhle 761 P2d 1369, 1374 
(Utah 1988): Wldev.Mid-Centurv Ins Co.. 635 P2d 
417.419 (Utah 1981); 3ar/e Bros, v. 3ar/e 588 P,2d 
689,691 (Utah 1978). 
Under the first requirement of issue preclusion, 
we must examine whether the precise issue decided by 
the bankruptcy court is identical to the issue presented 
in Harline's malpractice action against Vlahos. The 
bankruptcy court had to determine whether, in light of 
Vlahos' alleged negligence in omitting assets from 
Harline's bankruptcy schedules, Harline (i) intended to 
hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or the bankruptcy 
trustee by making the four property transfers and by 
cashing in the Merrill Lynch account, and (ii) kno-
wingly or fraudulently made a false oath. A brief 
review of the nature of bankruptcy discharge hearings 
and the evidence presented at Harline's hearing helps 
to put the precise issue before the bankruptcy court in 
focus. 
[121[13"1[14][15T When a creditor objects to a 
debtor's discharge in bankruptcy, the burden of pro of 
is on the objecting creditor to prove by a preponde r-
ance of the evidence that the debtor acted with frau-
dulent intent. In re Caldwell. 101 BR 728. 732-33 
(Bankx.D Utah 1989) (mem.). However, the bank-
ruptcy judge may deduce or infer the requisite intent 
from the facts and circumstances ofthe case. Calder. 
907 F.2d 953. 956 (10th Cir.1990). A finding of 
"reckless indifference to the truth" also suffices to 
establish the requisite intent to defraud. Calder. 93 
Cir.1987)). The debtor, of course, is then entitled to 
explain his actions so as to avoid a finding that he 
acted with fraudulent intent. "Generally, a debtor who 
acts in reliance on the advice of his attorney lacks the 
intent required to deny him a discharge of his debts. 
However, the debtor's reliance must be in good faith." 
First Beverly Bank v.Adeeb (In reAdeeb). 787 F.2d 
1339, 1343 (9th Cir 1986) (citations omitted) (noting 
availability of defense to § 727(a)(2) fraudulent 
transfers); see also *443 Pool'qui'p-McNeme, Inc. 
v, Hubbard (In re Hubbard), 96 B.R. 739, 742 
(Bankr.W.D.Tex. 1 989) ("Bankruptcy courts have not 
imposed strict liability under S 727(a)(4) for omis-
sions from schedules"); Calder, 93 BR at 737 (not-
ingthat liability for false oath should not be imp osed 
for mistaken or inadvertent omissions). Accordingly, 
Harline's good faith reliance on Vlahos' advice and 
preparation of the statement and schedules was a 
plausible defense in the bankruptcy discharge hearing. 
Harline did in feet raise the defense of good feith 
reliance at the discharge hearing. He testified that he 
told Vlahos about his assets, including the transfers of 
property to his children, and that Vlahos feiled to list 
this infomiation in Harline's bankruptcy statement and 
schedules.•Lm- In his subsequent motion to alter or 
amend the judgment denying his bankruptcy dis-
charge, Hjjrline asserted these same facts as well as 
additional legal arguments which attempted to justify 
the property transfers and the cashing of the Merrill 
Lynch account. It thus appears that Harline's sole aim 
in the Vlahos malpractice lawsuit is to have a jury 
reconsider the very issue that was decided by the 
bankruptcy court in 1988: namely, whether Harline 
acted with fraudulent intent or innocently relied on 
incompetent attorneys. 
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FN!1. Harline testified as follows: He 
"wasn't familiar at all" with bankruptcy rules 
and Sam Herscovitz of the Vlahos firm in-
structed him with regard to bankruptcy; he 
tried to give Herscovitz "the information as 
to my practice and my ownership of proper-
ty" which Harline considered to be accurate, 
but Herscovitz "didn't go through every-
thing"; Harline told Herscovitz (who had 
died by the time of trial) about the property 
transfers to his children; Herscovitz or 
someone from the Vlahos firm prepared the 
statement and schedules; Vlahos' signature 
was on the schedules, but Harline did not 
know that Vlahos was his attorney; Harline 
had the opportunity to look through the re-
sulting document "but didn't look through it" 
and only "glanced through it" because he was 
"working so long and so hard in his practice"; 
he intended to give complete and full dis-
closure to his creditors; and he had no reason 
to believe at the time he signed the document 
that it contained inaccurate information. 
Harline also explained that he was residing at 
the address listed on his statement and 
schedules when he first met with Herscovitz. 
In this regard, we note that even if all the facts 
surrounding Vlahos' failure to list assets were not 
brought out in the bankruptcy proceedings, the issue 
before the bankruptcy court and the issue in Harlin e's 
malpractice case against Vlahos are nonetheless the 
same. "The mnirrumroach of issue preclusion beyond 
precise repetition of the first action is to prevent reli-
tigation by mere introduction of cumulative evidence 
bearing on a simple historical tact that has once been 
decided." 18 Charles A. Wright. Arthur R Miller & 
Edward i i Cooper. Fed^al l^^ice and Procedure § 
4417. at 157 (198H (emphasis added). Further, 
"[b]road definition of the issue precluded is most 
appropriate as to efforts to advance new arguments as 
to facts that had been fixed by the time of the first 
litigation." Id. at 158. We are thus satisfied that the 
first requirement of issue preclusion is metbecaus e the 
issue Harline seeks to litigate in the Vlahos malprac-
tice suit is identical to the issue Harline previously 
litigated in the bankruptcy trial. 
We are equally satisfied that the remaining re-
quirements of issue preclusion-that the judgment was 
final, that the issue was fully, fairly, and competently 
litigated in the first action, and that Harline was a party 
to the first action-are met here. It is undisputed that the 
bankruptcy court judgment is final, because it was 
affirmed by the linked States District Court, and 
Harline took no further appeal. We are also convinced, 
pursuant to our discussion above, that the issue was 
fully, fairly, and competently litigated and that a 
determination of Harline's intent in light of Vlahos' 
negligence was essential to the bankruptcy court's 
judgment. Finally, under the last requirement of is sue 
preclusion, there is no question that Harline was a 
party to the bankruptcy proceeding. Thus, because all 
four requirements of issue preclusion are met here, 
Harline is bound by the bankruptcy court's factual 
finding that he acted with the requisite state of mind to 
support a denial of discharge despite Vlahos' negligent 
preparation of the statement of affairs and schedules. 
FN12. We note that in his malpractice com-
plaint against Barker and Whyte, Harline did 
not allege negligent representation at the 
bankruptcy discharge hearing or in the han-
dling ofhis appeal of the judgment denying 
him discharge. 
*444Thus, Harline has tailed to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact that Vlahos proximately caused 
the denial of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. Harline's 
sole claim in these proceedings is that Vlahos' initial 
failure to list assets that Harline disclosed to the firm 
caused Harline's denial of discharge. However, 
"[demonstrating material issues of fact with respect 
to defendants' negligence is not sufficient to prec hide 
summary judgment if there is no evidence that estab -
lishes a direct causal connection between that alleged 
negligence and the injury." Mitchell, 697 P 2d at 245 
Under the doctrine of issue preclusion, the bankruptcy 
court's finding that Harline acted with fraudulent in-
tent despite his reliance on Vlahos is binding. That 
finding defeats the causation element of Harline's 
negligence claim against Vlahos, thereby defeating 
the malpractice claim. 5tee Lane v. Skjllivan. 900 F 2d 
1247. 1250-51 &n. 5 (8th Cir.) (holding that earlier 
judgment that plaintiffs understood a stock transfer 
precluded malpractice claim against attorney for mi-
srepresenting or failing to represent true nature of 
transfer), corf, denied, 498 U.S. 847. 111 S.CL 134. 
112 T.Frt?.d 101 (1990* Falconer v. Meehan. 804 
F2d 72. 75-76 (7th Cir.1986) (bankruptcy court 
finding that attorney advised client of contents of 
dissolution agreement precluded relitigation of issue 
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in malpractice action); see also Standage v. Jaburg & 
Wlk. P.C.. 177 Ariz. 221. 866 P.2d 889. 895-96 
fQ App 1993) (holding that bankruptcy court ruling 
that debtor's first attorney did not commit malpractice 
by railing to inform debtor of deadline precluded same 
claim in state court against different attorneys). Be-
cause Harline is precluded from relitigating Vlahos' 
failure to list Harline's assets, Harline has not pre-
sented a genuine issue of material fact that would 
enable him to prove in a malpractice trial that he 
would have won the underlying "suit within a suit." 
SBeLana 900 E2d at 1250 n. 5: Standage 866 P.2d at 
896. Even though the trial court came to this conclu-
sion from a different route, we affinn its grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Vlahos. 
[16] Turning to Harline's malpractice claim 
against Barker and Whyte, we conclude that the evi-
dence which Harline submitted in response to Barker 
and Whyte's motion for summary judgment not only 
fails to raise an issue of material fact, but leaves no 
room for reasonable minds to conclude that Barker 
and Whyte could have proximately caused the denial 
ofHarline's bankruptcy discharge. 
Harline's sole claim against Barker and Whyte is 
that they negligently railed to amend his statement of 
affairs and schedules. Barker and Whyte's defense in 
their motion for summary judgment was that no 
amendment could have cured Harline's original frau-
dulent transfers and false statement and schedules. 
Barker and Whyte submitted the bankruptcy court's 
January 24th ruling as the only evidence supporting 
their defense. First, we reject any implicit argument 
that the bankruptcy court's original findings regarding 
Harline's fraudulent intent are binding on Harline in 
his suit against Barker and Whyte under the doctrine 
of issue preclusion. There is no evidence that Barker 
and Whyte's failure to amend Harline's statement and 
schedules was raised in Harline's discharge hearing 
before the bankruptcy court. Further, Whyte 
represented Harline at the discharge hearing. Under 
these circumstances, issue preclusion does not apply. 
See generally Bucd v.Rustin. 227 ril APP3H 779 169 
lll.Dec. 810. 592N.E.2d 297(1992V 
Second, we reject Barker and Whyte's express 
argument, based on the bankruptcy court's January 
24th ruling, that amendments could not have cured 
Harline's false statement of affairs and schedules. We, 
like the court of appeals, cannot say as a matter of law 
that timely amendments would not have prevented the 
denial ofHarline's discharge. 5&? Harline v. Barker. 
854 P 2d at 602. However, we disapprove of the court 
of appeals' assertion that "[cjertainly an amendment 
would have removed the section 727(ay4YA) ground 
for denial of discharge as the schedules would no 
longer be false." Id. This assertion is simply untrue. 
Amendments do not negate the original false state-
ment or schedules. Rather, they help negate a findi ng 
that the debtor filed the false documents with the in-
tent to defraud. Sse Nsw VfarldMktg. Corp, v. Garcia 
(In re Garcia). 88 B.R 695. 705 n. 19 
(Bankr.ED.Pa. 19 88) *445 ('The existence of sanc-
tions for failure to disclose assets would serve no 
purpose if deficiencies could simply be remedied any 
time parties in interest call attention to them."). In 
short, the fact that a debtor files amendments is only 
one of many factors a bankruptcy court considers in 
determining whether the debtor initially acted with 
fraudulent intent. 
Consequently, under this same analysis, even if 
the bankruptcy court's January 24th ruling was ad-
missible, it could not have established as a matter of 
law that jamendments would have had no effect on 
Harline's bankruptcy discharge. As discussed earlier 
in this opinion, bankruptcy courts do not impose strict 
liability on debtors who file false statements and 
schedules; rather, they make a determination based on 
the facts and circumstances of the case. The failure to 
file timely amendments is simply one fact which in-
dicates fraudulent intent. Caldwell. 101 BR at 739 
Accordingly, even if the bankruptcy court's January 
24th ruling was admissible, that evidence could not 
have eliminated the factual question of whether a 
reasonable bankruptcy judge would have denied Har-
line's discharge had he submitted timely amendments. 
Because we cannot decide as a matter of law that 
timely amendments would have had no effect on the 
outcome of Harline's discharge trial and because we 
hold today that the bankruptcy court's January 24th 
ruling is inadmissible, we ordinarily would remand on 
the grounds that Barker and Whyte, as the moving 
parties, have failed to meet their burden of demon-
strating that there are no disputed issues of material 
fact regarding proximate cause. m± V\alker Drug Co. 
V.La Sal Oil Co.. 902 P2d 1229, 1233 (Utah 1995);* 
& T. Inc.. 888P.2d at 628. Unless the moving party 
meets its initial burden to present evidence establish-
ing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, "the 
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party opposing the motion is under no obligation to 
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial." K& 
TlnGn 888 P,2d at, 628; a s a/so Utah R.QYP, 56(e); 
cf. Ihame v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874 P.2d 120. 124 
(Utah 1994). On the other hand, we cannot rum a blind 
eye to the nonmoving party's evidence when that party 
chooses to respond to the summary judgment motion. 
In this case, Harline's own evidence compels us to 
affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment. In 
light of that evidence, we conclude that no reasona ble 
person could find that Barker and Whyte proximately 
caused Harline's injury. 
FN13 Barker and Whyte argue that even if 
the bankruptcy court's January 24th ruling 
was improperly admitted, under the reason-
ing o f ^ ^ © L ^ f f i i J i ^ £ ^ L i 2 I i l S t J l L 
106 SO. 2548, 91 I, Ed 2d 265 (1986). the 
burden is on Harline to produce some evi-
dence showing that Barker and Whyte 
proximately caused the denial of Harline's 
discharge. See ft/, at 323-24 106 S.Ct. at 
2552-53. This court has not previously 
adopted the reasoning of the majority opinion 
in Celotex, which is not binding on us as a 
matter of law, and declines to do so today. 
Both in response to Barker and Whyte's motion 
for summary judgment and on appeal to this court, 
Harline relied on Whyte's answer to an interrogatory 
to undercut Barker and Whyte's assertion that 
amendments would have made no difference to the 
outcome of Harline's discharge hearing. Whyte's an-
swer contained the following: 
[I]n the summer of 1988, defendant Whyte deter-
mined that Dr. Harline's statement of affairs and 
schedules were inadequate as to their content, which 
determination defendant Whyte related to [Harline]. 
Further, the risk involved in going ahead with the 
[discharge] trial without amending the schedules 
was specifically related to [Harline].... [Subsequent 
to May, 1988,... Dr. Harline specifically instructed 
Mr. Wiyte not to file amended statements or sche-
dules. 
(Emphasis added.) Both at the trial court and on 
appeal, Harline has not denied instructing Whyte not 
to amend the schedules, nor have we found any record 
evidence supporting a denial even if one had been 
made. j m * 44 6 As a result, we must conclude that it is 
undisputed that Harline directed Whyte not to amend 
the statement of affairs and schedules. This conclusion 
should come as no surprise to Harline, because Barker 
and Whyte in their brief specifically discussed Har-
line's instruction to Whyte not to amend the statement 
of affairs and schedules, and Harline in his reply brief 
did not mention the evidence, let alone dispute it. 
FN 14. We note that Harline filed a supple-
mental affidavit in response to Barker and 
Whyte's first motion for summary judgment 
in which he said, "Whyte ... repeatedly ad-
vised [Harline] that amended schedules and 
statement of affairs had to be prepared and 
filed, but Mr. Whyte never undertook to 
prepare or file such schedules or statement of 
affairs." When asked in a deposition whether 
he instructed Barker and Whyte to fix his 
statement and schedules, Harline replied, "I 
don't recall whether I did or not" In Harline's 
response to Barker and Whyte's supplement 
to their first motion for summary judgment, 
Harline denied that Whyte advised him of the 
need to file amended schedules, but he filed 
no affidavit and pointed to no evidence to 
support the denial. 
This evidence demonstrates that Harline chose 
not to pursue his available legal remedy of amendin g 
his statement of affairs and schedules prior to his 
bankruptcy discharge hearing in August of 1988. " 
'We do not believe it would be wise judicial policy to 
allow one party to create legal liability in another by a 
voluntary exercise of the complaining party's own 
personal business judgment not to seek to protect his 
rights in the legal forums provided him.' " Horn v. 
Mobera 68 Wash.App. 551! 844 P.2d 452. 456 (1993) 
(holding client's independent, voluntary decision to 
dismiss products liability suit precluded finding that 
attorney's alleged negligent preparation of case 
proximately caused client's injury) (quoting King v. 
Seattle. 84 Wash 2d 239 525 P2rf 228 236 (1974)). 
Admittedly, late-filed amendments may not have been 
as effective as earlier-filed amendments in demon-
strating Harline's lack of intent to defraud, but we 
cannot say that they would have been useless. In short, 
Harline's refusal to amend his statement and schedules 
precludes a finding that Barker and Whyte prox-
imately caused the denial of Harline's bankruptcy 
discharge. Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
granted Barker and Whyte's motion for summary 
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judgment. 
In sum, we affirm summary judgment in the 
Vlahos action because Harline is precluded from reli-
tigating Vlahos' failure to list assets in Harline's 
original statement of affairs and schedules. Without 
the ability to relitigate this issue, Harline cannot prove 
that Vlahos'negligence proximately caused the denial 
of Harline's bankruptcy discharge. We also affirm 
summary judgment in the Barker and Whyte action 
because Harline's evidence that he instructed his at-
torneys not to amend his statement and schedules 
precludes a finding that Barker and Whyte's negli-
gence proximately caused the denial of Harline's dis-
charge. 
STEWART. Associate C.J., and HOWE. DURHAM 
and RUSSON, J J., concur in Chief Justice ZIM-
MERMAN'S opinion. 
Utah,1996. 
Harline v. Barker 
912P.2d433 
END OF DOCUMENT 
©2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jan 05 OS 03:44p neil breton 4356497893 p. 1 
'\ , Page! of 1 
Subj: trust 
Date: 1/4V2005 2:37:57 P.M. Mountain Standard Time 
From: MBreton909 
To: Neilbreton 
CC: Berto n@n6t vision.net 1L 
Hi Neil, 
Here Is a summary of my conversation with Rhonda Jan 3, 05. 
Willie: Rhonda, I am going home tomorrow and wanted to know whafs happening with the letter you received? 
Rhonda:The kids aren't signing. 
W. Did they read the letter? 
R: I read them the letter and since I'm not sighing off, and the letter states "all or nothing1"' then the kids decided 
not to sign either. I don't trust Neil and I think he's covering up where the money went. I've never seen a trust tax 
return and in addition the letter only gave me about a week to sign off. I don't want to rush into this. 
W: You're making a big mistake. This is an opportunity to release mark and get the kids a lot of money this week. 
R:The whole thing is erroneous. J 
W. Rhonda, you're saying opposite things. If this was an issue of time, then you should have consulted a lawyer 
and ask your questions (like why we insist that also Rhonda signs off in addtion to her kids). At that point you 
could have catted me or had your lawyer write Neil's lawyer and ask for a couple of extra days. But you never 
even consulted a lawyer. This is a big mistake and if s a shame. 
R: I've made lots of mistakes before and the kids have all suffered plenty. 
W: This is about going forward and making a deal worth lots of money to your whole family. There have problems 
in the past but its possible to start getting back on the right track. 
R: I see it very differently. Have a safe trip back home. 
^ hoku m^ 
Vi**"*»- CttuUfiM 
I • 
* Tuesday, January M, 2005 America Online: Neilbreton 
Hi fc<J* jc^Mp ~ 
DEPOSITION -
EXHIBIT t I 
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Sub]: FW: trust letter 
Date: 1/6/2005 4:39:51 P.M. Mountain Standard Time 
From: formaQQio49@hotmail.com 
To: neilbreton@aol.com 
From: Judy Breton <berton@netvision.netil> 
To: neil <formaggio49@hotmail.com> 
Subject: trust letter 
Date: Thu, 06 Jan 2005 11:10:31 +0200 
X-SID-PRA: Judy Breton <berton@netvision.net.il> 
X-SID-Resutt TempError 
X-Message-lnfo: JGTYoYF78jE7aut1 gAZYHnwW+jZZ4Kw3cwif2+l/DZI= 
Received: from mxout4.netvision.net.il ([194.90.9.27J) by mc1-f30.hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC 
(6.0.3790.211); 
Thu, 6 Jan 2005 01:11:08-0800 
Received: from netvision.net.il ([212.235.116.232]) by mxout4.netvision.net.il 
(iPlanet Messaging Server 5.2 HotFix 2.02 (built Oct 21 2004)) 
with ESMTPA id <0l9W006NV1HJ5V@mxout4, netvision.net il> for 
formaggio49@hotmail.com; Thu, 06 Jan 2005 11:10:36 +0200 (1ST) 
Date: Thu, 06 Jan 2005 11:10:31+0200 
From: Judy Breton <berton@netvision.net.iI> 
Subject: trust letter 
To: neil <formaggio49@hotmail.com> 
Message-id: <41 DD0087.6010609@netvision.net.il> 
MIME-version: 1.0 
Content-type: text/html; charset=us-ascii 
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT 
X-Accept-Language: en-us, en 
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Win98; en-US; rv: 1.0.1) Gecko/20020823 
Netscape/7.0 (nscd2) 
Return-Path: berton@netvision.net.il 
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 06 Jan 2005 09:11:09.0000 (UTC) FIL£TIME~[A8DC3480:01C4F3CF] 
Hi Neil, 
This is a follow to our conversations yesterday. Let me know if you received Judy's and Aryeh's social for the two 
Kobb bank accounts. Please have the bank make a copy and mail to me for my Kobb records. Ask the bank if 
there is a way to make a proper pro rata percentage (23.95% and 76.05%) of the beneficiaries or if it is something 
that the two of us have to do 'internally' between ourselves. 
Also, with regards to Rhonda's letter, you told me that you'd have the lawyer send me a copy of the draft for my 
input before mailing it out. I'm thinking that since Rhonda's kids issues will take a bit of time, you'll probably want 
to distribute everything to the early signers and leave $75,000.00 for the time being." That way your kids, my kids 
and you will get the money without delay as I know you're eager to get repaid by Jana. You were going to get an 
accountant to suggest the best tax way to give the gifts, maybe even adding Gail to the account so as to avoid the 
gift tax form that you'll need to file for all gifts over $11,000.00 per annum. 
With regards to the letter to Rhonda, I think that we need to have M correspondences go directly to Breton, 
Jordan and Hayden. Rhonda and Mark are not the address. Besides, they're all over 21 years of age. 
Lastly, what did you think of my name suggestions for Har Shalom property? 
Take good care. 
Love, 
Willie 
Best regards to Gail and tell the boys to have a safe trip back to Switzerland tomorrow. GO WITH THE RIGHT 
FOOT... 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Subj: checks on the way 
Date: 2/6/2005 5:24:34 A.M. Mountain Standard Time 
From: berton@netv1sion.net.ll 
To: Neilbreton@aot.com 
Hi Neii 
Welcome back from the big game expedition. Gail told me you sacked 20 geese. NO COMMENT. But 1 am 
considering reporting you to the save the whale and universe committee... 
Fedex says that you'll have the checks by Tuesday afternoon. If you don't have it by then, I'll trace the tracking 
number. 
Also, Vanguard notified us that the kid's money arrived. 
Thanks and regards to the family. 
Love, 
Willie 
NB004637 
Monday, Februaiy 07,2005 America Online: Neilbreton 
BRE06720 
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Court of Appeals ofUtah. 
Jon and Elizabeth TRIESAULT, Raymon and Ste-
phanie Bori, individuals; Imagination Theaters, Inc., a 
corporation; and Imagination Theaters Holdings, 
LLC, a limited liability company, Plaintiffs and Ap-
pellants, 
v. 
The GREATER SALT LAKE BUSINESS DIS-
TRICT, a Utah corporation dbaDeseret Certified 
Development Company, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 20040811-CA. 
Nov. 10,2005. 
Background: Movie theater owner sued certified 
development company (CDC) that originally help him 
develop his theater for breach of fiduciary duty, tor-
tious interference with prospective economic rela-
tions, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress after 
rival theater opened and owner's theater went into 
bankruptcy. The Fourth District Court, Provo De-
partment, Fred P. Howard. J., entered summary 
judgment for CDC. 
Holdings: Owner appealed The Court of Appeals, 
Billings. PJ.. held that: 
(Ij owner failed to show that opening of rival theater 
with assistance of CDC caused his loss of revenue, 
and 
{2} owner failed to show that CDC used improper 
means in assisting in opening of rival theater. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
£U Appeal and Error 30 <£=?863 
2Q Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVT(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k8fc> Extent of Review Dependent on 
Nature of Decision Appealed from 
30k863 k. InGeneral. Most Cited Cases 
No deference is given by a reviewing court to the 
trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented in a 
motion for summary judgment. 
12] Fraud 184 €==25 
I84Fraud 
1841 Deception Constituting Fraud, and Liability 
Therefor 
184k25 k. Injury and Causation. Most Cited 
Cases 
Movie theater owner failed to demonstrate that 
opening of rival movie theater caused drop of reven ue 
at his theater, as required to maintain claim that as-
sistance to rival movie theater by same certified de-
velopment company (CDQ that assisted owner in 
opening his theater caused owner's loss of revenue, in 
breach of CDC's fiduciary duty to owner. 
[3]Torts379<&^>213 
379 Torts 
379III Tortious Interference 
319]Jl(B) Business or Contractual Relations 
379IIKBM In General 
379k213 k. Prospective Advantage, 
Contract or Relations; Expectancy. Most Cited Cases 
To nxxwer for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations, plaintiff must show: 
(1) that defendant intentionally interfered with plain-
tiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for 
an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) 
causing injury to plaintiff. 
14] Torts 379 € = 2 4 1 
379 Torts 
379III Tortious Interference 
3791IKB) Business or Contractual Relations 
379IIIfB)2 Particular Cases 
379k241 k. Business Relations or Eco-
nomic Advantage, in General. Most Cited Cases 
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Failed movie theater owner failed to demonstrate 
that certified development company (CDC) that as-
sisted owner in opening his theater used improper 
means in assisting rival movie theater's developmen t, 
as required element of intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations claim against CDC; 
there was no evidence that CDC falsified or conceal ed 
any information regarding rival theater from the Small 
Business Administration (SBA) in assisting rival 
theater in obtaining SBA loan, and federal regulation 
prohibiting conflict of interest by CDC did not prohi-
bit CDC from assisting owner's competitors. 13 C.F.R. 
§ 120140(b). 
*782 Allen K.Young. Young Kester & Petro, Provo, 
and Jonah Orlofsky, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellants. 
Lynn S, Paries, Michael P, Zaccheo, and Nathan S, 
Morris. Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson, Salt Lake 
City, and Paul H. VanQyke, Elggren & Van Dyke, 
Sandy, for Appellee. 
Before BIT I .INGS P T DAVIS and ORMF. J.I. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS.Presiding Judge: 
K1 Plaintiffs m appeal from the trial court's grant 
of Defendant Greater Salt Lake Business District, dba 
Deseret Certified Development Company's (Deseret) 
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue that 
the trial court erred by ruling that the Plaintiffs failed 
to raise triable issues of fact on their breach of fidu-
ciary duty and intentional interference with prospec-
tive economic relations claims. We affirm. 
FNL The named plaintiffs in this action are 
Jon and Elizabeth Triesault and Raymon and 
Stephanie Bori as individuals; Imagination 
Theaters Inc., a corporation; and Imagination 
Theaters Holdings, L.L.C. For ease of ref-
erence, we refer to the plaintiffs collectively 
as either Triesault or Plaintiffs. 
BACKGROUND m 
FN2. Because summary judgment was en-
tered against Plaintiffs, we state the facts in a 
light most favorable to them. See Harlinev. 
Barter. 912 P.2d 433 415 (Utah 1996\ 
112 In 1991, Jon and Elizabeth Triesault moved to 
Utah seeking a lifestyle change. The Triesaults joined 
Raymon and Stephanie *783 Bori to pursue opening a 
movie theater in Spanish Fork, Utah (the Spanish Fork 
theater). They later formed two corporations, Imagi-
nation Theaters, Inc. and Imagination Theaters Hold-
ing, L.L.C. Mr. Triesault had a background in the 
movie and television industry, but had no prior expe-
rience in opening or owning a movie theater. 
U 3 Triesault sought financing for the Spanish 
Fork theater with various banks. Triesault was unable 
to obtain conventional financing, so he hired Deseret, 
a certified development company (CDC), to help him 
through the process of obtaining a Small Business 
Administration (SBA) backed loan. Deseret was the 
only CDC the SBA authorized to operate in the area at 
that time. Triesault first met Mr. Vanchiere, a 
vice-president of Deseret, at Zions Bank in Provo, 
Utah. Triesault presented his business plan to bank 
officials for the purpose of obtaining advice and ul-
timately, financing for the theater. Immediately after 
the meeting, Vanchiere introduced himself to Tri-
esault and said, "I don't think you're going to get an-
ywhere with the bank. But I like your idea and I ca n 
help you get a[n] SBA loan. And I can also help you 
get a bank that would also partially fimdyour project." 
FN3. Triesault was to apply under the Sec-
tion 504 loan program, which provides 
long-term permanent financing for small 
businesses. The financing typically involves 
a package with three components: the bor-
rower contributes 10%, a private bank loans 
50%, and a CDC loans the remaining 40%. 
The CDCs loan is funded by debentures that 
are backed by a 100% SBA guarantee. There 
is a complex application process involved in 
securing the SBA's approval for a Section 
504 loan. After submitting the application, 
the SBA grants preliminary approval. After 
preliminary approval, the applicant must 
meet all ofthe conditions for final approval. 
After final approval, the applicant must con-
tinue to meet all of the SBA's requirements 
on an ongoing basis. 
H 4 Vanchiere first worked with Triesault on the 
business plan for the Spanish Fork theater. Specifi -
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cally, Triesault and Vanchiere discussed that 10,000 
people per movie screen was a generally accepted 
number used to determine the economic viability of 
rural movie theaters. The planned Spanish Fork thea-
ter would have eight screens, and the target market 
was from southern Provo to south ofNephi, Utah, an 
area that included approximately 80,000 people. m 
FN4. Deseret contends that "the evidence 
does not reflect that Vanchiere and ... Plain-
tifls ever reached [the] conclusion [that the 
target market was from southern Provo to 
south of Nephi] together, or that Triesault's 
opinion about the geographical market was 
accurate." 
H 5 Vanchiere provided Triesault with all of the 
necessary SBA application documents and provided 
assistance in filling them out. Those documents in-
cluded the loan applications, personal financial 
statements, business plans, and individual resumes. 
After completing the necessary paperwork, Vanchiere 
and Deseret reviewed the application to decide if it 
would likely meet the SBA's criteria. Once Deseret 
decided the application would likely be acceptable, it 
submitted the application to the SBA. From this point 
onward, all communications with the SBA were han-
dled for Triesault by Deseret. 
K 6 After obtaining the necessary preliminary 
approval from the SBA, Vanchiere helped Triesault 
with the Spanish Fork theater's construction. At one 
point during construction, Triesault exceeded the 
theater's budget and Vanchiere advised Triesault on 
how to cut costs. Vanchiere continued to monitor the 
costs of the theater's construction, and he repeatedly 
discussed the construction project and costs with the 
builder himself. The Spanish Fork theater opened on 
November 26,1997, as a "second-run" theater. 
If 7 On or about May 27, 1998, the SBA backed 
financing closed. At closing, Vanchiere presented 
Triesault with a stack of documents and said that 
because Triesault trusted him, he did not need to read 
any of the documents. Triesault agreed and signed the 
documents without reviewing them. 
1f 8 Subsequent to the loan closing, Vanchiere vi-
sited the Spanish Fork theater an average of two 
weekends per month. During his visits, Vanchiere and 
Triesault discussed various aspects of the Spanish 
Fork theaters business, including what should be 
served at the concessions stand, what movies should 
be shov/n, and whether the theater should show 
first-run rather than second-run movies. *784 Tri-
esault provided Vanchiere with confidential informa-
tion regarding how the Spanish Fork theater's business 
was doing. Although Vanchiere was involved in nu-
merous meetings, he made no specific decisions with 
regard to equipment selection, architectural plans, or 
construction, and made no specific representation that 
he had expertise in the movie theater business. 
H 9 After nine months of operating as a 
second-run movie theater without any profits, Tri-
esault decided to show only first-run films. By the end 
of 1999, the Spanish Fork theater was consistently 
turning a profit. Around that same time, Deseret was 
working on a possible Section 504 loan package for a 
group of investors that sought to open a theater in 
Payson (the Payson theater), which is about ten miles 
away and within the target market area of the Spanish 
Fork theater. The Payson theater's appraisal report, 
which was part of its business plan, noted that twelve 
other movie screens were then located in southern 
Utah County, including the Spanish Fork theater and 
three older single-screen theaters. The appraisal con-
cluded that with the addition of the Payson theater, 
there would be fifteen first-run screens in southern 
Utah County, although "[ajccording to various 
sources, there [was] one other movie theater devel-
opment in the pipeline for Utah County. This [was] 
located in south Provo [the Cinemark 16 Provo Town 
Centre Theater]." Moreover, the appraisal provided: 
At first glance it appears that there may not be suf-
ficient demand or population for the proposed 
[Payson] theater; however, it should be noticed that 
a new project which is superior to existing supply 
frequently takes away market share from the exist-
ing supply-and in effect, makes the older projects no 
longer feasible, rather than the newer project. In the 
case of the [Payson theater] subject property, it will 
be the only theater in this market with stadium 
seating and all THX sound system. Given this fact, 
it is reasonable that the [Payson theater] subject 
property will be able to attract more than its "fair 
share." 
110 The Payson theater opened in 2000. After its 
opening, the Spanish Fork theater never again showed 
a profit. The financial figures show that for the twelve 
©2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim toOrig.USGov. Works. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 4 
126 P.3d 781,538 Utah Adv. Rep. 69,2005UT App 489 
(Cite as:126P.3d 781) 
months prior to the Pay son theater's opening, the 
Spanish Fork theater's revenues were about two mil-
lion dollars, but for the twelve months after the 
opening, revenues fell to 1.4 million dollars. By 2002, 
Triesault filed for bankruptcy, and as a result, Tri-
esault lost his 1.5 million dollar personal investment. 
If 11 Deseret's theater expert, Tony Rudman, 
opined that a variety of market factors contributed to 
the Spanish Fork theater's failure, particularly the 
opening of the Provo Cinemark 16 Theaters, the 
project earlier said to be in the pipeline. Moreover, 
Rudman testified that there was no way of knowing 
whether the establishment of the Payson theater con -
tributed to the failure of the Spanish Fork theater. 
Triesault did not submit any expert testimony tending 
to show that the opening of the Payson theater caused 
the decline in revenue of the Spanish Fork theater. 
If 12 Triesault filed suit against Deseret alleging 
breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference with 
prospective economic relations, breach of the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. Ultimately, the lower court 
granted Deseret's motion for summary judgment and 
dismissed all of Triesault's claims. Triesault now ap-
peals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[XI 1f 13 Triesault argues that the trial court erred 
by granting Deseret's motion for summary judgment 
and ruling that Triesault failed to raise a triable issue 
of material fact on his breach of fiduciary duty and 
intentional interference with prospective economic 
relations claims. "In reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable infe-
rences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party." Harlinev. Barker. 912 P.2d 
433, 435 (Utah 1996^ (quotations and citations omit-
ted). "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no 
genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 
42& (quotations and citations omitted). Whether a 
party is entitled to summary judgment is a *785 
question of law, therefore "we accord no deference to 
the trial court's resolution of the legal issues pre-
sented." Id. 
ANALYSIS — 
FN5. We do not reach the issue of whether 
©2011 Thomson Reuters. No 
Deseret owed Triesault a fiduciary duty as 
we affirm on the basis of no causation. 
I. Causation 
121 Tf 14 The trial court concluded there was no 
record evidence from which a reasonable juror could 
conclude that the opening of the Payson theater caused 
Triesault's loss. We agree. Utah courts have held that 
summary judgment on the issue of causation is ap-
propriate, "[notwithstanding the general rule" that 
causation is a jury issue, when the plaintiff cannot 
"show that a jury could conclude, without specula-
tion," that the injury would not have occurred but for 
the defendant's breach. Thurston v. \Abrkers Corrp. 
Fund. 2003 UT App 438.HH 12-16. 83 P.3d 391: see 
also Harlinev. Barker. 912 P2d 433. 439«Jtah 1996^ 
("[P]roximate cause issues can be decided as a matter 
of law ... when the proximate cause of an injury is left 
to speculation so that the claim fails as a matter of 
law."). Moreover, this court has affirmed summary 
judgment when the trial court found "the jurors would 
have had to engage in rank speculation to reach a 
verdict" regarding causation. Park v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch.. 893 P2d 598r 600-01 fUtah QApp.1995^ 
(quotations omitted). 
|^ 15 Triesault argues that Deseret's assistance to 
the Payson theater caused his loss. However, this 
claim is based simply on the timing of the opening of 
the Payson theater and the coincidental drop in rev e-
nues at the Spanish Fork theater. As a result, Tri-
esault's claim would require ajury to engage in "rank 
speculation to reach a verdict" on causation. Id. at 600. 
If 16 Deseret submitted expert testimony that the 
Spanish Fork theater could have railed due to any 
number of factors-including movie selection and the 
opening of the Cinemark 16 Provo Town Centre 
Theater. Triesault did not present any evidence tend-
ing to support his claim that the opening of the Payson 
theater caused the decline in revenue of the Spanish 
Fork theater. Sse Stireiter v. Wasatch Manor. Inc.. 
871 P2H 570 574 (Utah Q App 1994^ (stating expert 
testimony is required to establish causation unless "the 
propriety of the defendant's action is within the 
common knowledge and experience of the layman" 
(quotations and citation omitted)). Whether the 
Spanish Fork theater declined due to the Payson 
theater's existence is not something "within the 
common knowledge and experience of the layman." 
Id. Thus, Triesault has not convinced this court that 
toOrig.USGov. Works. 
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there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether 
Deseret's actions caused Triesault's injuries, and we 
therefore affirm the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment on Triesault's breach of fiduciary duty 
claim. 
II. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic 
Relations 
X3J If 17 Triesault next contends that the trial court 
erred by granting summary judgment because there 
was a triable issue of material fact as to whether De-
seret intentionally interfered with Triesault's prospec-
tive economic relations. To recover for intentional 
interference with prospective economic relations, 
Triesault must show "(1) that [Deseret] intentionally 
interfered with [Triesault's] existing or potential eco-
nomic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by 
improper means, (3) causing injury to [Triesault]." 
Leah Furniture & Carpet Co. v.lsom 657P.2d 293. 
304 (Utah 1982V Triesault argues that Deseret's 
promotion of the Payson theater interfered with Tri-
esault's existing and potential economic relations with 
its movie patrons. Triesault further alleges this was 
intentional because the business plan for the Payson 
theater intended to succeed by luring away Triesault's 
customers. 
J4J U 18 First, Triesault argues that Deseret en-
gaged in improper means by interfering with Tri-
esault's economic relations with the Spanish Fork 
theater customers because Deseret engaged in "decei t 
or misrepresentation." Id. at 308 (quotations and cita-
tion omitted). Triesault contends that Deseret *786 
deceived the SBA into providing financing to the 
Payson theater that would allegedly cause the de-
struction of the Spanish Fork theater. Triesault argues 
that the Payson theater's business plan appraisal report 
depended upon taking significant numbers of Tri-
esault's customers and making the Spanish Fork 
theater "no longer feasible." Moreover, because the 
"SBA's program is designed to foster successful 
businesses," Triesault argues that Deseret used im-
proper means by seeking SBA approval when it had an 
alleged conflict of interest. However, there was simply 
no evidence before the trial court that Deseret falsified 
or concealed information from the SBA. Thus, the trial 
court properly concluded that the appraisal was in-
sufficient to create an issue of material fact that could 
justify a finding of deceit or misrepresenta tion. 
If 19 Triesault next argues that Deseret engaged in 
improper means because it "violated] an establishe d 
standard of a trade orprofession." Id. (quotations and 
citation omitted). Triesault cites to the Code of Federal 
Regulations which states that a CDC may not "[h]ave 
a real or apparent conflict of interest with a small 
business with which it is dealing (including any of its 
Associates or an Associate's Close Relatives) or 
SBA." 13C.F.R S 120.140(b) (2005). However, the 
Code does not define what a conflict is, and the broad 
reading argued by Triesault is unrealistic under the 
process provided by the SBA for a Section 504 loan. 
Thus, we agree with the trial court's determination that 
Deseret did not engage in improper means as a matter 
oflaw. 
CONCLUSION 
f 20 Triesault has tailed to convince this court 
that the trial court erred by granting Deseret's motion 
for summary judgment. We determine, as a matter of 
law, that there are no triable issues of material tact and 
that the trial court did not err in so ruling. Accor-
dingly, we affirm. 
1 21 WE CONCUR: JAMES 7 DAVIS and GRE-
GORY K. ORME. Judges. 
Utah App.,2005. 
Triesault v. Greater Salt Lake Business Dist. 
126 P.3d 781, 538 Utah Adv. Rep. 69,2005 UT App 
489 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
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v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE; Darin G. 
Woolstenhulme; Donald S. Colovich; and Jennifer 
MacArthur, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 940446-CA. 
March 28, 1995. 
Passenger injured in complex multivehicle acci-
dent brought action against various drivers involved in 
accident. The Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
Lynn W.Davis, J., granted summary judgment to all 
drivers, and passenger appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, DavisT Associate PJ., held that no evidence 
established that passenger's injuries were proximately 
caused by conduct of any drivers sued. 
Affirmed. 
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MacArthur. 
Before DAVIS. JACKSON. and WILKINS. JJ. 
OPINION 
DAYIS., Associate Presiding Judge: 
Bradley M.Clark appeals from the district court's 
grant of summary judgment to defendants Darin G. 
Woolstenhulme, Donald S. Colovich, Fanners Insur-
ance Exchange,— and Jennifer MacArthur. — The 
trial court ruled that because the proximate cause of 
Clark's injuries was unknown and purely speculative, 
Clark's negligence claim failed as a matter of law. We 
affirm. 
£NL Farmers Insurance Exchange is named 
as a defendant based upon Jennifer MacAr-
thur's insurance policy covering the acts of 
uninsured motorists. As defined by statute, 
John Doe # 1 was an uninsured motorist. See 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-305 (Supp.1994). 
FN2. Defendants William H. King, Gordon 
V. Holbrook, Marcus Gilbert, William T. 
Hopkins, David Adamson, Rita M. Kennedy, 
and the U.S. Forest Service settled or were 
dismissed from the lawsuit in earlier stages 
oflitigation. 
FACTS 
Clark was injured on December 10, 1989 as a 
result of a complex multi-vehicle accident occurring 
on the southbound Highway 89 overpass at its junc-
tion with 1-15 in Farmington City, Utah. It was ap-
proximately 8:40 p.m., and it had been snowing earlier 
that day. 
The series of accidents began when defendant 
Marcus Gilbert hit black ice on the overpass, lost 
control of his vehicle, and came to a halt, stalled in the 
right lane of traffic. Defendant Rita M. Kennedy next 
approached the accident scene, swerved to the left to 
avoid Gilbert's car, and also lostcontrol ofher vehicle. 
Her vehicle struck the guardrail several times and 
finally stopped in the roadway. Kennedy exited her 
vehicle and jumped over the guardrail to the east to 
avoid oncoming traffic. 
The next vehicle to come upon the scene was an 
unidentified semi-truck (John Doe # 1) approaching in 
©2011 Thomson Reuters. No 
Page 2 
the right lane of traffic. John Doe # 1 veered quickly 
from the right lane to the left lane to avoid striking the 
stalled vehicles and proceeded down the road without 
stopping When John Doe # 1 changed lanes precipi-
tously, he or she cut off the vehicle driven by Ma-
cArthur, which was travelling in the left lane of traffic. 
Clark was a passenger in the MacArthur vehicle. 
MacArthur employed braking and turning maneuvers 
to avoid impact with the semi-*600 truck, and in so 
doing lost control of her car. The car came to rest 
against the lefthand (east) guardrail feeing north to-
ward oncoming traffic. At that point, no one in the 
MacArthur vehicle was injured. 
Gilbert crossed the road toward the MacArthur 
vehicle, apologized, and said that his car was stalled 
and he could not move it. Clark opened the door of the 
MacArthur vehicle (on the oncoming traffic side, not 
the guardrail side) to assist Gilbert in moving his car. 
Shortly after Clark opened the rear passenger 
door, another series of collisions occurred. First, de-
fendant Woolstenhulme drove into the accident scene, 
struck Gilbert, and struck the MacArthur and Kennedy 
vehicles. Next, defendant Hopkins came to a stop in 
the left lane just behind the stopped vehicles, but was 
then bumped from the rear by defendant Adamson. 
Adamson went on to strike the side of Woolsten-
hulme's track. Hopkins was next struck from the rear 
by defendant Colovich, causing his vehicle to colli de 
with the front of MacArthur's vehicle. 
At some point during this concatenation of 
events, Clark "came flying over the guardrail" in 
Kennedy's direction. Clark's knee and right hand were 
injured, resulting in over $21,000 in medical expenses 
and lost wages. No one saw Clark struck by any ve-
hicle, nor is there any evidence explaining how he got 
over the guardrail and down the embankment. Clark 
has no memory of the accident after exiting the Ma-
cArthur vehicle. 
Clark filed a complaint on April 17, 1991 
sounding in negligence. In April of 1993, the trial 
court granted summary judgment to defendants State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Far-
mers Insurance Exchange,2^ MacArthur, Colovich, 
and Woolstenhulme. For the purpose of its ruling, the 
court assumed these defendants were negligent. 
However, title court determined that "no direct evi-
dence exists on the issue of causation as to [these 
toOrig. USGov. Works. 
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defendants]." As a result, the court found that the 
jurors would have to "engage in rank speculation to 
reach a verdict" and that the "result would not be fair, 
nor just, nor appropriate for any of the parties." Clark 
appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in deter-
mining that the negligence of MacArthur, John Doe # 
1, Woolstenhulme, and Colovich could not be prox-
imately connected to his injuries.mL 
FN3. Appellant contends that the trial court 
granted summary judgment to Farmers In-
surance Exchange "sua sponte." Farmers 
Insurance Exchange joined defendant State 
Farm Insurance's motion for summary 
judgment at oral argument; thus the court's 
order was not sua sponte. 
FN4. Clark also appears to challenge the 
appellees' and trial court's reliance on un-
published deposition testimony. However, 
Clark has not argued that he made a con-
temporaneous objection to this reliance, nor 
does the record reveal an objection. In the 
absence of such an objection, we will not 
reach Clark's challenge. See Brobera v. Hess. 
782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App.1989) C 
' [Cjontemporaneo us obj ection or some form 
of specific preservation of claims of error 
must be made apart of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such 
claim on appeal.' ") (citation omitted). 
Moreover, we note that this error appears to 
have been invited in that Clark himself made 
extensive reference to unpublished deposi-
tions in his objections to appellees' motions 
for summary j udgment and even in the briefs 
submitted to this court. "A party who leads a 
court into error cannot later complain of that 
error to obtain reversal." Merriam v. Mer-
riam 799 P.2d 1172, 1175-76 (Utah 
App,199Q). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate only when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). As a question of law, en-
titlement to summary judgment is reviewed for cor-
rectness. K & T.lnc. v.Koroulis. 888 P2d 623. 627 
(Utah 1994V " 'We determine only whether the trial 
court erred in applying the governing law and whether 
the trial court correctly held that there were no dis-
puted issues of material feet.' " Id. (quoting F&TGe V. 
Sate 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (citation omit-
ted)). 
ANALYSIS 
[21| 3] A prima facie case of negligence requires a 
showing of: (1) a duty of reasonable care extending to 
plaintiff; (2) breach of that duty; (3) proximate and 
actual causation of the injury; and (4) damages suf-
fered by *601 plaintiff. Sflrgfy y. W?$atcn Manor, 
foe, 871P,2d570, 573 (Utah App.) (citing Wdiamsv. 
Mdbv. 699 P.2d 723. 726 (Utah 1985^. cert, denied, 
879 P2d 266 (Utah 1994V Defendants concede, for 
the limited purpose of summary judgment, that duty, 
breach of that duty, and damages have been shown. 
Thus, the issue on appeal is whether plaintiffs al lega-
tions can support a finding of proximate causation as 
to each defendant. 
Proximate cause is generally defined as " 'that 
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces 
the injury and without which the result would not have 
occurred. It is the efficient cause-the one that neces-
sarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the 
injury.' " Mitchell v. Pearson Enters. 697 P.2d 240. 
246-47 (Utah 1985> (quoting gfle y Lawsqp 688 
P.2d 479. 482 n. 3 (Utah 1984»: aooord Steffensen v. 
Smith'sManagement Corp. 87.0 P3d 482 486 (Utah 
App.l99n. affd, 862P,2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
The question of proximate causation "is generally 
reserved for the jury." Seffensen. 820 P.2d at 486 
(citing Godesky v. Prow City Corp.. 690 P.2d 541. 
544 (Utah 1984^. Consequently, the trial court may 
rule as a matter of law on this issue only if: "(1) there 
is no evidence to establish a causal connection, thus 
leaving causation to jury speculation, or (2) where 
reasonable persons could not differ on the inferences 
to be derived from the evidence on proximate causa-
tion." Steffensen. 820 P.2d at 487 (citing Ftobertsonv. 
Sixpence Inns of Am. Inc.. 163 Ariz. 539 546. 789 
P,2d 1040.1047(1990) (en banc)). 
The trial court granted summary judgment to all 
the defendants party to this appeal because "no direct 
evidence exists on the issue of causation." ^ No one 
saw how Clark was injured, and Clark does not know 
how he was injured. Clark argues that the trial court's 
conclusion is in error, citing the affidavits and depo-
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sition testimony of his accident reconstructionists. 
However, as the trial court noted, "plaintiffs own 
expert, Mr. Duvall, was asked in his deposition 
whether he would be able to detennine the mechanism 
of plaintiffs injury without speculating or guessing. 
His response was 'no.' "When the other expert wit-
ness, David C. Stephens, was pressed to identify the 
vehicle that may have struck Clark, he responded, "I'm 
not certain. I can't say for sure." Moreover, Steph ens 
testified in his deposition that "the tacts of this total 
accident are so vague and unidentifiable that it is re-
ally hard to be precise in coming to any conclusion 
because there's nothing to be precise-these's no precise 
data on which to draw those conclusions." 
Due to Clark's failure to make a prima facie 
showing of facts demonstrating the existence of 
proximate causation, his case fails as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
JACKSON and W1LKINS . JJ., concur. 
Utah App.,1995. 
Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exchange 
893 P.2d 598 
END OF DOCUMENT 
FN5. The trial court recognized that "[i]f 
reasonable inferences can be drawn from the 
evidence, then the matter should be put to the 
factfinder." See Lindsay v. Gibbons and 
fag/, 497 P,2d 28, 31 (Utah 1972) (noting 
that jurors may "make justifiable inferences 
from circumstantial evidence to find negli-
gence or proximate cause"). However, the 
court concluded that any evidence of causa-
tion would necessarily be the product of 
speculation, and the jury would have no basis 
for drawing inferences as to what occurred. 
In light of the complete absence of evidence on 
causation, the trial court correctly granted defendants' 
motions for summary judgment. Clark has not met his 
burden to establish a prima facie case of negli-
gence. JMmii 'When the proximate cause of an injury is 
left to speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law.' " 
Mitchell. 697 P.2d at 246 (quoting StaheJi v. Farmers' 
Co-op ofS Utah 655 P3ri 680 684 (Utah 1982))-
FN6. Plaintiff has neither raised nor briefed 
the issue of the propriety of shifting the 
burden ofproof to defendants, either before 
the trial court or this court. See Summers v. 
TIPS 33 Cai.2d 80. 199 P.2d 1 (1948): Vahev 
V.StQQ, 126Cd,App,3d 171 178 Cal.Rptr. 
559. 564 (App.l98U: Restatement (Second) 
Torts § 433B (1965). Accordingly, we also 
decline to address it. See Ret her ford v. AT & 
T Communications. 844 P2ri 949 965 n 8 
(Utah 1992): Sokes v. Board of Review. 832 
P.2d56.60n .2 (Utah App 19921 
CONCLUSION 
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
July 29, 2011 
Honorable Anthony Quinn 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1860 
Re: Breton v. Clyde, Snow & Sessions 
Case No. 090919546 
Dear Judge Quinn: 
This is my response to defense counsel's submittal of various citations to my client Neil 
Breton's deposition transcript, with attached exhibits and three cases. I have no complamt about 
the cases, nor do I have any complaint about the three attached deposition exhibits. I do think the 
deposition citations not only go far beyond what Mr. Wheeler offered to provide to the court at 
Wednesday's hearing. In addition, contrary to what is stated in Mr. Call's Wednesday July 27 
letter to you, I do not believe the cited transcript sections support the defense claim that Mr. 
Breton "was skeptical that the Slater Brothers would sign releases at the time he and his two 
siblings released funds to the 12 grandchildren." 
As is so often the case, when deposition transcript citations are cited, context is key. So, 
like when one party wants to use some deposition testimony at trial and the other party reviews 
the proposed citations and adds additional citations, I would like the court to read the following 
cited sections, to give context and clarity to those sections cited by the defense. I have attached 
to this email letter those transcript sections. 
The defense has seven cited sections, I will respond seriatim: 
1. Please read also p.121 1. 20- p.1221. 13 
2. Please read also p.123 1. 14- p.1261. 25 (the "futility" the defense references Mr. 
Breton describing refers to an overall resolution of the family schism, not the releases) 
3. Please read also p. 1871. 12 - p . 1881. 18 
4. Please read also p. 222 L 11 - p. 223 1. 11 
5. ok 
6. ok 
7. Please read also p. 2691. 3 - p. 270 1. 15 (defendants' failure to advise Neil NOT to 
distribute until all grandchildren signed) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In addition, please read the following: 
p. 2511. 22 - p. 252 1. 3 (Neil was prepared to hold the Slater Brothers' dollars 
indefinitely while Willie kept talking to them) 
p. 258 1. 9 - p. 2591. 6 (as to why Neil did not accept the Slater Brothers' counteroffer, or 
make a different counteroffer of more than $24,000) 
Thank you for your consideration of these additional transcript citations, attached. 
Very truly yours, 
Q&ENBEIJG ^GILCHRIST 
JRO/cm 
cc: Keith Call(via email) 
Marianad@email.utcourts.gov 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Page 121 
1 lawyer, and I said, "Well/I know somebody in Utah, 
2 and since you both don't live in this country, let me 
3 talk to Hal and see" ~ "explain to him the situation 
4 and see if he can put together a document that you 
5 can present to Rhonda and her children, and if they 
6 accept it, we'll reach a settlement If they don't, 
7 then we'll have spent money on a document that wont 
8 go anywhere." 
9 Q I think you said "at the insistence of your 
10 brother and sisters." 
11 A Right 
12 Q Plural. 
13 A Thafs correct. 
14 Q Was Rhonda insisting -
15 A No, no. I meant brother and sister. 
16 Jana -
17 Q Sister? 
18 A Yeah. Rhonda had nothing to do with this. 
19 It was Willie and Jana. 
20 Q And you said there was a family dispute 
21 that was kind of the catalyst for this decision. 
22 What was that dispute? 
23 A Well, party - a few things. One, my 
24 mother - you know, my mother, who we were all very 
25 close to, was really being torn apart by the fact 
Page 123 
1 again, after several felled attempts at global 
2 settlement, and I said, 'look, you two trustees -
3 I'm only one vote. If the two of you can negotiate a 
4 deal that satisfies everybody, I'm willing to give up 
5 the judgment," which is a huge gift. That's a 
6 quarter million dollars more than anybody else got or 
7 was entitled to, and the judgment was still valid. I 
8 said, "That's what I'll give up, but I'm not engaging 
9 in any communications or writing any letters, talking 
10 to anybody. You negotiate it, you make the deal, and 
11 if you make a deal, Til go to a lawyer and have it 
12 papered," and that's what I did, given the assurance 
13 that they had made a deal. 
14 Q Okay. So, as I understand what you're 
15 saying, is that this is a general good faith attempt 
16 by you to settle the family feud that has been going 
17 on for years, correct? 
18 A It was an attempt by all - yes, all of us, 
19 to - all the parties, 
20 Q And who was it that came up with the idea 
21 that, "Well, let's pay each of the grandchildren some 
22 money and see if that takes care of the problem"? 
23 A Jana. Jana was aware that I put money 
24 aside in a personal account - in this account, 
25 actually. It was my money. It was about -
Page 122 
1 that her family was not speaking for years, and my 
2 nephews and I - my sister had accumulated eight 
3 years of birthday presents that we'd mailed them and 
4 sent them all back. It was just - it was just a 
5 real family mess that wasn't going anywhere. We 
6 weren't going to resolve anything. 
7 Jana had a relationship with Rhonda, but it 
8 was strained. Willie occasionally spoke to Rhonda. 
9 I didn't speak to anybody in the Slater family, nor 
10 were they allowed to speak to me or any of my kids. 
11 They disowned all my kids. My daughters, who were 
12 very close to their aunt, were basically, you know, 
13 removed from any family communications. 
14 And so it was probably partly my mother 
15 requesting we try to make a settlement. I know I had 
16 a meeting at my - with my mom and my aunt, with 
17 Rhonda actually there, sometime years earlier, and 
18 she was crying about, "Why can't we all get this 
19 worked out?" And I, of course, explained that her 
20 husband is a problem that we can't resolve and work 
21 around. And then, of course, my mother was never 
22 allowed back In her house, and it just became a 
23 really ongoing ugly and uglier family issue that -
24 this was an attempt - 1 thought it was futile, but 
25 Jana and Willie offered to try to negotiate, once 
Page 124 
1 MR.ORITT: "This account," you're 
2 referring to Exhibit 11? 
3 TOE WITNESS: This account, the Exhibit 11 
4 account. I had put money in this account It was 
5 strictly collecting interest and taking care of some 
6 legal bills and tax returns that had to be filed when 
7 they were filed on behalf of Breton before it finally 
8 closed, and this was money that was - that I 
9 intended, personally, to give to the grandchildren to 
10 honor my father's request, even though it wasnt a 
11 million dollars. It was about - a little over a 
12 quarter million dollars, and if you include the 
13 judgment, it was over a half a million dollars. It 
14 was close to 600,000 if the judgment had been paid, 
15 so, again, even though it wasn't the full million 
16 dollars, it was my attempt to try to honor my 
17 father's wishes. 
18 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) So it was Jana that 
19 suggested that, "Why dont you take that money and 
20 give" — "divide it up among the grandchildren"? 
21 A Right. Yes. 
22 Q And so did you agree with her that that was 
23 something you would do? 
24 A I actually didn't agree with her. I told 
25 her that, "I have no obligation to do anything until 
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1 the youngest child is 25 years old." At the time, 
2 the youngest child was eight or nine, or even 
3 younger, maybe five or six, so I had no incentive -
4 I had less than zero incentive, actually, to do 
5 anything. I had no obligation to do anything. 
6 But Jana was in financial difficulties and, 
7 as a favor, asked if I would consider this. She 
8 spoke to Willie, who agreed, although Willie was 
9 financially very comfortable, didn't need the - did 
10 not, nor did his children, need the money, nor did my 
11 children need the money, and, as far as I knew, the 
12 Slater children had inherited a lot of money from 
13 their grandparents, didnt need the money. 
14 But 3ana needed some money to buy a home or 
15 a down payment on a home and asked if I'd help her, 
16 and I said I would personally loan her the money, 
17 rather than get into this, because I thought this was 
18 a serious problem to try to resolve, and, of course, 
19 I made a mistake of accepting Willie's and her 
20 opinion, and tried to protect myself in terms of 
21 having an agreement that I was insisting, as best I 
22 could, in any way I could, that I would be protected, 
23 as well as the other trustees, and thaf s really the 
24 genesis of this lawsuit, that I was not protected. 
25 Q Okay. Who came up with the $24,000 number? 
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1 THE WITNESS: It was before the Clyde Snow. 
2 Then 1 met with Hal and specifically discussed with 
3 Hal, and maybe even showed him - 1 don't recall if I 
4 showed him some of the letters that had been sent 
5 back and forth about what Willie was attempting to 
6 do, and 3ana was trying to make family peace, and 
7 those things were all ongoing, and, really, the fight 
8 was really with Mark and me. It really wasnt about 
9 the grandkids or anybody else. It was really Mark 
10 Slater, almost from day one. 
11 And so I reluctantly agreed that if we can 
12 get a document that everybody signs and everybody 
13 agrees to, that we would move forward and all of us 
14 can go on with our lives. 
15 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) And that was the only 
16 impetus to do something, was to try to solve the 
17 family dispute? 
18 A The only reason. 
19 Q Let me show you the next exhibit, 3719, 
20 Exhibit 12. 
21 (Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 12 was 
22 marked for identification.) 
23 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) You have in front of you 
24 Exhibit 12 to your deposition, which purports to be a 
25 letter from Breton Slater dated May 18,1998, 
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1 A That was the amount of money divided by 15 
2 grandchildren. It was $360,000, more or less, and if 
3 you multiply it times 15, you'll get 360. 
4 Q And so Willie and 3ana were pressing you to 
5 go along with this arrangement, correct? 
6 A They were negotiating with Rhonda and 
7 getting assurances, verbal, that Rhonda wanted this 
8 behind her and demanded that the judgment - at first 
9 Rhonda wanted only us to sign releases but that she 
10 did not want to sigh a mutual release to release any 
11 of us, which, of course, was absurd and typical of 
12 her, even though I offered the judgment. 
13 So it stalled for months while Willie and 
14 3ana kept trying to resurrect it, and I just stood 
15 back and watched documents flying back and forth 
16 between the three of them. And finally when -
17 MR. ORTTT: Let me interrupt just to 
18 clarify. Time frame-wise, are you talking about 
19 before going to Clyde Snow or after, when you say -
20 THE WITNESS: Well, no. This was before I 
21 went to Clyde Snow, and then I went to Clyde Snow 
22 when we -
23 MR. ORITT: Well, stop, then. You can go 
24 back to where you were. As long as it's before Clyde 
25 Snow. 
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1 addressed to both you and Willie and Jana. 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And it's signed by Bret. Do you remember 
4 receiving this? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Now, this was received prior to your 
7 decision to pay any money to the grandchildren, 
8 correct? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q And he is essentially asking if you will 
11 advance money from the trust to help him with his 
12 education? 
13 A That's correct. 
14 Q And you respond, in the next exhibit, 3718. 
15 (Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 13 was 
16 marked for identificationO 
17 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Do you remember writing 
18 that letter? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Was this sent by fax to him? 
21 A Yes, 
22 Q And it is in response to the prior exhibit 
23 that we looked at, correct? 
24 A That is correct. 
25 MR. CALL: This is Exhibit 13. I don't 
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1 A Orally. 
2 Q And -
3 A As I recall, it was orally, but I don't 
4 recall the documents that were written. 
5 Q Tell me, as best as you can recall, what 
6 you told Mr. Swenson you wanted in the letter. 
7 A Initially I think it was Mr. Swenson, and 
8 then I think at one point it became Mr. Wiese, but I 
9 think - if I - and I'm assuming this is to 
10 Mr. Swenson - that I brought him up to speed with 
11 the family history, I brought him up to speed, I 
12 think in great detail, because he explained that in 
13 his own deposition, that he understood there was — 
14 he hated my guts, or some term, I think, some phrase 
15 that Hal referred to, that there was serious - he 
16 understood, Hal did, that there was serious problems 
17 between Mark Slater and myself and that Willie and 
18 Jana had been negotiating, for the umpteenth time, to 
19 try to find a global settlement, and in Jana's case, 
20 as I spoke to you and answered your question earlier, 
21 she specifically needed the money, so when she said 
22 everybody needed it, she was being a little generous 
23 with the fads. She was specifically the only one 
24 that needed money. 
25 I tried to accommodate her. As I said, 
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1 times at a family function. 
2 Q Did you t e l l -
3 A I told my lawyers. Yeah, of course, I told 
4 my lawyers. And they said, "What? Are you going to 
5 sue him about that?" I also had him - my mother, in 
6 a written request, asked him not to be at the 
7 funeral, and he came with his own lawyer. Carrie to 
8 her funeral and made a big scene in front of 400 
9 people. 
10 Q And this is all information you've 
11 transmitted to the - -
12 A No, no. I'm just - no. I'm just sharing 
13 this with you right now. The information I told Hal 
14 was that there was bad blood and there was a lot of 
15 bad blood, and some before this lawsuit and some 
16 after, but the majority of it, 90 percent of it, 
17 happened before their letters and their lawsuit, and 
18 Hal was abundantly aware that this had to be an 
19 agreement that was bulletproof, airtight, and that 
20 everybody was protected. 
21 That was the only charge I asked him. 
22 However he figured out how to do it, he would do it. 
23 I don't know who he conferred with, didn't confer 
24 with, but he and I had a very clear understanding, 
25 both of us, and he admitted that in his testimony, 
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1 offered her - to loan her the money, but she thought 
2 if we just distributed the money and ended all of 
3 this, she got indication from Rhonda that's what they 
4 all wanted, was a global settlement, and I was very 
5 leery, but when I met with Hal, I was very dear 
.6 about, "I have no obligation to do this. I'm not 
7 even sure that it will get settled, but if we do it, 
8 it's got to be something that all of the trustees are 
9 protected. There are no repercussions." 
10 Hal acknowledged that, understood that, and 
11 referred to it as "the all or nothing clause," which 
12 was critical, totally critical for me to be involved 
13 in any of this transaction. And, unfortunately, 
14 whatever Hal's best efforts were, he didnt 
15 accomplish that goal, and I ended up in a lawsuit. 
16 Q Okay. Tell me exactly how you transmitted 
17 the information concerning your family feud to 
18 Mr. Swenson or Mr. Wiese. 
19 A Just that there had been years of threats 
20 of litigation/1 think I maybe even produced some 
21 documents. I don't know if I did or I didn't. Some 
22 of the letters that I'd seen or gotten. But I made 
23 it crystal clear, to use an old expression, that 
24 there was about as bad of blood between our families 
25 as there could be. Mark threatened to kill me three 
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1 that that was his responsibility, did not advise me 
2 to go talk to somebody else, that he would take care 
3 of it, and that is why we're sitting here today. 
4 Q But the question that I asked you is, what 
5 was the format by which this information was 
6 transmitted? 
7 A I just told you. I said I told him 
8 verbally that whatever document he drafted would be a 
9 global agreement, a global settlement, that Rhonda 
10 and Mark had a special situation that they were going 
11 to get released of a judgment, which nobody else got 
12 the benefit of. That was okay with me. That was 
13 going to be in writing. And that everybody would be 
14 sent this agreement and that everybody would either 
15 sign it or there would be no agreement, as far as I 
16 was concerned, and that I had no obligation to do 
17 anything further till sometime in the year 2024, 
18 so -
19 Q Can you identify with specificity any 
20 document that you gave to anybody at Clyde Snow & 
21 Sessions that portrayed this family feud that you're 
22 describing to us? 
23 A I dont know if I could - Hal already 
24 testified that he knew about it, and so did Matt, 
25 and -
I lS£t3S&S#3i&2 
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1 A Yeah. I jus t -
2 Q — the Clyde Snow lawyers gave you by draft 
3 form? 
4 A Yeah. I just don't think we would have 
5 drafted this, but that?s all right. We signed it. 
6 Q I'm not suggesting you drafted it. I'm 
7 suggesting that the lawyers prepared it for your 
8 signature. 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q That's your recollection? 
11 A Yes. 
12 (Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 36 was 
13 marked for identification.) 
14 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) But the letter that you 
15 did sign, that you and Willie did sign in the last 
16 exhibit, was prepared only after several drafts were 
17 exchanged with you and Willie and the lawyers 
18 received your comments, correct? 
19 A That's what it appears to be, yes. 
20 Q Exhibit 36 appears to be a letter from Matt 
21 Wiese at Clyde Snow & Sessions, dated January the 
22 4th, which, again, is a letter telling Rhonda that if 
23 they don't sign and return the releases, that you're 
24 going to proceed with giving the gifts to the other 
25 grandchildren and leave out the Slaters; isn't that 
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1 writing letters to Rhonda, saying, "Let's bury the 
2 hatchet" — my words, not his — "and lets solve 
3 this family dispute and sign off, and the money is 
4 sitting in the account for you," and this goes on for 
5 a long time, right? 
6 A Yes, that's correct. 
7 Q So these letters continue, and efforts by 
8 Willie, in particular, continue to try to convince 
9 Rhonda to get her kids to sign off? Is that fair? 
10 . A That's fair. 
11 Q Thirty-eight, CSS. 
12 (Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 37 was 
13 marked for identification.) 
14 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Exhibit 37 to your 
15 deposition appears to be an e-mail — may have 
16 been — 
17 A It was a fax, maybe. 
18 Q It may have been a fax. It's addressed to 
19 you, correct? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Is it from Willie? 
22 A No. It's actually - well, It is from 
23 Willie, but it's from - this says "MBreton," that he 
24 was in town at my mom's. 
25 Q I see. That's why the "MBreton" -
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1 right? 
2 A Yes. c 
3 Q Was this letter sent at your request? 
4 A This letter was probably the result of 
5 Matt, at this point, not receiving all the other -
6 the three signed agreements and letting me know that 
7 he hadn't received them, and I think we probably 
8 developed this letter together, just to let her know 
9 that we hadn't received it yet, and that Matt drafted 
10 it and sent it out 
11 Q But the other letters that we've talked 
12 about earlier set a deadline at the end of December, 
13 and obviously you had not received anything from the 
14 Slaters at that point, correct? 
15 A That is correct. 
16 Q And so this is an extension of the 
17 deadline? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Is that right? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q And so would it be fair to say that you and 
22 Willie are trying to persuade Rhonda to have her kids 
23 sign off so this could be done? 
24 A That's - 1 think that's fair to say, yes. 
25 Q In fact, Willie became heavily involved in 
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1 A Yeah. He sent it from her machine. 
2 Q Okay. So he's at your mom's place ~ 
3 A Right He's in the California ~-
4 Q - which is the "MBreton909" address? 
5 A That's correct. 
6 Q And he's sending it to you, and it says, 
7 "Subject matter, the trust," and he's summarizing for 
8 you a conversation that he had with Rhonda the day 
9 before, correct? 
10 A Yeah. 
11 Q And, in fact, it appears to be a verbatim 
12 transcript of the conversation? Is that what you 
13 understand? 
14 A Well, I see the "R" and--yes. Again, 
15 I - yes, that's what it looks like. Something to 
16 that effect 
17 Q And, again, he apparently has recorded 
18 this, because he says, "Willie:" quote, "Rhonda, I am 
19 going home tomorrow and wanted to know what's 
20 happening with the letter you received." Rhonda 
21 says, "The kids aren't signing." 
22 A Right. 
23 Q "Willie: Did they read the letter? 
24 "Rhpnda: I read them the letter, and since 
25 I am not signing off and the letter states 'all or 
J 
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A Oh, okay. 
MR. ORTTT: Which was the preceding 
exhibit. 
THE WITNESS: Oh, okay. Oh,' oh. Right. 
Okay. Yes, yes. Okay. 
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) - "and have decided to 
sign them. Please allow a few weeks till everything 
falls in place." 
A Yes. 
Q So he's asking for paperwork? 
MR. ORITT: Just so the record is clear, 
that - what you just read is the - this is 
Exhibit - we're looking at Exhibit 51, but what you 
just read is also Exhibit 50. 
MR. WHEELER: They're - it's overlapped. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
MR. ORITT: S o - y e a h . Fifty-one is 
showing the response. 
MR. WHEELER: Oh, you're right. I read the 
wrong part. I f s the top part that's new. 
THE WITNESS: Right. 
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Yeah. And then he's 
responding, saying, "Thanks for getting back to me." 
A Right. 
Q And basically agreeing to give him the 
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1 didn't have them signing. It had Rhonda and Mark, 
2 only, signing. 
3 Q 6642. 
4 (Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 53 was 
5 marked for identification.) 
6 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Do you recognize this? 
7 It's not a very good copy, but it appears to be an 
8 e-mail that was probably crinkled when it was copied. 
9 A Yeah. I kind of remember seeing this one, 
10 actually, as well. 
11 Q Looks like Willie is getting a little 
12 perturbed at this point 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Is that your handwriting at the bottom? 
15 A No. That's Willie's. 
16 Q And he is basically saying, "Why are you 
17 not signing? You've got everything." 
18 A Right 
19 Q And you agreed to sign? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q 6641 ERE. 
22 A He also gave me another extension to 
23 September. 
24 Q Yes. I'm assuming you agreed that you 
25 would hold that money when he was giving these i 
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documents. 
A Exactly. That is correct. 
Q 6643 BRE. 
(Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 52 was 
marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Again, did you see this 
correspondence that was taking place between Willie 
and Bret? 
A Yeah, I actually did, because - 1 was a 
tittle frustrated. First of all, Rhonda said she 
read it to ail the boys. Now they don't know 
anything about the documents. Now they've got to 
look at the documents. Then - you may have got the 
letter that says they never got the documents; can we 
resend them. 
Q Yeah. We'll get to those later. 
A Okay. Good. Good. Yeah, I see this one. 
I remember this one. 
Q Do you know if the papers they were 
agreeing to sign were the papers prepared by Clyde 
Snow? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Not the ones Willie's lawyer had 
prepared? 
: A As far as I know - well, Willie's lawyers 
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1 extensions? 
2 A I was prepared to hold the money for -
3 indefinitely. 
4 (Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 54 was 
5 marked for identification.) 
6 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Exhibit 54 is a receipt 
7 and release, consent. Do you know if this document 
8 is the same one prepared by Clyde Snow, the one he's 
9 sending to Bret? 
10 A It looks ~ yeah. Just - on the face of 
11 it, it looks like the language and the format. 
12 Q It's been retyped, it appears? 
13 A Yeah. So I'd have to look at - if you 
14 want me to look at the -
15 Q No, you don't need to do that 
16 A But it's n o t - I don't t h i n k - I don't 
17 think he created a new document I think he just 
18 took the language and retyped it. 
19 Q Let's go to 6638. 
20 (Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 55 was 
21 marked for identification.) 
22 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) This appears to be an 
23 e-mail sent to both you and Willie. 
24 A Yes. 
25 Q Do you know why suddenly you are included 
1 
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they waited till the day before to send this letter 
out. I mean, they had months to make this request 
and didn't. 
I became fairly convinced that this was 
just not going to happen. They were not - they had 
some other scheme in mind. I told Willie, you know, 
"The 24,000 is sitting there. It is theirs if 
they'll agree to those terms that we've offered," but 
I don't know what - under what guideline; I think . 
they'd be entitled to a dollar more. They didn't do 
anything more. They're not - there weren't any 
favored children. They were the same one of 15. My 
dad didnt even know nine of his grandkids, because 
they were all born after he died, so I - 1 just 
didn't - this wasn't going to satisfy them, either. 
Q So you were convinced that this was an 
unreasonable offer, to settle for $66,000? 
A Well, at the time. 
Q Uh-huh. 
A I mean, you look back at, you know, what I 
spent. 
Q Of course, you were going to give them 
24,000 each, so if you subtract what you were willing 
to give them from what they offered to settle for, it 
was not a lot of money, 126,000, if my — 
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1 of closed that door after a year of -
2 Q Now, is this a conversation that Willie 
3 recounted? 
4 A Willie recounted. They told this to 
5 Willie, and they called it blood money, and they 
6 don't want any money from anybody. 
7 Q 6637. 
8 (Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 56 was 
9 marked for identification.) 
10 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Again, this appears to be 
11 an e-mail to you — a cc to you. 
12 A Right. 
13 Q With Willie also on the address. 
14 A Uh-huh. 
15 Q Asking if you'd received his e-mail. 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q So apparently — this is the 21st of 
18 September. The e-mail he sent was the — 
19 A ' 14th. 
20 Q -- 14th, so you had not communicated with 
21 him or Willie had not communicated with him between 
22 that period, correct? 
23 A That's correct. 
24 Q Lets go to 6756. 
25 (Whereupon Deposition Exhibit No. 57 was 
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1 A Well, if you want to - 1 mean, no. Its a 
2 lot of money for no reason, and - 1 mean, given what 
3 I know today, after spending over a million dollars 
4 in legal fees, they didn't get - they got 75 - they 
5 got, you know, hardly even more than this. 
6 Q But they did get 75, so they got more than 
7 they offered to settle for? 
8 A Yeah. They sued me for 4 million. 
9 Q But, in any event, you didn't make a 
10 counteroffer or — 
11 A Yeah, we did. The 24. We told them the 24 
12 was still on the table. 
13 Q Okay. All you did was reiterate the first 
14 offer and never — 
.15 A That was -
16 MR.ORITT: You've got to -
17 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) You never countered with 
18 any halfway measure or something like that to see if 
19 they'd take 50, for example, or something like that? 
20 A No, because when Willie called them, their 
21 last comments to them were, "We've decided we don't 
22 want any of this blood money," not the 66, not the 
; 23 24, not any of it, and they referred to it 
; 24 specifically as "blood money," "and we want nothing 
' 25 that Uncle Neil has his hands on," and so that kind 
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1 marked for identification.) 
2 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) I assume you remember 
3 this letter. 
4 A I do. Very well. 
5 Q This is a letter from the Slater children's 
6 lawyers. 
7 A Uh-huh. 
3 Q Essentially accusing you and the other 
9 trustees of incompetence in handling the trust, and 
10 worse, correct? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q And so at this point, you knew that - your 
13 suspicions were confirmed that they'd been talking to 
14 lawyers about their cause of action against you? 
15 A That's correct. 
16 Q Did you retain California counsel once you 
17 received this? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q In fact, you talked to the lawyers at Clyde 
20 Snow, who advised you that it would be better to get 
21 California counsel? 
22 A That's correct. 
23 Q And, in fact, they gave you the names of 
24 some lawyers, right? 
25 A Matt, I recall specifically, looked up on 
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1 have to return those funds, but, at the moment, we 
2 knew where to find them. 
3 Q Earlier you said that the lawyers at Clyde 
4 Snow did not warn you, I think is the word you used. 
5 A Uh-huh. 
I 6 Q Or did not properly advise you with respect 
7 to what was happening with the attempts to get the 
8 releases. Can you tell me what advice you think they 
9 should have given you? 
10 MR. ORITT: Object to the extent it calls 
11 for a legal conclus on. You can go ahead. 
12 THE WITNESS: That, to the extent that they 
13 understood or knew the exposure that they were 
14 putting me under by even suggesting to distribute any 
15 of the money when all the - when everything was -
16 everything spoke to an all-or-nothing arrangement, 
17 and then when they were both deposed and neither one 
18 of them felt that, you know, they had any obligation 
19 to tell me or to contact the California lawyer to see i 
20 if maybe they should have gotten other advice 
21 concerned me greatly, because I wasn't - obviously I 
22 wasn't protected, and I was sued, and so the one 
23 thing I asked of them didn't turn out the way that I 
1 24 was led to believe it was going to turn out. 
25 And they could have easily said, 'You cant 
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1 distribute any money to anybody until everybody 
2 signs," and that would have been the end of the 
3 story. I'd have been a million dollars richer, we 
4 wouldn't all be sitting here, and thaf s not what 
5 happened. 
6 Q Okay. So one piece of advice that they 
7 didn't give you that you think they should have is 
i 8 that they should have told you not to make any 
9 distributions unless everybody signed? 
10 A Absolutely. 
I l l Q Any other advice you think they failed to 
12 give you? 
113 A Well, that was a pretty critical piece of 
14 advice I could have used, because, without 
J 1 5 everybody's signature, I guess there would have been 
16 no basis for a lawsuit, so I think that - that might 
17 be the most critical component There may be - you 
18 know, I had a relationship with Hal. I didn't really 
19 have much of a relationship with Matt I just met 
20 him during the - you know, when this turned over -
21 was turned over to him, and came later to find out, 
22 you know, that neither one of them had a lot o f 
23 experience in litigation law, which it would have 
24 been helpful If they'd have consulted with somebody 
25 that actually did have experience in that area. 
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1 Maybe even your firm. So yeah, I was - 1 was - b 
2 (2 Well, you previously testified that you and | 
3 Willie made a decision to distribute the money, not | 
4 the lawyers, but your complaint is they didn't tell j 
5 you not to do it; is that right? | 
6 A My complaint is they never said that, "By | 
7 doing anything other than the all or nothing, you | 
8 leave yourself exposed to potentially a very" - I 
9 well, they didn't know how large the lawsuit would 1 
10 be. Neither did I. But you left yourself exposed, | 
11 and that was - again, this was - I had no reason to | 
12 do any of this consent, release, distribute money, | 
13 any of that There was no time frame that - no gun | 
14 to my head. There was 12 more years ahead of me, and 1 
15 so yeah, I'm a little upset J 
16 Q Well, let me ask you this: At the time you 1 
17 and Willie decided to distribute money to the signing J 
18 grandchildren, you knew, did you not, that the I 
19 Slaters had not signed releases? | 
20 A At that time, I knew they had not signed | 
21 the releases. | 
22 Q And you knew that, without them signing | 
23 those releases, that they were free to sue you? | 
24 A I didnt focus on that at the time, but - I 
25 yes, apparently they would be free to sue me, as they J 
b 
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1 1 did. I 
2 Q Well, common sense tells you that if they I 
3 haven't signed a release, there's nothing to stop i 
4 them from suing you, correct? i 
5 A If that's their intention, yes. | 
6 Q And so at the time you made the | 
7 distribution, you had to know, from your experience, | 
8 that you still had exposure from the Slaters? [| 
9 A There's a couple of attorney-client things | 
10 that I'd l i ke - i 
11 MR. ORITT: Which you're not going to speak | 
12 to. 1 
13 THE WITNESS: Which I'm not going to speak 1 
14 to about that, so - 1 
15 Q (BY MR. WHEELER) Well, common sense tells 1 
16 you that if you don't have a release — and with your j 
17 business background, you knew that without a release, j 
18 you were not protected from suit from the Slaters, ] 
19 correct? | 
20 A Not entirely. I think there was a couple 1 
21 other provisions in the will that prevented them from |j 
22 suing me, but that didnt come up in litigation at 1 
23 the time. t 
24 Q But you did know there were no releases 1 
25 signed by the Slaters, and you knew, at the time you [ 
"-*
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July 27,2011 
Honorable Anthony Quinn 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1860 
Re: Breton v, Clyde, Snow & Sessions 
Case No. 090919546 
Dear Judge Quinn: 
I just received an e-mail copy of the letter Defendants' counsel in the above-referenced 
case sent you along with the three cases they promised you at the hearing this afternoon, the 
transcript from my client's deposition for the cited pages and their letter, and three additional 
exhibits. It seems to me this is far more than Mr. Wheeler suggested he would be sending you. 
Indeed, other than the citations from my client's deposition, which I believe exceed what Mr. 
Wheeler promised you at the hearing this afternoon, the additional exhibits that counsel attached 
should either have been included as part of their initial memorandum or reply memorandum. In 
effect, I believe this is supplemental briefing. 
Unfortunately, because of a hearing I have in Summit County on July 28,2011 and a 
lengthy meeting Friday, July 29,201131 will not be able to check the citations until mid-day 
Friday, July 29. At that time I will send another e-mail if I believe the citations do not represent 
what they are cited for. 
Very truly yours, 
QSENBERQ & QLCHRIST ... 
JRO/cm 
cc: Keith Call 
Marianad@,email,utcourts. gov 
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RECEIPT AND RELEASE, AND CONSENT 
TO TERMINATION OF TRUST BY SWORN STATEMENT 
The undersigned, NICHOLAS QUINN BRETON, as a beneficiary of the 
testamentary trust for Sau! Breton's grandchildren created under paragraph 8 of the 
Last WiB of Saul Breton, signed in May, 1981 (hereafter the "Grandchildren's Trust*), 
hereby: 
1. Acknowledges receipt of a letter dated December 10, 2004 from Neil 
Breton and Wiffam Breton. 
2. Acknowledges reading the letter referred to in the above paragraph 1 and 
understanding the* contents thereof. 
3. Acknowledges that the current trust assets of the Grandchildren's Trust 
are of little or no value. 
4. Acknowledges that the proposed payment of $24,000 from Neil Breton will 
be in be in full payment and satisfaction of the undersigned's interest in the 
Grandchildren's Trust. 
5. Acknowledges that in disbursing payment referred to in the above 
paragraph 4, Neil Breton is acting individually and not in his capacity as a Trustee of the 
Grandchildren's Trust 
6. Acknowledges that the payment referred to in the above paragraph 4 is 
from an individual account owned by Neil Breton and that such amount is being paid as 
an alternative means to honor the intent of the Grandchildren's Trust, which otherwise 
would be frustrated. 
7. Releases Neil Breton, Jana Breton, and William Breton, as Trustees of 
the Grandchildren's Trust, from any and all liability in ponnecBon with the undersigned's 
interest in the Grandchildren's Trust 
8. Releases Rhonda Slater, as a former Trustee of the Grandchildren's 
Trust from*any and all liability in connection with the undersigned's interest in the 
Grandchildren's Trust 
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9. Consents to the termination of the Grandchildren's Trust. 
DATED: December / 0 . 2 0 0 4 
NEIL BRETON, as guardian for 
NICHOLAS QUINN BRETON 
STATE OF / > 4 ^ 
COUNTY OFjurmf/fe" > 
) )ss. 
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me by Neil Breton, as guardian 
for Nicholas Quinn Breton, this l&&-ten of December, 2D04. 
Ndtary Public 
taimaA»faM«M«aw»i.«»riii.» >•.« in in. n-i i-M.^ 
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